Sun Tzu - The Art of War -- War College

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RaventheOnly
Every so often i'll place a quote in here and someone explain to me why thats a good idea or what depth does it have to the battle field or everyday life battles.


First big grin one of my favorites:

"Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
your compactness that of the forest."

HockeyHorror
i havne't read the ARt of War by SUn Tzu

but i like the works of Lao Tzu.

HockeyHorror
and in my opinion that quote is saying (during battles) be one with the elements surrounding the field.

RaventheOnly
thats close Tzo makes a lot of observations to nature but there is more practical means to the quote. big grin

HockeyHorror
big grin i tried lol

RaventheOnly
Ok move like the wind: manuever quickly and be out of nowhere

Be compact as the forest: mask your numbers and move as one body

RaventheOnly
"Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him."

HockeyHorror
basically this has to do (in my opinion) with tricking the enemy...trick strategies to confuse the enemy....lure ur enemy in with bait to get a perfect chance to kill...

RaventheOnly
yes

Easier:

"If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
If his forces are united, separate them."

HockeyHorror
i would answer, but ill let others join in. yes big grin

RaventheOnly
if your interested :

http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html

Dexx
well..what's to answer. it is clear what it means, when you read it. and everyone applies it in practical daily things.
i have read the art of war. and you can learn something from it.

RaventheOnly
Then a more difficult one big grin

"Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays."

Dexx
as i said...smile

it's not good to be neither hasty nor lingering. you have to set your strategy speed to a best optimum between the two

RaventheOnly
That is correct but its more along the lines of Speed is not always the greatest strategy...nor is idleness... the longer you take to think up a strategy doesn't make that idea more well thought out then the quickest decision at the proper moment.

RaventheOnly
"To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our
own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy
is provided by the enemy himself."

HockeyHorror
in my opinion its basically the principle of the offensive strategys.

RaventheOnly
All defeat lies in the decisions we make .... as do your enemies

RaventheOnly
"Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength."

Dexx
this one actually isn't all that correct

The Omega
http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/gthursby/taoism/suntext.htm

For anyone interested smile

RaventheOnly
its directly from the book confused big grin

thanks Omega big grin contributions are welcome big grin

RaventheOnly
thats a way nicer version big grin

Dexx
i cannot agree with the man on everything. be him even a military genius.
attacking might not be only a superabundance of strenth. it might be a desperate attack. or a strategic attack meant only to divert attention..etc.

as for defensive. don't agree with that either. you could just be waiting for things to unfold

Ushgarak
I do not like Sun-Tzu. Sorry, but the man is staggeringly overrated. Just because the US military have a love affair with the Art of War and Western culture in general finds a mystique in ancient Asian culture, he gets a write-up way beyond the actual quality of his work.

Basically nearly all his statements boil down to the equivalent of obvious statements like "The guy who runs fastest wins the race".

Or the others, like "Know yourself, know your enemy, and you will never be defeated in a thousand battles" are simply a. trite and b. wrong.

Fire
ush is right

shaber
I am inclined to agree with Ushgarak on this one embarrasment

RaventheOnly
laughing out loud well the reason why he is famous because he was the first to write these ideals down on paper big grin and the simplicity masks the complex ideas that may seem simple here but are very hard to consider in grand total on the battlefield.

by all means if you have a better tactician in mind please do not hesitate

Dexx
i do like a lot of his ideas, simple and direct as they are....but...as i said...some are wrong, or too particular in a certain area to generally apply

Ushgarak
No, that's the reason he is known at all. The reason he is SO famous is because people have blown him out of all proportion. If you were doing a list of historical strategists, put him down as a notable early one. But he has been made into this quasi-God, which is just wrong.

"and the simplicity masks the complex ideas that may seem simple here but are very hard to consider in grand total on the battlefield."

No it doesn't; you're just saying that to make it sound better, The simplicity merely shows how frighteningly unimpressive the whole lot is.

You want me to name better tacticians? Or even strategists, seeing as Sun-Tzu talks almost nothing about tactics (certainly not what we call tactics throughout history and the modern day, anyway). What, throughout the whole of history? You'd lose count...

RaventheOnly
Its written like a Chinese Proverb. Proverbs are simple ideas that make a person think and consider many things.





Quote better tacticians here and we will consider thier quotes big grin feel free this is a War College big grin i just liked Sun Tzu's because it is easy to post a simple idea and allow others to elaborate on it but if you have others go ahead. we are talking about an advisor who just summed up the ideals of war in a simple book in like Chinese middle ages of course there are far more demensions to the battlefield now....firearms.... tanks air power ... nuclear... water assets... but one thing Tzu emphasizes that isn't noramlly is the use of spies big grin The beuaty of his work is that it applies to something beyond himself and his generation, beyond the ideals of his age.

Ushgarak
It doesn't matter how they are put; they have been given an importance they don't have.

I will repeat, btw, as you seemed to ignore me- Sun-Tzu was mainly a strategist, not a tactician.

"The beuaty of his work is that it applies to something beyond himself and his generation, beyond the ideals of his age."

Only because it is so uselessly basic. Like I say, 'the fastest guy wins the race' applies as much today as in, say, Greek times- that doesn't make it clever or profound.

RaventheOnly
He was a unconventional tactician, the use of spies and deception is profound throughout his work. His feild army tactics are very basic yet lasting, one must never overlook the basic becasue simple ideas overlooked have doomed armies. if you want to talk brilliant original strategies then Erwin Rommel can be an example or Dolittle with the airpower doctrine.... yet the truth is that they all learned from the same manual big grin the Art of War. They sight quotes from this work.

A strategist is someone actually on the kings side issueing orders directly as an advisor while a tactician is a philosopher who developes ideals on subjects. Sun Tzu was both... he was an advisor to his king and a think tank.

Mr Zero
This is about maintaining healthy bowel movements -right?

RaventheOnly
eek! laughing out loud laughing laughing out loud it actually could be applied to that laughing out loud laughing laughing out loud

RaventheOnly
Thats why there are more then just one line and one ideal at play... all aspects must be acounted for.

Ushgarak
Err, you clearly know little of military thinking...

Strategy is the skill of fighting wars and Campaigns- it is about supply, logistics, troop movements, and objectives.

Tactics is the skill of winning battles- formations, fighting drill, field communications, manoeuvres.

Napoleon was a great strategist. Wellington was a great tactician. They were only average in the other field. Very few have ever been both.

What Sun-Tzu has to say on the second is very little indeed.

He was also not in the least unconventional- on the contrary, he was repeating conventional ideas.

But as you clearly know nothing of the basics of military thinking, it is rather difficult to take anything you say here seriously.

How many battles did Sun-Tzu win? Or Wars?

RaventheOnly
laughing out loud i know everything from alexander the Great to Zukov laughing out loud of course there are far more ideals involved. Why are you so hostile erm trying to insult me? no expression



Tactics are advanced strategy erm thinking outside of the box and advancing the envelope of present ideals to create a more efficient fighting force.

Sun Tzu fought no battles he was not a general, he was a thinker observing. some of the greatest military thinkers never commanded troops or fought battles, only the famous generals are remembered ... except Sun Tzu.

Ushgarak
Tactics are advanced strategy?

Sorry, that is simply incorrect. The definition I have given is the correct one. I am not being deliberately hostile, but if you do not even known the difference between tactics and strategy- page one of military thinking- then my regard for your knowledge of things military is zero.

And that, I believe, has a lot to say about why you should be wary of liking Sun-Tzu... he talked a lot, but he never DID anything.

I am not saying he was useless or should be ingored. I am saying he is vastly overrated.

RaventheOnly
Tactics:
art of handling troops or ships in battle; science of strategy.
srry but you are wrong erm that is the definition of tactics

RaventheOnly
tactics are to strategey
as
technology is to science

Ushgarak
Nope, I am not, and what you just printed does not even support what you daid.

I repeat once more- tactics is what you use to win battles, strategy to win wars. This is an absolutely basic piece of knowledge as discussed and assumed by all military historians and analysts- my comparison above of Wellington and Napoleon is the most famous; the tactician versus the strategist, demonstrated more clearly there than in any other period of history.

This is such basic stuff I am amazed you do not know it.

RaventheOnly
because this is on the bottom of the page

RaventheOnly
strategy:
art of handling troops, ships, etc.

i don't like proving people wrong but you have proved rather hostile.

Ushgarak

Ushgarak
Even chess players!

http://www.markalowery.net/Chess/Tactics_Strategy/Menu/tactics_strategy_index.html

Ushgarak
And from the Oxford English Dictionary:

Strategy- Generalship, the art of war, management of an army or armies in a campaign, art of so moving or disposing troops or ships as to impose upon the enemy the place and time and conditions for fighting preferred by oneself

Tactics- art of deploying military forces in actual contact with the enemy

And from Captain Cyril Falls- one time Chichele Professor of the History of War, Oxford University, in his essay "The evolution of Tactics", 1964:

"The means by which soliders seek to achieve their aims in battle are called tactics... the tactician attempts to crown the efforts of the strategist, whose task it is to conduct the Campaign as a whole."

How much more do you need?

RaventheOnly
Worldbook Encyclopedia:

tactics, noun.1. the art or science of directing military or naval forces in battle; science of disposition and maneuver. 2. a method or process of doing this. 3. the operations themselves. Ex. The tactics of pretending to cross the river and of making a retreat fooled the enemy. Tactics are used to win an engagement, strategy to win a campaign or a war (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists). 4. (Figurative.) procedures to gain advantages or success; methods. Ex. When coaxing failed, she changed her tactics and began to cry. To some the obvious answer was to fight fire with fire, to reply in kind if resorted to bully-boy tactics (Newsweek).


strategy, noun, pl. -gies.1. the planning and directing of military movements and operations; science or art of war. Ex. Tactics are used to win an engagement, strategy to win a campaign or a war (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists). (SYN) strategics. 2. the skillful planning and management of anything. Ex. ... the faulty strategy of idealists who have too many illusions when they face realists who have too little conscience (Reinhold Niebuhr). 3. a plan based on or involving strategy. Ex. Strategy is needed to keep the boys at work. (SYN) maneuver.

RaventheOnly
Neither of us is going to convince the other at all. You are here only to argue petely... your opinion on the subject was not asked... i asked you simply to give examples that we can talk about here so lets get back on subject. My knowledge of these subjects is sound, i do not claim to be all knowing i merely want to have people come and talk about ideals similar to the subject.

Ushgarak
Excellent, Raven... you posted something that actually COMPLIMENTS what I said! Congrats!

(claps)

Your quote even directly says:

"Tactics are used to win an engagement, strategy to win a campaign or a war"

Exactly, what I have been saying, and in opposition as to what you have been pointing out! So thanks very much for further proving my point, as if it NEEDED any further proof after everything I just said. Tactics is NOT advanced strategy. It is not to strategy what technology is to science. It is simply about battles; strategy about wars. Every single posted source says that. You can keep denying it if you want, but anyone with an ounce of sense reading this will know how horrendously out-of-step with everything that you look.

I don't care in the slightest if my opinion was asked or not- it is VERY relevant; if you want a 'war college' then you must be able to recognise these basic terms, and if you want to talk Sun-Tzu it must be bourne in mind that he taked 90% strategy, talking little of tactics.

And for you to do all that above and then try and claim that your knowledge is 'sound' is just insultungly ridiculous. You don't know what you have been talking about, have tried to call me wrong with no evidence, and when you DID try and produce evidence it supported me and not you. Now, I am sorry if this failure irritates you, or that you do not like me pointing it out but there you go- that is a mistake you have made, and one that is very pertinent to the subject.

So I will repeat- Sun-Tzu, who wrote about strategy and not much tactics, never actually won or even fought a battle in his life and is highly overrated. His historical position as the person who wrote the earliest surviving text on strategy is appreciated; his god-like nature that he has been given by some people is not- by me, anyway.

Neo_Version 7
How about Alexander the Great?

Didn't he have cool strategies?

RaventheOnly
You are trying to provoke me big grin shows how low you are trying to go. What standing do you have at all? your interpretation of the definitions are completely wrong. Strategy is at hold on every point of a battle war and nation in a total tactics are ideals used to enhance strategy. your petty attacks will bring you nowhere here. you want me to outlash at you in attack so you can report me and try and get me banned, id not know what grievence you have with me but stop now or you will find yourself in the position you wish me. All i want is a friendly conversation where no one is wrong or right.

Dexx
lol...no...actually he's a mod himself..he isn't trying to lure you into banning material.
but he's right. that IS the definiton

Strategy :
n 1: an elaborate and systematic plan of action
2: the branch of military science dealing with military command
and the planning and conduct of a war




From WordNet 2.0 :
Tactics :
n : the branch of military science dealing with detailed
maneuvers to achieve objectives set by strategy

RaventheOnly
even a mod can lure a person into those kinds of traps big grin

so by your definition those in government are strategists while the Generals are the tacticians. The first two definitions i had were from the websters dictionary so there is definetly conflict between english majors, therefore only proving that we would actually need to speak to a professor or general... or OMG an actual expert in the military field which OMG none of us are eek! maybe ..... we should get on subject... there isn't going to be a way to convince me otherwise and there isn't gonna be a way to convince you either so stop ruining this thread with gaggle erm and get on subject.

Throw some philosophy or quotes about military thinking!!! come on!!

RaventheOnly
If you think my knowledge of military ideals is wrong and im somehow inferior to your knowledge then throw something here and prove my ideas wrong with your extensive knowledge.

Dexx
Strategy : \Strat"e*gy\, n. gie. See
Stratagem.]
1. The science of military command, or the science of
projecting campaigns and directing great military
movements; generalship.

Tactics : \Tac"tics\, n.
1. The science and art of disposing military and naval forces
in order for battle, and performing military and naval
evolutions. It is divided into grand tactics, or the
tactics of battles, and elementary tactics, or the tactics
of instruction.



From Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary !!
don't be thickheaded.

it's not MY definition...it's EVERY definition

Dexx
if we can't get past a mere definiton that what do you want to discuss?...
it has nothing to do with knowledge..it's a definition

RaventheOnly
In college ... they discuss beyond literal definition erm higher learning...Philosophy or greater techniques on how to do things.... all you are here for is trying to give me a definition that can be interpreted like all other definitions different ways... Tactics and strategy go hand in hand one must decide thru strategy what sort of tactic one uses in dealing with the many problems of Stragem.

Dexx
laughing out loud
you were pretty happy to provide definitions on your own to make your stand in the argument...now you actually turn it around and highlight the relativity of a definition.
we were getting to that 'higher learning' as soon as the definition issue was over.

now submit already..

RaventheOnly
since you guys don't like Sun tzu big grin heres Erwin Rommel:



"THE ROUMANIAN CAMPAIGN"

SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1916
General Situation -- In 1916, as an inducement to Roumania to enter the World War against Germany, the Allied Powers offered her the territories of Bukovina (north of Moldavia) and the Transylvania-Banat region (eastern Austria-Hungary), all of which contained a large Roumanian population (Map 1). Motivated by this offer, by the favorable Allied situation, by public opinion, the sympathies of Queen Marie, and by various other contributing factors, Roumania declared war on Austria on 27 August, 1916. On the following day Germany declared war on Roumania. At this time the left of the Russian line was opposed to the Austrians and Germans in the Carpathians near the norther boundary of Roumania. The northwestern boundary of Roumania extended from the Carpathian Mountains southward and westward along the crest of the Transylvania Alps to Orsova on the Danube. From Orsova to the east the Danube River formed the southern boundary of Roumania to just west of Turtukai. From there the boundary ran southeast to the Bla ck Sea. The Central Powers had communications with Turkey through Serbia and Bulgaria. An Allied force under command of the French General Sarrail was at Salonika (northern Greece) with the mission of pushing north to cut the communications (including the Berlin-Belgrade-Constantinople-Bagdad railway) of the Central Powers with Turkey.
The Roumanian Military Situation -- The participation of Roumania in the war was necessarily bound up with the operations of the Allies, particularly as regarded Russia; in addition, Roumania was dependent on other than her own resources for a continuing supply of munitions of war. Political conditions and Allied pressure dictated the early launching of a large-scale offensive.

Since 1914, Roumania had greatly increased the size of her Army. Its combat efficiency was adversely affected by a lack of competent officers to organize and train the new units and by shortages in up- to-date equipment, which she had been unable to manufacture herself or secure from the nations at war.

Upon her entry into the war, Roumania had 20 infantry divisions (each 20,000 to 25,000 men) with 3 more forming; 2 cavalry divisions; and 5 home guard infantry brigades. The relative classification of the infantry divisions was as follows: divisions 1 to 10 (the old regular divisions), good; divisions 11 to 23, about equally divided between mediocre and poor.

The Roumanian Army had no automatic rifles, light machine guns or trench mortars; divisions 1 to 10 had 6 heavy machine guns per regiment, divisions 11 to 15, only 2 per regiment, and divisions 16 to 23, none at all. Thus although the numerical strength of the infantry battalion was 1000 to 1200 men, its fire power was actually inferior to the far smaller German battalion.

No gas equipment, offensive or defensive, was on hand. There were very few telephones, and other communication equipment was poor. Her air forces were negligible in size and she had no antiaircraft guns.

None of the units were equipped for or trained in mountain warfare.

Turtukai, Silistria, and Cernavoda, on the Danube in southwestern Dodrudja, were fortresses of considerable strength. Braila, Galatz and Bucharest were also fortified.

Terrain Features of the Theatre of Operations -- The fertile plains of Roumania (the "Plains of the Danube"wink lie nestled among the mountains which characterize the terrain of Bukovina, Transylvania, and, to a lesser extent, that of Dodrudja and Bulgaria. Among the crest of the Transylvanian Alps the frontier was in the shape of a great arc, with a length of about 400 miles. These mountains to between 8000 and 9000 feet, slope gradually toward the "Plains of the Danube", with long spurs extending into Roumania, while on the Transylvanian (Austro-Hungarian) side they break down very abruptly into the valleys of the Aluta (also called Olt) and Maros Rivers. This frontier mountain barrier is pierced by some fifteen passes (including that of the Iron Gate, through which flows the Danube). Through all these passes, except Vulcan Pass, ran good roads; the six passes of the center group (Predeal to Oituz) all converge on Kronstadt. Toward the north the most important pass is Ghimes Pass. In addition to the roads thr ough the passes there were a number of trails across the mountains over which troops could move, but only with considerable difficulty.

On the south, the Danube, navigable and with no permanent bridge except at Cernavoda, is a formidable obstacle, although the various islands afford facilities for assembling bridge material. The Bulgarian bank throughout commands the Roumanian bank. In Dobrudja the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania was about 90 miles long. The best defensive line against a force advancing from Bulgaria into Dobrudja was along high ground about 10 miles south of and covering the railroad between Cernavoda and Constanza, on the Black Sea. The fortress of Silistria was connected by a pontoon bridge with the north bank of the Danube.

Railroads -- The Roumania railway system left much to be desired for use in defensive operations along the Roumanian borders or for use in offensive operations into Transylvania or Bulgaria. Because of the long spurs of the mountains extending into the "Plains of the Danube" near the northwestern frontier, few lateral rail communications existed near that border. In western Wallachia (western Roumania), rail lines approaching the Transylvania Alps and the Danube not only were few and widely separated, but also all rail communication from Bucharest to the west of the north-south line Pitesti-Zimnicea had to pass through the railroad junction at Pitesti. Between Ploesti and Pitesti six lines ran toward the northwestern frontier; one of these ran through Predeal Pass to Kronstadt and western Transylvania. Through Moldavia (northeastern Roumania) were two lines parallel to the Transylvanian frontier, with but few lines feeding toward the border. In the Danube area east of Giurgevo was but one main lateral line, Bucharest-Cernavoda (a possible lateral line was Bucharest- Ploesti-Fetesti), the Dobrudja area being mainly dependent on this line for shipments from north of the Danube. After war was declared, shipments from outside sources had to originate or pass through Russia, so that Roumania was dependent for such shipments on the railroads running from Russia and on the railroad line leading from her Black Sea port of Constanza.

In contrast to the Roumanian railway system was the compact one in Transylvania, consisting of a lateral lined forming an interior circle to the Transylvanian Alps near the border and several lines running into the interior of this circle. On the other hand, the interruption of the railroad junctions north of Czik Szerada, at Kronstadt, and at Hermanstadt would cut the rail traffic facilities of the Central Powers close to the border.

To cite a concrete instance of the general effect of the railway systems on the concentration and movement of troops along the Transylvanian border, the distance from Predeal Pass to Red Tower Pass the Roumanian railways was 270 miles as compared to 80 miles by the Transylvanian system.

Situation of the Enemy -- The enemy situation as known to the Roumanian general staff at the outbreak of war was as stated below.

On the Transylvanian frontier there were not more than 100,000 enemy troops, composed largely of five tired Austrian divisions, in poor condition, that had been sent to this area to reform and recuperate. It was believed that ultimately Roumania would have to contend with a considerable number of German divisions on the northwestern front, although the Allies stated that they hoped to hod German divisions elsewhere by continuing their offensives in the other theatres.

Concerning the souther front, it was possible that Bulgaria would declare war on Roumania shortly after the latter's entry into the war. On this front were two or three good bulgarian divisions together with four cavalry brigades and a part of one German division, in all about 90,000 men. There was a possibility that this front might be reinforced by one or two divisions from the Salonica area or from Turkey.

Situation as to Allied Military Support -- As to military support, the Allies promised the following:

Energetic action on the part of the Russians; a Russian offensive in the Carpathians was to be started without delay. Two Russian infantry divisions and one Russian cavalry division were to be sent into Dobrudja at once and more troops were to follow later, if necessary. Cooperation of the Russian Black Sea fleet. A minimum of 300 tons of munitions was to reach Roumania daily from Russia. General Sarrail in Salonica was to begin his offensive immediately upon Roumania's entry into the war.

Dexx
well...the only reason i read that is ebcause i'm romanian. but...i don't really know where to begin a comment from

RaventheOnly
that was just to set out the situation big grin now is for what happened from each point of veiw in the battle.

RaventheOnly
PLANS OF CAMPAIGN CONSIDERED BY ROUMANIA
Two general offensive plans of campaign were considered by the Roumanian authorities:
To conduct a major offensive to the south into Bulgaria, holding defensively elsewhere, the objective being to overwhelm Bulgaria and to join with Sarrail at Salonica. To conduct a major offensive into Transylvania, holding defensively elsewhere. The advantages of a successful offensive to the south into Bulgaria, holding defensively elsewhere, would be very great for the Allies and, indirectly, for Roumania. If Bulgaria could be eliminated, Germany's communications with Turkey would be cut; the difficult problem of supply both to Russia and Roumania would be solved by joining up with General Sarrail and by the consequent opening of routes from the Mediterranean; and the Allies' heavy liabilities in eastern theaters, including Salonica, could soon be liquidated. A successful advance into Bulgaria might finish the war; it promised advantages which the British Gallipoli campaign had sought. The approaches into Bulgaria were not as difficult as those in Transylvania, and, conversely, the terrain in northern Roumania lent itself better to defensive operations than did that in the south.

The alternate plan, to conduct a major offensive into Transylvania while holding defensively elsewhere, was very attractive to Roumania. By advancing to the chord of the arc formed by the Roumanian frontier, the front would be shortened by over 100 miles. The important railroad system would come into Roumanian possession or be denied to the Central Powers. The barrier of the Carpathians would be turned and the Russian forces would be thereby assisted their forward movement. Politically, Roumania desired possession of Transylvania when the war ended. Psychologically, and advance into Transylvania would be popular with both the Army and the people, for Transylvania, from the Roumanian point of view, was a lost province -- another Alsace-Lorraine.

A very real disadvantage to this plan was the difficulty of staging a major offensive through the mountain barrier of the Transylvanian Alps and of maintaining the forces so employed, in view of the opposition to be expected from readily concentrated Austro- German forces.

The Roumanian decision was to conduct a major offensive with three armies into Transylvania, holding defensively elsewhere. Russia was to continue her offensive in the Carpathians upon the start of the Roumanian offensive, and was also to send two infantry divisions and one cavalry division to Dobrudja. General Sarrail was to start his offensive in the Salonica area.

The order of battle from north to south was:

Fourth Army (3 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division in front line, 1 infantry division in reserve; total strength, 107,000). Second Army (4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division in front line, 2 infantry divisions in reserve; total strength, 126,000). First Army (3 infantry divisions in the front line, 3 in reserve; total strength, 135,000). In the south, the third Army (142,000) had the mission of holding Dobrudja and covering the Danube. Three of its divisions were holding the line of the Danube and three were left to guard Dobrudja (one at Turtukai, one at Silistria, and one at Constanza). The promised Russian reinforcement of 2 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division was expected in the Dobrudja area.

A general reserve of 2 divisions and some heavy artillery (total strength, about 50,000) was located near Bucharest.

The Roumanians moved promptly to carry out their offensive. On the night of 27-28 August, they advanced three armies simultaneously into Transylvania on a broad front of some 300 miles, pivoting on the First Army (on the left).



PLAN AND OPENING MOVES, CENTRAL POWERS
Bulgaria declared war on Roumania on 1 September. General von Mackensen commanded the force in Bulgaria, which consisted of three Bulgarian divisions, four brigades of cavalry, and part of a German division. He moved at once against the Roumanian forces in Dobrudja in order to create a diversion away from the Transylvanian theater, where additional forces (5 German and 2 Austrian divisions) were meanwhile to be concentrated.
Mackensen's plan was to attack Turtukai with two divisions and to use the remainder of his forces to hold off the other troops in that area. As soon as he made his attack, Roumanian GHQ started moving reserves from near Bucharest and pushed a division across the Danube into Turtukai to reinforce its garrison of one division. Mackensen was well equipped with heavy artillery and had balloons and planes to assist in adjusting fire. On 6 September Turtukai surrendered its garrison of 25,000 men and 100 guns. Three days later Silistria was abandoned, and in a short time the Roumanian forces were driven back to the high ground just south of the Constanza-Cernavoda railroad.

By the end of September, von Mackensen's forces had been increased by two Turkish divisions and one division from the Salonican front, making a total of about six infantry divisions and four cavalry brigades.

General von Falkenhayn arrived in Transylvania on 18 September to take over command of the Ninth Army. His first move was to contain the advancing Roumanian forces in Transylvania with as few troops as possible, while he attacked their left (west) flank with all other available means. By late September the Roumanian First and Second Armies were maintaining a stout resistance to the von Falkenhayn attack. To the north the fourth Army had made some progress against the Austrians on Falkenhayn's left.

RaventheOnly
See this is what i mean. No one will sit here and read all of this, thats why i kept it simple and quick.

HockeyHorror
i've read it...but how do i comment on it? yea its interesting...but its hard to open up a debate on it. good post btw. yes

HockeyHorror
i made a Zend-Avesta thread and i barely got any posts...people just dont like long threads i guess sad

RaventheOnly
no they don't sad I started off fine but Dexx and Ush acted like it was childish philosophy so i pull out the big guns and they don't answer laughing out loud

RaventheOnly
OK this is what happened:

THE ROUMANIAN RAHOVO OFFENSIVE
The Roumanians held a council of war. General Averescu, new commander for the southern front, insisted that the proper plan was to cross over the Danube behind von Mackensen and destroy him. General Presan, commander of the norther group of armies moving into Transylvania, insisted on carrying out the original plan of operations. The final decision was an unhappy compromise -- to carry out both offensives. At this time the isolated Roumanian columns were moving into Transylvania. Now all of their reserves were to be taken away for use south of the Danube.
The plan was to cross a force to the south of the Danube on pontoon bridges at Rahovo (about 20 miles west of Turtukai) and operate against the rear and line of communications of von Mackensen; at the same time to start an advance south in Dobrudja to hold von Mackensen's forces on the front south of the Constanza-Cernavoda railroad. For this operation the crossing force, under Roumanian command (General Averescu), was to consist of five infantry and one cavalry divisions. The force in the Dobrudja was to consist of six Roumanian and two Russian (one actually consisted of Serbians) infantry divisions and one Russian cavalry division, all under Russian command (General Zaionchkovsky). The two forces were to operate independently, and the operation was to commence on 1 October. Some Austrian monitors (gunboats) were known to be in the Danube west of Orsova. Roumania had no boats which could effectively oppose them.

To furnish troops for the crossing at Rahovo all forces on the northwestern front were forced to take up the defensive in the face of Falkenhayn's attack. Nevertheless, the attack at Rahovo was a failure, due to hostile opposition, a sudden flood, and the necessity of withdrawing troops to the north because of reverses in Transylvania. By the third week in October von Mackensen had taken Constanza. Leaving half his army to defend the conquered territory by an entrenched line from the Danube to the sea, he brought the remaining force, strengthened by a Turkish division and an additional Bulgarian division, south of the Danube near Sistova.


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SITUATION 26 NOVEMBER
On 10 November, General von Falkenhayn, having received reinforcements of 5 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, launched an attack against the Roumanian First Army, with the decisive effort through Szurduk and Vulcan Passes. These passes were forced, and toward the end of November the right of the Ninth Army had advanced into western Wallachia, pushing the Roumanian forces on its front to the east of the Aluta River. All bridges across that river, except that at Stoenesti, were destroyed by the Roumanians. The German cavalry seized the bridge at Stoenesti and pushed on to the east.
Von Mackensen started crossing the Danube at Sistova on 23 November. In spite of reports of von Mackensen's concentration at Sistova, the Roumanians made only feeble efforts with second-rate troops to prevent the crossing; consequently the Roumanian defense is no criterion of the possibilities of the defense of a river line under modern conditions.

By 26 November von Falkenhayn's Ninth Army had reached a favorable position. At Bran Pass, Morgen's four divisions were making little progress, but their attack there had pinned the Roumanian Second Army in place.

Farther to the west, at Red Tower Pass, von Dellmensingen's three and a half divisions were making progress against resistance offered by the right of the Roumanian First Army, but had not yet cleared the mountains. As in the case of Morgen's action against the Second Army, Dellmensingen's forces had succeeded in holding the right wing of the Roumanian First Army well to the north while Falkenhayn's main attack moved to envelop its south flank.

Kuhne's five infantry divisions of the Ninth Army's main attack were disposed along the general line of the Aluta River. The 109th Division was well across the Aluta. The 11th Bavarian Division was following the 109th; the 301st and 41st Divisions were having considerable difficulty in crossing to the east of the Aluta River; the 115th Division was about one day's march to the west of the river, marching on Stoenesti. The group as a whole was in an excellent position to turn the left flank of the First Army.

The 6th Division of von Schmettow's cavalry corps had gained contact with the Roumanians at Rose de Vede. The 7th Division was covering the left flank of the 109th Division's advance against the left flank of the Roumanian First Army.

By this date Mackensen's forces (4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division) were north of the Danube, along a general line extending from Giurgevo about 30 miles westward. His cavalry division covered his left flank and had established contact with Falkenhayn's cavalry.

The total force of the Central Powers operating in and toward the Wallachian area was thus about 17 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. Practically all these were good, experienced divisions. Those in Kuhne's force were tired, due to their continued marching and fighting.

General Presan, former commander of the Fourth Army which had successfully held the passes in the north, arrived at GHQ and took command of all the Roumanian forces on 26 November. The situation of the Roumanian forces on the Wallachian front at that time was as follows:

The Second Army (four divisions) was successfully holding the southern exits of Predeal and Bran Passes.

The First Army was delaying, with three divisions (14th, 13th, and 8th), the hostile advance through the mountains northwest of Pitesti: and delaying with two combined divisions (the 2d/5th and 1st/17th -- a number of divisions, due to losses, having been so combined) the advance of the enemy east of the Aluta River. The 1st Cavalry Division was covering the left of the First Army.

In the south, Joncavescu's group, consisting of one division (18th) and some odd brigades of infantry, with some cavalry, was delaying the advance of von Mackensen's force toward Bucharest.

Reserves were located as follows:

11th, 23d, and 10th Divisions--reforming near Targoviste.

9th/19th Division--east of Titu.

21st Division--southwest of Bucharest.

2d Cavalry Division--southeast of Bucharest.

7th Division, from the northwest, would shortly become available.

The Russians promised to make available on this front their 30th and 40th Divisions and 8th Cavalry Division, which were along the Danube east of Turtukai.

Including the Russian troops promised, there were available, or would be available shortly, for operations on the Wallachian front about 16 or 17 infantry divisions (not including the 11th and 23d Divisions, which were not yet reformed) and 3 cavalry divisions. The 9th/19th and 21st Divisions and 2d Cavalry Division were in good condition: the divisions on the front were tired and considerably depleted in strength; the remaining divisions were reforming and were in fair condition.


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GENERAL PRESAN'S PLAN
Based on the situation on 26 November, General Presan decided to hold defensively against von Falkenhayn and turn at once to attack von Mackensen while Falkenhayn was still beyond supporting distance. To that end, General Presan drew up the following plan of operations for an attack 1 December:
The Second Army (16th, 4th, 22d and 12th Divisions) to cover the Buzau (east of Ploesti) -Ploesti-Targoviste oil region. The First Army (14th, 13th, 8th and 1st/17th Divisions and 1st Cavalry Division) to delay von Dellmensingen and the 301st Division, gradually falling back to the line Costesti-Pitesti. In the south, Joncavescu's group to act frontally against von Mackensen's Danube Army, as a holding and delaying force. The 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions to cover the gap (initially about 30 miles wide, but which would tend to decrease as the First and Second Armies fell back) between the First Army and Joncavescu's group. A "mass of maneuver" consisting of the 2d/5th (then on the First Army front), 9th/19th, and 21st Divisions to attack von Mackensen's left flank from the north; at the same time the Russians (the 30th and 40th Divisions and 8th Cavalry Division) to attack von Mackensen's right. The 7th and 10th Divisions (not immediately available) to be in general reserve.


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ROUMANIANS DEFEATED
General Presan was unsuccessful in his efforts to strike an effective blow against Mackensen. His attack drove back and cut off part of Mackensen's force, but before the attack could be pushed home, Falkenhayn's Ninth Army advanced, quickly closed the weakly held gap between him and Mackensen, and then struck the Roumanian "mass of maneuver" in flank and rear. Outflanked on both northern and southern fronts, and their communications to Bucharest threatened, all the Roumanian armies were force back. They made a stand in front of Bucharest, but after a brief and hopeless struggle in the face of the superior German power, the Roumanians gave up their capital on 3 December. Badly demoralized, the remnants of the Roumanian Army retreated toward the Russian frontier, while newly arrived Russians took over the front. The Germans forced the line back to the Sereth River (Map 1) in early January. Further attacks ceased and the front stabilized along the river line.

RaventheOnly
These are the final thoughts by Rommel on the events that occured:

COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION
The principal criticism of the Roumanian conduct of the campaign applies to its initial conception. In the first place, in the words of Winston Churchill, "The golden opportunity for which Roumania had long watched for had not only come, it had gone." Her prospects for success would have been much brighter had she entered the fight in June or July, 1916, so that her attacks could have been coordinated with the Brusilov offensives. At that time most of the Austrian reserves were on the Italian front. An attack then, coordinated with the Somme attack, while the main German effort was concentrated on Verdun, might have made the situation of the Central Powers critical. But by September Brusilov's offensive was spent, and the pressure had likewise been relieved on the other fronts, so that the Germans were able to throw a strong force against Roumania.
In the second place, the Roumanian High Command permitted itself to give in to popular demand and made its primary objective the territorial and political one of advancing into Transylvania, instead of basing the campaign upon military considerations and selecting a plan which would best insure the defeat of the hostile armies. The successful seizure of Transylvania could have had an offensive from Dobrudja, threatening the Orient Railway and timed with a similar offensive from Salonika, could have had far-reaching strategic consequences.

Moreover, the terrain favored such a plan. The Transylvanian Alps offered defensive advantages which would have permitted great economy of force there, releasing troops for an offensive to the south. By the same token, the selection of mountainous country for an offensive was faulty. The Roumanian army was not trained in mountain warfare, and their numerical superiority could not be used to the best advantage in narrow defiles, with lines of supply drawn out through narrow passes and into difficult country. On the other hand, the open country south of the Danube was better suited to offensive operations tactically, as well as fitting more soundly into the strategic picture.

Even accepting the Roumanian decision for an offensive into Transylvania, numerous faults were committed both in planning and execution. The First, Second, and Fourth Armies, from left to right, were all to advance simultaneously on fronts proportionate to their strengths. This approximately even distribution of troops along the entire front of some 300 miles provided for no decisive effort. In view of the breadth of front involved, the armies were in danger of defeat in detail, which is what actually happened. In effect, the initial operation was more in the nature of a forward concentration of the Roumanian armies on the far side of a difficult mountain range than an offensive. Such a concentration requires highly trained subordinate commanders and is always dangerous, especially if, as in this case, the columns are widely separated, are advancing where serious opposition may be encountered before concentration is complete, and are not backed up by reserves sufficient to prevent defeat in detail. Furthermo re, the Roumanian movements were not vigorous enough after the passes had been cleared -- partially a result of the withdrawing of forces for the faulty division of effort in the diversion across the Danube on 1 October.

The offensive along the 400-mile northwestern frontier (Orsova to Tolgyes Pass) should have been made with a decisive effort against one part of the front, secondary or defensive missions being assigned to the remainder.

RaventheOnly
From the standpoint of railroad transportation, a decisive effort in the west (Orsova to Szurduk Pass) would have been very unsatisfactory, since but one lateral line led to this area from the interior, via Pitesti and Craiova; this line also had to supply troops in the west along the Danube. Near the center of the northwestern frontier two lines ran into Transylvania, through Predeal and Red Tower Passes; also in this area several other lines ran northward toward the frontier. Thus the front Predeal Pass-Red Tower pass would have been very satisfactory from a railroad viewpoint. To serve the northern part of the Transylvania front, two lateral lines were available; however, there was but one line running into Transylvania and no other lines, except that from Buzau, leading toward the border. In view of the above, a decisive effort along the Predeal Pass-Red Tower Pass front would have been the most satisfactory in so far as concerned railroad transportation.

A decisive effort in the north would not have been without merit; however, should the Russian offensive in the Carpathians have failed, an advance into Transylvania would have been liable to expose the right flank of the Roumanian force. Due to a lack of passes, a decisive effort in the west (Orsova to Szurduk Pass) would have been very undesirable; also, the western flank of a force moving north from this area would have been difficult to protect. For the above reasons, the Orsova-Szurduk Pass part of the front should have been held defensively. In order to conform to the proposed Russian advance in the Carpathians, effect surprise, and cover the right flank of the decisive effort in the center, particularly if the Russian offensive should fail, a secondary effort should have been made in the north.

If, then, the decision had been to conduct a major offensive into Transylvania, making the decisive effort on the Kronstadt-Hermanstadt front, with a secondary effort on the right of the decisive effort in the vicinity of Ghimes Pass and with a defensive sector from the left of the decisive effort to the Danube, what should have been done on the Roumanian souther frontier?

In the Roumanian plan, the Third Army had the mission of holding Dobrudja and covering the Danube. Three divisions were placed along the Danube and three in Dobrudja -- one holding Turtukai, one silistria, and one Constanza. As it turned out, the division holding Turtukai, and one division sent there from general reserve, surrendered to von Mackensen. Silistria was then abandoned. The wide spreading out of the forces in Dobrudja indicated an attempt to hold everything. Roumanian forces were inadequate for such a purpose. In war an effort to be safe everywhere is liable to result in being safe nowhere. Here the important consideration was to keep open the railroad to Constanza on the Black Sea, a vital supply line for munitions. The broad Danube River provided a substantial protective obstacle for the rest of the southern frontier.

For political purposes, and to gain time, it would have been desirable to fight an initial delaying action along the souther border of Dobrudja, falling back from the frontier northward to the high ground just south of and covering the Constanza-Cernavoda railroad. This line should have been prepared as a final defensive position for prolonged and determined defense of the railroad. Meanwhile, the north bank of the Danube, from Dobrudja to Orsova, should have been held lightly, with particular attention to the most favorable points for crossing, and local reserves located at various points back of the river to support the troops observing the river line, to move to threatened points, and to develop any enemy attempts to cross. No attempt should have been made to hold the long line of the Danube in force.

The Roumanians should not have tried to hold the forts at Turtukai and Silistria. Each lacked an effective and sure line of communication with the north bank of the Danube. They ran the almost certain danger of being invested and their garrison immobilized or captured. Nothing was to be gained by attempting to hold these isolated forts, and the futility of such action has been demonstrated time and again.

The Roumanians made an excellent and obvious choice in placing a general reserve of 5 divisions and heavy artillery near Bucharest. An effort was being made to cover two fronts of great extent. The widely separated northern and southern forces were not readily capable of mutual support. It was therefore necessary to have available a general reserve which could be used to reinforce the decisive effort or critical points on the defensive fronts as the situation developed. Bucharest was centrally located and had rail lines leading in several directions.

The strategic plans of the Central Powers for the operations against Roumania were sound. By letting Roumania become committed and involved in Transylvania before launching their attacks, they furthered the chances of success of the Mackensen attack on vital strategic areas and the Roumanian rear, as well as paving the way for Falkenhayn's proposed envelopment, by drawing forward the main enemy armies toward the northwest. The advantages of unified command, coordinated operations, and selection of sound objectives, the attainment of which would result in knockout blows to the enemy, were evident on the German side throughout the campaign.

RaventheOnly
The Roumanian plan for the crossing south of the Danube at Rahovo on 1 October is considered unsound for the following reasons:

The two forces taking part in the operation (the force making the crossing and that on the Dobrudja front) were separated by some 70 miles, and initially by the obstacle of the Danube, thus making cooperation and coordination between the two forces a task of great difficulty. Efforts at cooperation were negatived by poor communications and by not having the two forces under one commander. Troops were drawn away from the northwestern front at a time when it was important to build up that front. The offensive in the north was thereby stopped. Pontoon bridges were relied upon for the crossing, but in view of the air supremacy of the Central Powers and the gunboats of the Austrians there was considerable danger that the bridges would be destroyed before the entire force had crossed or that, once across, the line of communications of the force would be cut. When the Roumanian forces found that they were unable to hold Transylvania and were being driven back to the mountains, sound action on their part would have been to concentrate a large central reserve east of the mountains, hold the mountain passes lightly, with sufficient local reserves to develop the German attack, and then strike a counter blow when the German main force was still only partially across the mountains.

Considering the situation on 26 November, the basic decision of General Presan is believed to have been generally sound. The Roumanian forces were in close contact with the enemy and the situation was not conducive to the organization of a defensive position all along the front. Von Mackensen's force, now across the Danube, was drawing close to the important city of Bucharest; however, he was isolated and too far advanced for support from the Ninth Army. The Roumanians could not possibly win, or save the situation, by remaining passively on the defense everywhere. Defeat could be prevented only by prompt and vigorous action, if at all. There was no chance of success against the Ninth Army at this time, especially with von Mackensen on the Roumanian rear, so close to the vital centers of the country. But an opportunity did exist to strike von Mackensen while he was exposed and unsupported. A successful maneuver might have driven him back against the Danube. Therefore, General Presan's plan of holding the Nint h Army (von Falkenhayn), while attacking and defeating von Mackensen's Army, was the only sound choice available, and afforded an opportunity for a decisive victory provided the execution of the plan could be assured.

The forces allotted to the First and Second Armies and to Joncavescu's group were probably adequate to provide a reasonable chance of successful accomplishment of their holding and delaying missions. However, the force allotted to cover the gap between the First Army and Joncavescu's group was not adequate for such a mission. The Roumanian holding force of two cavalry divisions was so inferior in combat strength and efficiency to the German force which could be moved to oppose it that the defenders could have little hope of giving proper protection to the right flank of the "mass of maneuver". Within a few days von Falkenhayn could move two cavalry divisions (6th and 7th) and two to four infantry divisions (109th, 11th, 41st and 115th) into this gap; such a threat against only two cavalry divisions spread over a front 20 to 30 miles wide constituted a weakness in General Presan's plan. Although the composition of the "mass of maneuver" was probably only barely adequate for the accomplishment of its mission, it was the best obtainable from Roumanian sources. The fact that one of its units, the 2d/5th Division, had to march from the First Army, a distance of between 40 and 50 miles, was a handicap.

In view of the available Roumanian forces and the superior combat qualities of the German forces, it is difficult to suggest much improvement in General Presan's plan, other than to correct the deficiency noted above. One solution would have been to increase the forces holding the gap and strengthen the "mass of maneuver" by the employment of the two Russian infantry divisions and the one cavalry division on the right, instead of on the left, of Joncavescu's force, especially since they could have done little against Mackensen's right, which was well protected by the Danube. However, Russian and Roumanian coordination and collaboration were not of the best. An alternate plan, favored by the Russians, was to remain on the defensive, utilizing the river lines, while awaiting the German attack or the Russian counteroffensive in Transylvania, whichever came first. This plan did not appeal to the Roumanians because it gave up Roumanian territory and would permit the enemy to concentrate his forces against them. T heir previous experiences on the defensive against massed attacks by the enemy with his superior artillery and more efficient divisions were not encouraging. On the other hand, the Roumanians believed that an attack on von Mackensen provided an opportunity to defeat the enemy in detail before he could concentrate his entire strength. In general, the plan adopted was strategically the best afforded by the existing situation, the strengthening of the forces allotted to the gap on Joncavescu's right being about the only important and desirable change it would have been practical to make.

General Presan's attack of 1 December, though sound under the existing conditions and probably the only possible chance for success at that late hour, was doomed to failure by the tremendous advantages the German commanders then possessed, both in strategic position and quality of arms. The Roumanians had lost their original advantages of terrain and initiative; freedom of action no longer existed for them. The enemy forces were both across the Danube and inside the Transylvanian Alps, threatening a complete envelopment of the Roumanian forces.

RaventheOnly
If anyone would like to see where i got this stuff:
here is the address big grin a lot of extrodinary military minds big grin

http://www.bellum.nu/wp/warphi.html

RaventheOnly

Ushgarak
DEEPLY feeble. You cannot even get a basic grasp of the basic definitions of the basics of military thinking., and because that is pointed out to you you call that childish. I'm sorry, but everyone reading the start of this thread has been what a fool you have made of yourself. LEarn what those words mean, stop trying to worm your way out of it with feeble comments about 'higher meaning' (because militaryt experts sure as hell use the definitions I provided- I gave you a direct quote from one) and maybe you won;t look that silly any more.

You then copy and paste huge amounts of dry wordage and expect that to a. demonstrate any knowledge on your behalf and b. really be that interesting for anyone.

What are you trying to DO here? If I want to spend half an hour reading Rommel's notes I'll do it on my own initative. As HH says- what's to talk about here?

In this case, not only is the problem that the thread is long-winded and dry... it also doesn't really have anything for anyone to talk about.

Ushgarak
No! No-one's definition said that! Very rarely does Government engage in strategy except at the most broad of levels. Generals do both, though as time goes by they become less tactically involved.

Ushgarak
Alexander was relatively basic. His strategy was to go from A to B and win; his tactics were simple and highly effective- he understood what it took to win battles against an enemy of any nature, even a vastly numerically superior one. He kept to the basic ideals of what brought victory (on the whole, to make your opponent break, which is more important than trying to simply kill all of them in a melee) and concentrated on that in every battle, and so he won.

Ushgarak
I don't need to- your inability to recongise those basics condemns yourself.

Tptmanno1
Am I correct in saying that Tactics Compliments Strategy.

I think the two are tied closely together. You can have a killer strategy, but if you don't have your tactics figured your Strategy goes down in flames.

RaventheOnly
Alexander spearheaded the notion of cavalry in a time where it was not used for his time he was the great and for his time they were not basic strategy. You must realive that all generals after him learned from him and i do not see why you call things basic when in thier time they were cutting edge thinking. One must put themselves in the shoes of those they study.

The Romanian campaign is one of Rommels greatest analysises we have. if you think his writings are dry then you truly have never been to college laughing out loud thats the kind of things they study Mr. I know EVERYTHING. I have had enough of your chastisement so please if you are not to contribute to this discussion please leave.

Ushgarak
Depends what you mean by compliment. Strategy and tactics are two seperate sections of warfare; you cannot really fight a war without having people good at both.

Technically they are unrelated in a direct sense- but your best strategy is no good if your tactics mean you lose every battle, and the greatest tactican cannot win a war if bad strategy means he is surprised and outnumbered in every fight.

---

Meanwhile, Alexander's use of cavalry was borrowed from a. his people and b. his father. Alexander was a genius precisely because he never over-complicated... something you should learn, RTO. His greateat victories have no complications to them at all.

And Rommel was a great strategist... NOT a great writer. There's something wrong with your brain if you cannot tell all that stuff is dry. It's why you cannot get anyone bothered to read it. Meanwhile, I don't care what you have had enough of- post stuff worth chastising, and it will be chastised. You have neither right nor power to stop that.

Tptmanno1
Basicly Both are nessasary to be sucessful.


Alexander really didn't have mush of predetermined tactics. He kept his forces fluid and was ready to exploit weakness.
His real mastery was in observation. He could see a slight enemy weakness or soft spot and knew how to use it to his advantage. You couldn't make a single mistake facing him, because he would catch it and make you pay.
Decisive Battles onthe history channel is great for this. Cool show too.

RaventheOnly
If you haven't noticed ... soldiers do not care if you are entertained while they write of war. He is writing about a WWI battle that was in his view very important to note in that adaptaion of new tactics that he would revolutionize later with the combined arms doctrine were infantry airpower and armor all compliment eachother. Stop trying to insult my intelligence.

Tpt makes a point that Alexander's use of his army was revolutionary in the view that he was a combat commander. he was on the field fighting with his men.... he would lead his black guard cavalry into the melee and for him the moment is all that mattered. His quick decisions and use of the enemies disposition at that moment won him his empire. His tactics were simple as you say but the way he used his cavalry and infantry was revolutionary due to the advanced comunication system of field orders directly to his officers was amazing.

Most generals in his time and Kings who led battles would usually sit on a throne like Xerexes at Thermopoli and tell there armies to charge or hold or advance. Alexander managed everything on the minute scale leaving nothing to chance... even though he was a great gambler. big grin

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