JP, i thought you hated politics
remember rice's testimony at the 9/11 comission?
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ROEMER. I think we should make this document public, Dr. Rice. Would you support making the Aug. 6 P.D.B. public?
RICE. The Aug. 6 P.D.B. had been available to you.
ROEMER. In a -
RICE. You are, you're describing it. And the Aug. 6 P.D.B. was a response to questions asked by the president not a warning document.
ROEMER. Why wouldn't it be made public then?
RICE. Now as to - I think you know the sensitivity of presidential decision memoranda. And I think you know the great lengths to which we have gone to make it possible for this commission to view documents that are not generally, I don't know if they've ever been made available in quite this way. Now as to what Dick Clarke said on Sept. 4. That was not a premonition nor a warning. What that memorandum was was I was getting ready to go into the Sept. 4 principals meeting to review the new N.S.P.D. and to approve the new N.S.P.D. What it was was a warning to me that the bureaucracies would try to undermine it. Dick goes into great and emotional detail about the long history of how D.O.D. has never been responsive. How the C.I.A. has never been responsive, about how the Predator has gotten hung up because the C.I.A. doesn't really want to fly it. And he says if you don't fight through this bureaucracy, he says at one point they're going to all sign on to this N.S.P.D. because they won't want to be - they won't want to say that they don't want to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda. He says but you really have, in effect, you have to go in there and push them. Because we'll all wonder about the day when thousands of Americans and so forth and so on. So that's what this document is. It's not a warning document. It's not a - all of us had this fear. I think that the chairman mentioned that I had said this in an interview that we would hope not to get to that day. But it would not be appropriate or correct to characterize what Dick wrote to me on Sept. 4 as a warning of an impending attack. What he was doing was I think trying to buck me up so that when I went in to this principals meeting I was sufficiently on guard against the kind of bureaucratic inertia that he had fought all of his life.
ROEMER. What is a warning if Aug. 6 isn't and Sept. 4 isn't to you?
RICE. Well, Aug. 6 is most certainly a historical document that says here's how you might think about Al Qaeda. A warning is when you have something that suggests that an attack is impending. And we did not have on the United States threat information that was in any way specific enough to suggest that something was coming in the United States. The Sept. 4 memo as I've said to you was a warning to me not to get dragged down by the bureaucracy not a warning about Sept. 11.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/08/politics/08RICE-TEXT.html?pagewanted=32&ei=5070&en=5f71755dc812a917&ex=1100754000
sure rice, it wasnt a warning at all...it was.......whatever the f**k you called it.
let us disregard the fact that it was titled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A2285-2004Apr10¬Found=true
and here it is:
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Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."
After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a ...(redacted portion) ... service.
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an ... (redacted portion) ... service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.
Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.
Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.
Al-Qa'ida members -- including some who are US citizens -- have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.
A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.
We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a ... (redacted portion) ... service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.
The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.
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well shit, if you dont see that as a warning, you are either retarded or you're...
the secretary of state.
...yeah...we're f**ked aren't we?