LMM
1962 - US military drafted 'Operation Northwoods', a plan to commit terror acts in US cities, kill innocent people, hijack airplanes, and plant evidence as a way to trick the public into thinking Cuba committed an unprovoked attack against the US in order to support a war against Cuba. (ABC, Natl Security Archives)
On his own webpage, Killtown provides the quote, "Whether the Joint Chiefs' plans were rejected by McNamara in the meeting is not clear."
There is absolutely no documentation to show that this operation was ever seriously considered by the government as an option to draw Cuba into a war.
In the document, the focus of terrorist action would be Cuban refugees, military vessels and aircraft, and "harrassment" of civilian transports. Nowhere does it mention the destruction of US landmarks, buildings, or aircraft. It specifically mentions ways to avoid American civilian casualties.
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the ..,
Cubans of imtninent'invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo 'ti! give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order) :
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
(5) Blow up mnunitio base; start f i r e s .
(6) Burn a i r c r a f t on a i r base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from tfie see
or vicinity of Guantanamo C i t y .
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large f i r e s -- napthalene
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mock-victims (may be l i e u of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
a r t i l l e r y and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" inoident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship i n Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could mange t o cause such incident;
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from t@e a i r or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely inve&igating the intent of '
the vessel could be f a i r l y compelling evidence that the ship
was takenunder attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the f i r e . The US could
follow up with an alr/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of 8he non-existent
crew. Casualty lists i n US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida c i t i e s and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding i n instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefilly chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepmed documents
substantiating Ouban involvenent also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro~supported" f i l i b u s t e r could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haitl, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived fox exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican A i r Force to
intrusions within their national a i r space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft oould make cane-bwming raids a t night.
Soviet Bloo incendiaries oould be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Comunist undex&round in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban1' shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.'
6. Use of MIG type a i r c r a f t by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of c i v i l air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruct;ion of US military drone a i r c r a f t
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince a i r passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the p i l o t of the transport were
t o announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security r i s k inherent in obtaining or modifying
an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident whtch will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban-aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a comon interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircrdt at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbezxdas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled-to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB vrhere arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original s'catus. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the fLled flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the iinernational
distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft' instead of the US trying to"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which w i l l make it
appear that C o m i s t Cuban MIGs have destroyea a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 a i r c r a f t - w i l l be dispatched
in t r a i l from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission w i l l be to reverse course and simulate fakir
I aircraft for an a i r defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights a t
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain a t
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On 'one such flight, a pre-briefed p i l o t would f l y tail-end Charley a t considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this p i l o t would broadcast that
he had been Jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other c a l l s would be made. The p i l o t would then f l y directly west a t extremely low altitude and land a t a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The a i r c r a f t would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a n3w t a i l number. The p i l o t who had performed the mission under'an alias, would resume his proper identity and return t o his normal place of business. The p i l o t and a i r c r a f t would then have disappeared. A t precisely the same time that the a i r c r a f t was . S o presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., a t approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as f a r as they knew. Search ships and a i r c r a f t coulcl be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.
There you go, Ashtar.
On his own webpage, Killtown provides the quote, "Whether the Joint Chiefs' plans were rejected by McNamara in the meeting is not clear."
There is absolutely no documentation to show that this operation was ever seriously considered by the government as an option to draw Cuba into a war.
In the document, the focus of terrorist action would be Cuban refugees, military vessels and aircraft, and "harrassment" of civilian transports. Nowhere does it mention the destruction of US landmarks, buildings, or aircraft. It specifically mentions ways to avoid American civilian casualties.
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the ..,
Cubans of imtninent'invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo 'ti! give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order) :
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
(5) Blow up mnunitio base; start f i r e s .
(6) Burn a i r c r a f t on a i r base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from tfie see
or vicinity of Guantanamo C i t y .
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large f i r e s -- napthalene
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mock-victims (may be l i e u of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
a r t i l l e r y and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" inoident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship i n Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could mange t o cause such incident;
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from t@e a i r or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely inve&igating the intent of '
the vessel could be f a i r l y compelling evidence that the ship
was takenunder attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the f i r e . The US could
follow up with an alr/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of 8he non-existent
crew. Casualty lists i n US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida c i t i e s and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding i n instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefilly chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepmed documents
substantiating Ouban involvenent also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro~supported" f i l i b u s t e r could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haitl, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived fox exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican A i r Force to
intrusions within their national a i r space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft oould make cane-bwming raids a t night.
Soviet Bloo incendiaries oould be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Comunist undex&round in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban1' shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.'
6. Use of MIG type a i r c r a f t by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of c i v i l air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruct;ion of US military drone a i r c r a f t
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince a i r passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the p i l o t of the transport were
t o announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security r i s k inherent in obtaining or modifying
an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident whtch will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban-aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a comon interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircrdt at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbezxdas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled-to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB vrhere arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original s'catus. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the fLled flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the iinernational
distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft' instead of the US trying to"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which w i l l make it
appear that C o m i s t Cuban MIGs have destroyea a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 a i r c r a f t - w i l l be dispatched
in t r a i l from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission w i l l be to reverse course and simulate fakir
I aircraft for an a i r defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights a t
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain a t
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On 'one such flight, a pre-briefed p i l o t would f l y tail-end Charley a t considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this p i l o t would broadcast that
he had been Jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other c a l l s would be made. The p i l o t would then f l y directly west a t extremely low altitude and land a t a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The a i r c r a f t would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a n3w t a i l number. The p i l o t who had performed the mission under'an alias, would resume his proper identity and return t o his normal place of business. The p i l o t and a i r c r a f t would then have disappeared. A t precisely the same time that the a i r c r a f t was . S o presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., a t approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as f a r as they knew. Search ships and a i r c r a f t coulcl be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.
There you go, Ashtar.
