The zombie and the replica brain

Consciousness is often described as the subjetive "what it is like to be..."

Then, for instance, if we can imagine that there is an experience of "being" something, we can call it conscious. So, there is probably no subjective experience to being a mug or coffee, so then it is not conscious. However, there is probably something that "it is like being" a bat or a worm. While our brains are not set up to understand in depth what it is like to be a bat, we can assume that there is SOMETHING that it is like to be one, therefore the bat is probably conscious.

This is based on the work of Thomas Nagel, expanded a little by susan blackmore.

The Zombie

This is not about those crazy Haitian half-dead corpses. It is a question that pertains to the nature of consciousness, that afaik was popularized by Susan Blackmore.

Imagine that there is a zombie that is exactly the same as you in behaviour, appearance and thought, the only difference being that they are not conscious. By this I mean that they have no subjective awareness of the world and are constantly carrying out their actions (which are identical to those you would) without the inner "consciousness".

The Replica Brain

This is another similar idea, only going at it from another angle. This one I think is an original idea of mine, but I'm sure someone else has thought of it lol.

Imagine a brain that is a complete replica of your own. Same memories, same experiences, only it is being kept functional in a vat. Now, imagine it were possible to selectively remove certain processing centers from the brain while the others would still function.

So, some mad scientist comes up to your replica brain and begins to remove verious functions:

Stimuli input and processing (Also motor skills)
Emotional (affective) processing
language
memory (working and long term)
attention

Now, the question is, once these processing systems are removed, can this identical replica brain (which is theoretically still working minus the above mentioned processes) still be conscious?

Yes because you would still be able to think, might be some strange thoughts but they would still be there.

Originally posted by Magee
Yes because you would still be able to think, might be some strange thoughts but they would still be there.

what would you be able to think about?

Originally posted by inimalist
Consciousness is often described as the subjetive "what it is like to be..."

Then, for instance, if we can imagine that there is an experience of "being" something, we can call it conscious. So, there is probably no subjective experience to being a mug or coffee, so then it is not conscious. However, there is probably something that "it is like being" a bat or a worm. While our brains are not set up to understand in depth what it is like to be a bat, we can assume that there is SOMETHING that it is like to be one, therefore the bat is probably conscious.

This is based on the work of Thomas Nagel, expanded a little by susan blackmore.

[b]The Zombie

This is not about those crazy Haitian half-dead corpses. It is a question that pertains to the nature of consciousness, that afaik was popularized by Susan Blackmore.

Imagine that there is a zombie that is exactly the same as you in behaviour, appearance and thought, the only difference being that they are not conscious. By this I mean that they have no subjective awareness of the world and are constantly carrying out their actions (which are identical to those you would) without the inner "consciousness".

The Replica Brain

This is another similar idea, only going at it from another angle. This one I think is an original idea of mine, but I'm sure someone else has thought of it lol.

Imagine a brain that is a complete replica of your own. Same memories, same experiences, only it is being kept functional in a vat. Now, imagine it were possible to selectively remove certain processing centers from the brain while the others would still function.

So, some mad scientist comes up to your replica brain and begins to remove verious functions:

Stimuli input and processing (Also motor skills)
Emotional (affective) processing
language
memory (working and long term)
attention

Now, the question is, once these processing systems are removed, can this identical replica brain (which is theoretically still working minus the above mentioned processes) still be conscious? [/B]

First of all, the statement, "Consciousness is often described as the subjective 'what it is like to be...'" implies consciousness as a sense of self, some "I" (or subject) making a comparison. That means self-awareness.

The statement, "a zombie that is exactly the same as you in ... thought, the only difference being that they are not conscious," implies a separation of this self-awarenss from usual psychological activity. To remove other functions (eg, language, emotional processing) and still ask would the brain be conscious, also suggests (IMO) this separation.

So, I'm reading this question as, If you remove all the things that people typically use to be aware of themselves, would there still be any awareness of self?

Obviously (at least, initially), the answer would be no.

Originally posted by Mindship
First of all, the statement, "Consciousness is often described as the subjective 'what it is like to be...'" implies consciousness as a sense of self, some "I" (or subject) making a comparison. That means self-awareness.

The statement, "a zombie that is exactly the same as you in ... thought, the only difference being that they are not conscious," implies a separation of this self-awarenss from usual psychological activity. To remove other functions (eg, language, emotional processing) and still ask would the brain be conscious, also suggests (IMO) this separation.

So, I'm reading this question as, If you remove all the things that people typically use to be aware of themselves, would there still be any awareness of self?

Obviously (at least, initially), the answer would be no.

That is exactly the question 🙂 And I personally agree with your answer

Although, in the case of the zombie problem, there are many who find it possible that there could be completely identical systems, one which has "experience" and one that does not.

The questions are to try and show that consciousness, as far as the subjective experience or the inner self, is totally dependant on the structure and physical processes that underlies it.

I don't think this would be an adequate challange to the "stained glass" metaphore you used in another thread, and to be honest I don't think I have formulated a proper response to that which wouldn't just be "but come on" (Which would be of course said in the most respectful way possible).

Originally posted by inimalist
That is exactly the question 🙂 And I personally agree with your answer
Although, in the case of the zombie problem, there are many who find it possible that there could be completely identical systems, one which has "experience" and one that does not.
The questions are to try and show that consciousness, as far as the subjective experience or the inner self, is totally dependant on the structure and physical processes that underlies it.
I don't think this would be an adequate challange to the "stained glass" metaphore you used in another thread, and to be honest I don't think I have formulated a proper response to that which wouldn't just be "but come on" (Which would be of course said in the most respectful way possible).

As for the stained glass metaphor: for what it's worth, it was presented not as a truth, but merely as an alternative As If, meant to jostle (in a friendly way, of course) the ... complacency(?) of the empiricist's paradigm.

Originally posted by Mindship
The interesting thing about self-awareness (I prefer this to "consciousness" as it's more specific; I save "consciousness" for much broader purposes) is that, whether one comes from a purely empirical POV or a psychological one, research in either of these fields suggests that the self is a fabrication; there is no "inner person" or "identical system" riding along inside the mind and/or brain. Even modern meditative research (and certainly in the ancient texts), the self is seen as illusory.

As for the stained glass metaphor: for what it's worth, it was presented not as a truth, but merely as an alternative As If, meant to jostle (in a friendly way, of course) the ... complacency(?) of the empiricist's paradigm.

Perhaps its a bit off topic but how do you think consciousness is diferent from self-awareness(in the way you use the words)?

I understood that you use the term self-awaresness particularly for the, lets say "the results of the brain processing". But then what is consciousness(for you at least) and how it is related to self-awareness ?

I would like to see animals suddenly become self aware.Imagine a herd of Elephants or a pack of Wolves becoming aware to the degree of us humans.Would they do things different?Or would they stay in the same routine because that was in their nature and that was what they were used to.It maybe a stupid question but I still think it would be interesting.Even if you gave other creatures self awareness would they do things differently,and to what degree?It would probably take a few generations for major changes to happen but it would be neat.

What I'm getting at in a rough way is that you're asking what if we went through the same routines without our conscience.I'm asking what if other creatures went through their own routines with conscienceness?

Originally posted by Atlantis001
Perhaps its a bit off topic but how do you think consciousness is diferent from self-awareness(in the way you use the words)?

I understood that you use the term self-awaresness particularly for the, lets say "the results of the brain processing". But then what is consciousness(for you at least) and how it is related to self-awareness ?

It's consciousness as used in the perennial philosophy, of which self-awareness is the highest form of consciousness we are consensually aware of. Alternative terms for self consciousness would include attention-consciousness and metaconsciousness.