Apologies in advance for the length. I have endeavored to make it worthwhile.
I’m going to cover a lot of ground below. Some will be my own beliefs, some will just be a description of various philosophical systems as it pertains to moral responsibility. My purpose is somewhere in between…to describe my own thoughts by describing the system they exist within, and the differing views that inform them.
The concept of moral responsibility is closely – sometimes inextricably – tied to the concept of free will. So we’ll be discussing free will a lot as well.
I’m indebted to several sources that I will quote or link throughout this post. Primarily, but not entirely, to Bruce Waller’s Against Moral Responsibility. Much of this is adapted from that book, indeed many examples are ripped right from him, as he provides a wonderful overview of many arguments, even though it’s focused on one in particular. If I were writing for a more scholarly source, I’d credit each occurrence individually. As it is, I hope this note will suffice as credit, along with the page references when I quote him directly. I’d encourage anyone to pick it up, and will also link to a couple reviews and discussions that the book generated that further illuminate topics below. I do want to say I don’t endorse his view wholeheartedly – there are aspects of it that remain problematic for me (discussed below) – but the clarity and depth of his discussion is excellent.
Basic Terms:
Determinism/Naturalism: Determinism and naturalism will be used interchangeably in this post. It refers to the idea that the universe, and more specifically human action, is the result of causal forces determined by the laws of nature, or physics. It holds that the causes leading to an action could produce no other action than the resulting action. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism
Hard Determinism: Determinism/naturalism with the belief that this worldview makes the existence of moral responsibility and free will impossible.
Libertarian Free Will: The idea that we have the ability to choose any possible outcome. This requires a special separation from causal forces of the natural world, and is in opposition to determinism. In libertarian free will, humans are morally responsible agents. http://www.theopedia.com/Libertarian_free_will
Compatibilism: The belief held by many scholars and philosophers that is sometimes considered between the concepts above. Like determinists, they hold that the universe is naturalistic and that humans are not special agents that can transcend or ignore naturalistic laws. They view libertarian free will as incoherent logically and empirically. But unlike hard determinists, they believe that free will and moral responsibility exist, though their definition of free will of course differs from that of libertarians. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism
Take-Charge Responsibility: Refers to a personal decision to take charge (apologies for using the term in the definition) of one’s actions. Separate from moral responsibility, which deals with justified or unjustified praise or blame, reward or punishment, for right or wrong actions.
These labels are convenient, and cover most thinkers on the subject, but not all. The aforementioned Waller, for example, believes in a roughly compatibilist definition of free will but not moral responsibility. He is one of the few scholars to separate one from the other, rather than saying yes to both or no to both.
Basic Argument Against Moral Responsibility
Outlined briefly in the terms section, the basic argument comes back to naturalism or determinism. I’ll quote Waller ver batim here to explain:
“The fundamental naturalistic argument against moral responsibility is that it is unfair to punish one and reward another based on their different acts, because their different behaviors are ultimately the result of causal forces they did not control, causal factors which were a matter of good or bad luck.” (2011, 22)
These causal forces might be genetic, environmental (upbringing, country, culture, etc.), social, or less easily categorized. But the point remains the same. Each action is an inevitable consequence of the actions that preceded it, from the larger event to the tiniest movement of atoms. Therefore, we can no more fault or praise a person for an action than we could fault or praise an apple for falling off a table after being knocked over.
We’ll examine this a bit further, but I want to stop there for clarity’s sake.
Why Do We Hold to Moral Responsibility so Strongly?
The evolutionary basis for reactive and retributive punishment is strong. Rats will lash out at other rats when attacked, and even lash out at other rats when merely shocked (the other rat isn’t involved). We see this same behavior in chimps and other primates, as well as humans. At one point, the “eye for an eye” tendency had a strong evolutionary benefit to it, though the literature on such tendencies goes beyond the scope of this post. Once we began to become more civilized, these tendencies turned into justifications. WHY does this person deserve punishment? For early civilizations, “God commands it” was enough, moral quandaries be damned (actually, that still holds in some places today). Eventually arguments became more nuanced, and today we have things like legal age of consent, insanity defenses wherein a person isn’t morally culpable because of their mental state, and other conditions by which a person is and isn’t morally responsible. But it’s just a refinement of the more basic instincts desiring punishment for wrongdoing.
The emotional basis for moral responsibility is equally as strong. We want to feel like morally responsible agents, and we want to feel as though punishment for criminals or jerks is justified. It’s baked into our culture, our stories, our heroes, and is almost impossible to shake.
What It Is and What It Isn’t
Moral Responsibility is NOT the absence of moral and immoral actions.
Hard determinists may argue that no action is moral or immoral. But the lack of moral responsibility does not necessitate an utter lack of moral and immoral actions. Moral responsibility deals ONLY with the praise, blame, punishment, and reward due (or not due) upon a moral or immoral action. Most, even many determinists, will maintain that right and wrong actions exist. But the praise/blame they deserve is another question entirely.
Moral Responsibility is NOT the justification for an action (internal or otherwise)
We can provide justification for nearly all of our actions. They make sense to us, and thus we feel we are responsible for them. But moral responsibility is not the ability to justify an action, but whether or not the praise/blame is justified.
Also on this topic, it is telling that, often, our justifications for our actions are actually wrong. We moralize our actions without realizing the sometimes arbitrary forces that went into them. A great example deals with neuroscience. By stimulating a particular portion of the brain, we can make a person turn their head from side to side. But, unknown to the test subject, they’ll later provide a justification for the head turning. They heard a noise, maybe. Or they wanted to survey their surroundings. More practical sociological examples exist, but that more easily examines the underlying concept. Which is: Justification alone is not enough for responsibility, because we are often unaware of the causal forces that dictated our actions.
Moral Responsibility is NOT the presence or absence of moral behavior and goodness/evil.
In reading arguments against moral responsibility, let us not give into the irrational slippery slope that would claim it represents an abolishment of the need for goodly actions. While an infinite number of justifications exist for goodly behavior outside moral responsibility, they are outside the scope of this post. Suffice it to say this isn’t a war cry for some type of societal or moral anarchy. I say this as a precautionary measure against needless argument…I’ve been on the internet before and wish to focus this as much as possible.
I won’t sugar-coat my objection to this concept. It is held almost entirely by dogged religious philosophers, whose beliefs necessitate that they find a justification for it. It is not any type of embellishment to say that libertarian free will requires a miracle every time we make a decision; that is to say, a transcendence of the laws of physics in a way that makes us “unmoved movers” (i.e. the first cause to our actions, unaffected by preceding causes). If you think I overstate this point, feel free to research the concept and get back to me.
The reaction to this failure is rarely a logical one – we all recognize causal influences in our decisions every day. It is an emotional one, where we think that to abandon this type of free will is to lose something, some precious choice-making ability that we thought was ours alone as human beings. We’ll discuss why this is a bit overdramatic later on, but I hope that for any libertarian free will advocates, it is cause for reflection upon their beliefs.
Of course, libertarian apologists will disagree with me greatly. As a reminder, my aim is not impartiality, but to elucidate my views in the light of others. It goes without saying that should you wish to defend libertarian free will, you may do so; and if you wish to learn more, the internet or your local library should prove ample mentors.
Naturalist Free Will
So what is free will in a deterministic system? First off, let’s set aside emotional appeals. I’ve seen it argued that this is an attempt to rescue a feeling of uniqueness from the relative blandness of determinism. Hogwash. First, none of these worldviews, even for the most adamant hard determinist, dims the beauty and wonder of life and the choices we make. Nor does it dim the anticipation of a choice, or the mystery of an unknown outcome. Second, just because a term is being re-applied in a way that differs from its common usage, let us not dismiss the concept but examine it wholly. With that…
Waller states that this type of free will “does not require choices among open alternatives, but focuses instead on choices that are one’s own choices. In this approach, the focus moves from alternatives to authenticity. The question is not whether I could have chosen differently, but whether my choice is genuine, reflects my true commitments, and is authentically my own.” (2011, 59)
And what determines authenticity? A few simple examples of forces that hinder authenticity will prove the concept…gender-based or racial oppression, blackmail or coercion, mind-altering substances that decrease our ability to reason. Other examples create murkier ground, but the basic concept is easily graspable. Is the action YOURS? I.e. is it based on your intrinsic desires and aspirations, and is the choice influenced by outside forces that subvert your intention? This may be closer to what many consider to be “freedom” but closely resembles compatibilist free will.
The concept of free will in this sense has one other advantage: it exists on a spectrum. Allow me to elaborate. Libertarian free will is all or nothing. Humans have it, other animals don’t. Period. But many animals have great intelligence, and a large amount of freedom to determine their actions, and also a sense of the wrongdoing of their actions (ever seen a dog shamed?). Do they not have a measure of free will in this sense?
Waller lists several factors that can contribute to this spectrum: “Greater knowledge, less deception (including self-deception), a stronger sense of internal locus-of-control, more robust cognitive fortitude, a supportive environment that offers a rich range of alternatives, greater self-awareness, capacity for higher order reflectiveness…” (2011, 71)
In this way, some can be more free than others. And it has the added benefit of not creating an indefensible line between us and other animals, who possess some of those qualities, but not at the same depth as humans. Moral awareness and concepts of freedom and oppression are intrinsic to our species. Are we really arrogant enough to think all traces of similar concepts are utterly removed from our genetic cousins?
The issue of moral responsibility within this view of free will then becomes trickier. Because on this spectrum, can a clear line be created between morally responsible agents and those who are not responsible? The works of compatibilists for decades have aimed to create such definitions. Many share similar qualities, though the exact justifications and limits vary wildly in scholarship.
Implications & Applications
I’ll be honest and say I’m less concerned with practical applications than I am with the underlying philosophical concepts (which, ironically, is rare for me). However, much is written about the implications of these various systems.
The implications of libertarian free will abound, as it is almost inconceivable to believe it could exist outside the divine framework that it originated from, though non-religious models may exist that I am unfamiliar with.
Compatibilists and hard determinists alike tend to champion massive reform in our systems of justice and punishment, though the extent to which they want to go varies. That is one major area; there are others. I’ll allow your own curiosity to lead you to the appropriate fields and authors if you are interested. Some of those linked below may bear fruits, and the oft-mentioned Waller offers his own systems and implications, though they are at times incomplete.
A Brief Defense of Determinism
A simple thought experiment that I enjoy. It was told to me years ago:
You drive to get some ice cream. You’re going to get either chocolate or vanilla, but you’re not sure which. You’re not leaning one way or another; it seems a true coin flip to you. You go into the shop still unsure, deliberate over the choice, and we’ll say you order vanilla (normally I’d ask the person, but this is in written form).
Now, rewind to when you were getting in your car. Literally, the universe is rewinded (rewound?), and every last detail, down to subatomic particles, is exactly the same. You are NOT aware of the previous iteration. You don’t know what flavor you picked, or even that you went through this a first time. You drive to the shop, and deliberate. Which flavor do you pick?
Now do the same thing again 10 times. Same stipulations, and no awareness of previous iterations. Which flavor do you pick? 1,000 more times; which flavor? A million…
Did you answer vanilla each time? Then I’d say you’re a naturalist/determinist. Did you answer “sometimes vanilla, sometimes chocolate”? If so, what changes? How are you able to pick vanilla one time, and chocolate the next, when literally every causal force that precedes the decision is the same?
Below I’ve linked to a review of Waller’s book by Dan Dennett (notable as one of the “Four Horsemen” of atheism). It is a useful examination of many of these concepts. But I wanted to highlight an example he uses in rebuttal, because it represents one of the stronger oppositions to hard determinists (and hybrids like Waller) who are against moral responsibility. It comes after a criticism of Waller that he focuses solely on retributive punishment, which Dennett and many other compatibilists see as similarly indefensible to justify moral responsibility. But the criticism is that he ignores consequentialist scenarios for responsibility, of which the following story is one example:
“Suppose you sign a contract which includes a clause about what penalty you will pay if you fail to deliver. And then when you fail, suppose you refuse to pay the penalty. What happens? What should happen? If other attempts at getting you to pay the stipulated penalty—laws suits and the like—fail, you eventually become eligible to be taken, by force if necessary, against your will, and put on trial. You become liable for punishment. Not rehabilitation, not treatment, but honest to goodness infliction-of-suffering-type punishment. Not beating, but incarceration and/or punitive fines extracted by whatever means necessary from your estate. Why? Because in entering into a contract you tacitly agreed to be part of the system that has this further escalation clause behind it. Were you “coerced” into joining this system, making this deal? (Waller, p. 109-110) Not at all. It’s a wonderful bargain. I for one don’t want to live in a world without contracts—not because I’m a pathetic dupe of capitalism (for instance) but because contracts are just the carefully articulated expression of the underlying concept of a promise made in good faith, and I don’t want to live in a world without promising. It is the very glue of civilization. I expect that Waller would agree with me on this point. He, too (I imagine—he never mentions it), wants to maintain promising and contracts and the institutional understandings that make them possible, but if so, I guess he doesn’t view the penalties and justification of taking-by-force-if-necessary of these institutions as punishment (real, retributive punishment), since after all, they have a consequentialist grounding, as just articulated.”
This is the matter about which I am on the fence. I cannot reason past Dennett’s example to tell him there is no moral responsibility to the person in the story. But it remains at odds in my mind with the basic argument against moral responsibility (detailed earlier). When everything – everything - is causal, inevitable, and product of the forces that preceded it, and this denies moral responsibility on a fundamental, primordial philosophical level. I can’t fathom shoehorning moral responsibility into the equation.
This is one of two things I can’t quite stand eye to eye with Waller on at the moment, though I may ultimately be in his camp. The other is the societal practicality (or potential impracticality, more accurately) of some of the implications of abolishing moral responsibility. A judicial system of checks on human behavior may be a necessity, one that recognizes most humans as morally responsible agents; and the abolishment of moral responsibility may be a philosophical abstraction. He makes a valiant attempt at justifying it in his book, and I won’t say it’s impossible. Some experimental positive reinforcement prison facilities, which are aligned with Waller’s views, exist in several countries, for example. But it seems a long way off, at best.
Notes
One of the gut responses to the idea that (libertarian) free will doesn’t exist, or that moral responsibility doesn’t exist, is often the irrational fear of “what matters, then?” It seems to create existential crisis in many. While there are philosophical reasons why this need not be, sometime the easiest way to see why these fears are unfounded is to look at a mundane example (courtesy once again of Waller):
“The possibility and the legitimacy of reactive gratitude among moral responsibility abolitionists becomes even clearer when we consider our gratitude and affection toward dear old Mom . . . My mother loves me dearly . . . Her affectionate and protective attitude toward me is rooted in a profound maternal instinct, which she certainly did not choose nor construct, and thus (though some might not agree) it seems particularly clear to me that Mom is not morally responsible for her deep and genuine affection and care toward her son, but recognizing and believing that does not reduce in any way the deep gratitude I feel for my mother's profound affection and diligent care. Consider one more example. You are deeply distressed, sitting in a corner of the couch feeling desolate. Your dog, who is quite fond of you, comes up . . . Certainly, you do not consider your faithful dog to be morally responsible, but you have no trouble feeling gratitude (2011, 201).”
For a more full treatment of the arguments for determinism, and how it can actually be an empowering philosophy, head to the following link: http://www.naturalism.org/determinism.htm
Free Will by Sam Harris - http://www.samharris.org/free-will
I like Harris’s approach, because he’s a much more accessible author than most. He also focuses a lot on how the absence of libertarian free will doesn’t undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but pulls no punches when discussing what questions it should raise within us.
…I would be somewhat remiss in not saying that this represents only a small portion of the literature, and these few books and essays are heavily represented in my thread here. In particular, libertarian free will readings are absent entirely, and the range of compatibilist literature cannot easily be listed in ANY format. My point is not to be comprehensive, but to provide the sources and inspiration for much of what I just wrote. And, earlier, to outline the various schools of thought so that you can do your own research.
This looks like a really good thread, and I promise to comment on it tomorrow or the next day when I can give it the time it deserves. However, I will say in passing that hard determinism has a strong appeal to me. It seems to be a natural result of causation, which itself is inferred from any and all explanations humans apply. It's axiomatic in that sense. However, at the same time morality is a social issue and because human beings are social creatures who must live together, no one can have a pass because of predetermination. Personal responsibility must exist for society to function normally.
I should probably have defined consequentialism as well, but I have a more shallow understanding of it overall (though I do like the Dennett example I used). As commonly defined, it seems oddly skewed toward, well, consequences...which doesn't account for unforeseen consequences or initial intention. I'm sure Dennett's overall view is more nuanced, but the root philosophy itself seems lacking. In any case, it fits into the realm of compatibilism among the defined terms.
That seems to be the crux of the problem for Dennett in his review of Waller. And it seems almost impossible to imagine a coherent system that doesn't endorse some responsibility. And later in their discussion (also linked above), Waller himself admits he doesn't have all the answers for implementing new social systems (though he offers a few bits in his book), just that he hopes his works elucidates the need for consideration of them.
But thanks; I put a lot of time into this. Whether or not people reply is almost secondary...with threads like these, half my purpose is self-serving anyway. In writing this out, I help clarify my own thoughts.
I can understand that. I suppose I mean to say that I intend to give a reply more worthy of the work you've put into it. But just off of the top of my head, what I said above I stand by. I've thought this problem over for years.
Not sure if this is the best place buy I'd like to post my thoughts against the deterministic argument against free will. before I do though, coukd somebody post it in premise/conclusion form? I would but I'm way too drunk to get my noted out of my bag oir bother to remember it, but my counter argument follows quite well after the argument in officialy formatr.
__________________ My personal ranking of SWVF debaters:
There is too much topic here to discuss, but I want to begin with free will, which I don't think it exists , OK I'm sort of a nihilist So you might wanna think I'm one of those disappointed and devastated guys who has nothing to go on , but I believe we are bound to nature, we are part of this universe ,Ok it's maybe hard to understand because of the obvious reasons op said but it's true and i don't think it's necessarily bad!! it says that we are past of a bigger system!!
Not every topic can be delivered in tidy chunks, at least not without sacrificing the nuance needed to properly understand it. As it is, my opening posts are a summary of topics that, in truth, have taken many great thinkers entire careers and dozens of novels to fully digest. So I hope you'll reconsider.
Libertarian free will or compatibilist free will? Or both? The distinction is important.
This is more a personal extrapolation on determinism than a literal definition, but cool. I'm not sure what nihilism has to do with free will, though. Can you explain your idea of nihilism?
Nihilism is the natural consequence if a culture or civilization ruled and regulated by categories that mask manipulation, mastery and domination of people and cultures, and I meant Compatibilism free will , sorry I should have mentioned it ... however I really don't want to discuss about libertarian free will because it will take us back to social issues ... anyway I thought that definition I said about nihilism, give a clear idea about my belief, Compatibilists say that our freedom is dependent on our motive , but I say every action we make is part of a bigger action, an action that universe wants , OK it maybe give the wrong idea that we can do whatever we want but it doesn't, the reason we want to do the good thing instead of the bad one is because universe is like that , maybe if our universe was made of anti matter instead of matter, our morals would be much different !!!
I should go now but I will explain more later especially about my nihilism belief.
I think your definition is a bit curious, but ok. Nihilism has very little to do with moral responsibility and free will. Personally I think it's just an erroneous conclusion of some people when they encounter determinism. Even if life is without intrinsic value in a universal sense ("to give glory to God" for example), that doesn't mean that the meaning we ascribe to our own lives is without merit.
For reference, I'm just using the wiki definition of nihilism.
Ok cool, so you're a hard determinist.
Let me stop you here, because you're ascribing anthropomorphic qualities to the universe. Please explain how the universe "wants" anything.
Most nihilists don't believe in good or bad, right or wrong. Again: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihilism ...you seem to be using a very different idea than, well, any form of nihilism.
Yeah... there are several variations of nihilism, covering different fields and philosophies. As far as I can tell, you don't seem know what nihilism is. The rather poor grammar in your post aside, most of what you said appears to be nonsense.
__________________ Recently Produced and Distributed Young but High-Ranking Political Figure of Royal Ancestry within the Modern American Town Affectionately Referred To as Bel-Air.
OK first let me tell you I'm not a philosopher but i have had some courses about it , i agree what i said is a little odd but for your more information read this: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind
Its gives you a better idea about my thoughts.
I'm studying to be a scientist and a mathematician , these two have gave me good ideas about the world i'm living in , but this is a philosophy forum not a scientific forum , the nearest field I've found to my thoughts was nihilism , and of course what iv mostly said are personal ideas , if they weren't there wouldn't be any purpose to write them here !!
Last edited by DrDeadpool on Jan 25th, 2014 at 03:12 PM
Why does that Quantum Mind wiki page look so friggin weird?
Also, I don't see how the Quantum Mind hypothesis fits in to Nihilism. What manner of nihilism are you professing to espouse?
__________________ Recently Produced and Distributed Young but High-Ranking Political Figure of Royal Ancestry within the Modern American Town Affectionately Referred To as Bel-Air.
I've read some about metaphysical nihilism and moral nihilism , but mostly about metaphysical nihilism which Plato once said that somehow our spirit is able to "tap into" an otherworldly realm of perfection where perfect dog, perfect house and etc exists. We therefore can attach the lesser (our worldly) versions of these things to the perfect (otherworldly) ideal thereby allowing us to form groups and concepts. I don't know if Plato was somehow a nihilist or not but what he said takes metaphysical nihilism on another level which my idea begins.
__________________ Recently Produced and Distributed Young but High-Ranking Political Figure of Royal Ancestry within the Modern American Town Affectionately Referred To as Bel-Air.
That's great. But I'm still waiting for where you bring this back to moral responsibility and/or free will. Because all you've done so far, more or less, is say "that OP is pretty long. Screw it, but here's what I want to talk about." Tell us why we should give a sh*t (an ironic request, I grant, of a self-proclaimed nihilist).
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Jan 14th, 2014 03:59 AM
