Originally posted by inimalist
I don't pretend to be making a "materialist" argument, but what I am saying is that consciousness isn't even along for the ride. All these wonderful things you attribute to consciousness are far better explained through the interaction of localized and interconnected brain regions rather than a central agent of causality.Nobody is trying to minimize the power of subjective experience or top-down control of function. What I am saying is that there is a disconnect between how it feels like that is happening and how it actually is. Just because you feel like you are the agent of cause for your behaviour does not make it so. In fact, that feeling of agency comes only after biological preparedness.
Though it is predictable based on measures of neuronal activity, can be predictably modified through electromagnetic stimulation, and is specifically reliant on physical structures?
30-50m/hz gamma bandwidth osculations.
and many other ways. There are many material and empirical measures of subjective experience. They are new and sloppy, but this seems to be the "consciousness of the gaps" argument.
Certainly not. Your ideas are formed well before your "consciousness" is aware of them.
Brain functioning is certainly easier to understand because it is amenable to empirical study. It provides, at the very least, a concrete correlative measure, but this doesn't necessarily mean it is the causative agent. A favorite metaphor of mine is light shining through stained glass. The light is affected by the glass, it will always be changed by anything we do to the glass, but it is not created by the glass.
On the other hand, I'm not necessarily pushing for consciousness as the causative agent, either. I have too much respect for the empirical map to put a nonempirical map even on equal footing.
Basically, what I'm saying is what's been said many times before in other threads: ultimately all we really know, all that we directly, immediately experience are our perceptions of reality, not reality itself, however strong the inclination to assign that quality to the material world (paradigm bias?). And because consciousness is the only thing we do immediately experience, it would be a mistake, IMO, to dismiss it as meaningless or inconsequential to the study of reality, especially as we can't make a definitive statement about what or what is not the causative agent.
Again, I'm not necessarily trying to present a nonempirical map as equal to the empirical. But what is important, if we really want to understand the nature of reality, is that we "stand guard" against empiricist complacency.