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This looks like a really good thread, and I promise to comment on it tomorrow or the next day when I can give it the time it deserves. However, I will say in passing that hard determinism has a strong appeal to me. It seems to be a natural result of causation, which itself is inferred from any and all explanations humans apply. It's axiomatic in that sense. However, at the same time morality is a social issue and because human beings are social creatures who must live together, no one can have a pass because of predetermination. Personal responsibility must exist for society to function normally.

I should probably have defined consequentialism as well, but I have a more shallow understanding of it overall (though I do like the Dennett example I used). As commonly defined, it seems oddly skewed toward, well, consequences...which doesn't account for unforeseen consequences or initial intention. I'm sure Dennett's overall view is more nuanced, but the root philosophy itself seems lacking. In any case, it fits into the realm of compatibilism among the defined terms.

Originally posted by Stealth Moose
This looks like a really good thread, and I promise to comment on it tomorrow or the next day when I can give it the time it deserves. However, I will say in passing that hard determinism has a strong appeal to me. It seems to be a natural result of causation, which itself is inferred from any and all explanations humans apply. It's axiomatic in that sense. However, at the same time morality is a social issue and because human beings are social creatures who must live together, no one can have a pass because of predetermination. Personal responsibility must exist for society to function normally.

That seems to be the crux of the problem for Dennett in his review of Waller. And it seems almost impossible to imagine a coherent system that doesn't endorse some responsibility. And later in their discussion (also linked above), Waller himself admits he doesn't have all the answers for implementing new social systems (though he offers a few bits in his book), just that he hopes his works elucidates the need for consideration of them.

But thanks; I put a lot of time into this. Whether or not people reply is almost secondary...with threads like these, half my purpose is self-serving anyway. In writing this out, I help clarify my own thoughts.

I can understand that. I suppose I mean to say that I intend to give a reply more worthy of the work you've put into it. But just off of the top of my head, what I said above I stand by. I've thought this problem over for years.

Not sure if this is the best place buy I'd like to post my thoughts against the deterministic argument against free will. before I do though, coukd somebody post it in premise/conclusion form? I would but I'm way too drunk to get my noted out of my bag oir bother to remember it, but my counter argument follows quite well after the argument in officialy formatr.

Drunk posting. Gotta love it.

Originally posted by Astor Ebligis
Not sure if this is the best place buy I'd like to post my thoughts against the deterministic argument against free will. before I do though, coukd somebody post it in premise/conclusion form? I would but I'm way too drunk to get my noted out of my bag oir bother to remember it, but my counter argument follows quite well after the argument in officialy formatr.

Heh. Sober up and try again. If my posts above aren't sufficient to understand the concepts and respond to them, I can't really help you.

Digi I did not know you where an accomplished writer like this, I will read this!

There is too much topic here to discuss, but I want to begin with free will, which I don't think it exists , OK I'm sort of a nihilist So you might wanna think I'm one of those disappointed and devastated guys who has nothing to go on , but I believe we are bound to nature, we are part of this universe ,Ok it's maybe hard to understand because of the obvious reasons op said but it's true and i don't think it's necessarily bad!! it says that we are past of a bigger system!!

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
There is too much topic here to discuss,

Not every topic can be delivered in tidy chunks, at least not without sacrificing the nuance needed to properly understand it. As it is, my opening posts are a summary of topics that, in truth, have taken many great thinkers entire careers and dozens of novels to fully digest. So I hope you'll reconsider.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
but I want to begin with free will, which I don't think it exists ,

Libertarian free will or compatibilist free will? Or both? The distinction is important.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
OK I'm sort of a nihilist So you might wanna think I'm one of those disappointed and devastated guys who has nothing to go on , but I believe we are bound to nature, we are part of this universe ,Ok it's maybe hard to understand because of the obvious reasons op said but it's true and i don't think it's necessarily bad!! it says that we are past of a bigger system!!

This is more a personal extrapolation on determinism than a literal definition, but cool. I'm not sure what nihilism has to do with free will, though. Can you explain your idea of nihilism?

Nihilism is the natural consequence if a culture or civilization ruled and regulated by categories that mask manipulation, mastery and domination of people and cultures, and I meant Compatibilism free will , sorry I should have mentioned it ... however I really don't want to discuss about libertarian free will because it will take us back to social issues ... anyway I thought that definition I said about nihilism, give a clear idea about my belief, Compatibilists say that our freedom is dependent on our motive , but I say every action we make is part of a bigger action, an action that universe wants , OK it maybe give the wrong idea that we can do whatever we want but it doesn't, the reason we want to do the good thing instead of the bad one is because universe is like that , maybe if our universe was made of anti matter instead of matter, our morals would be much different !!!
I should go now but I will explain more later especially about my nihilism belief.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
Nihilism is the natural consequence if a culture or civilization ruled and regulated by categories that mask manipulation, mastery and domination of people and cultures,

I think your definition is a bit curious, but ok. Nihilism has very little to do with moral responsibility and free will. Personally I think it's just an erroneous conclusion of some people when they encounter determinism. Even if life is without intrinsic value in a universal sense ("to give glory to God" for example), that doesn't mean that the meaning we ascribe to our own lives is without merit.

For reference, I'm just using the wiki definition of nihilism.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
and I meant Compatibilism free will

Ok cool, so you're a hard determinist.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
Compatibilists say that our freedom is dependent on our motive , but I say every action we make is part of a bigger action, an action that universe wants ,

Let me stop you here, because you're ascribing anthropomorphic qualities to the universe. Please explain how the universe "wants" anything.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
OK it maybe give the wrong idea that we can do whatever we want but it doesn't, the reason we want to do the good thing instead of the bad one is because universe is like that ,

Most nihilists don't believe in good or bad, right or wrong. Again: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihilism ...you seem to be using a very different idea than, well, any form of nihilism.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
maybe if our universe was made of anti matter instead of matter, our morals would be much different !!!

...

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
Nihilism is the natural consequence if a culture or civilization ruled and regulated by categories that mask manipulation, mastery and domination of people and cultures, and I meant Compatibilism free will , sorry I should have mentioned it ... however I really don't want to discuss about libertarian free will because it will take us back to social issues ... anyway I thought that definition I said about nihilism, give a clear idea about my belief, Compatibilists say that our freedom is dependent on our motive , but I say every action we make is part of a bigger action, an action that universe wants , OK it maybe give the wrong idea that we can do whatever we want but it doesn't, the reason we want to do the good thing instead of the bad one is because universe is like that , maybe if our universe was made of anti matter instead of matter, our morals would be much different !!!
I should go now but I will explain more later especially about my nihilism belief. Yeah... there are several variations of nihilism, covering different fields and philosophies. As far as I can tell, you don't seem know what nihilism is. The rather poor grammar in your post aside, most of what you said appears to be nonsense.

Originally posted by Digi
I think your definition is a bit curious, but ok. Nihilism has very little to do with moral responsibility and free will. Personally I think it's just an erroneous conclusion of some people when they encounter determinism. Even if life is without intrinsic value in a universal sense ("to give glory to God" for example), that doesn't mean that the meaning we ascribe to our own lives is without merit.

For reference, I'm just using the wiki definition of nihilism.



Ok cool, so you're a hard determinist.



Let me stop you here, because you're ascribing anthropomorphic qualities to the universe. Please explain how the universe "wants" anything


Most nihilists don't believe in good or bad, right or wrong. Again: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nihilism ...you seem to be using a very different idea than, well, any form of nihilism.

...

OK first let me tell you I'm not a philosopher but i have had some courses about it , i agree what i said is a little odd but for your more information read this: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mind
Its gives you a better idea about my thoughts.
I'm studying to be a scientist and a mathematician , these two have gave me good ideas about the world i'm living in , but this is a philosophy forum not a scientific forum , the nearest field I've found to my thoughts was nihilism , and of course what iv mostly said are personal ideas , if they weren't there wouldn't be any purpose to write them here !!

Why does that Quantum Mind wiki page look so friggin weird?


Also, I don't see how the Quantum Mind hypothesis fits in to Nihilism. What manner of nihilism are you professing to espouse?

Originally posted by Lord Lucien
Why does that Quantum Mind wiki page look so friggin weird?


Also, I don't see how the Quantum Mind hypothesis fits in to Nihilism. What manner of nihilism are you professing to espouse?
I've read some about metaphysical nihilism and moral nihilism , but mostly about metaphysical nihilism which Plato once said that somehow our spirit is able to "tap into" an otherworldly realm of perfection where perfect dog, perfect house and etc exists. We therefore can attach the lesser (our worldly) versions of these things to the perfect (otherworldly) ideal thereby allowing us to form groups and concepts. I don't know if Plato was somehow a nihilist or not but what he said takes metaphysical nihilism on another level which my idea begins.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
I've read some about metaphysical nihilism and moral nihilism , but mostly about metaphysical nihilism which Plato once said that somehow our spirit is able to "tap into" an otherworldly realm of perfection where perfect dog, perfect house and etc exists. We therefore can attach the lesser (our worldly) versions of these things to the perfect (otherworldly) ideal thereby allowing us to form groups and concepts. I don't know if Plato was somehow a nihilist or not but what he said takes metaphysical nihilism on another level which my idea begins. That actually sounds a lot like Dualism.

Originally posted by DrDeadpool
I've read some about metaphysical nihilism and moral nihilism , but mostly about metaphysical nihilism which Plato once said that somehow our spirit is able to "tap into" an otherworldly realm of perfection where perfect dog, perfect house and etc exists. We therefore can attach the lesser (our worldly) versions of these things to the perfect (otherworldly) ideal thereby allowing us to form groups and concepts. I don't know if Plato was somehow a nihilist or not but what he said takes metaphysical nihilism on another level which my idea begins.

That's great. But I'm still waiting for where you bring this back to moral responsibility and/or free will. Because all you've done so far, more or less, is say "that OP is pretty long. Screw it, but here's what I want to talk about." Tell us why we should give a sh*t (an ironic request, I grant, of a self-proclaimed nihilist).

I just discovered an excellent addition to this thread. Dan Dennett has reviewed Sam Harris's book "Free Will" at length.
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/reflections-on-free-will

Harris is a hard determinist, for reference (though Dennett questions this somewhat, saying he's quite possibly a compatibilist in everything but name). The main crux of the review is that he misunderstands and/or falsely represents compatibilist free will in his critique, and throws out a straw man in its place.

On moral responsibility Harris, as a hard determinist, is against moral responsibility in theory, but at one point says it's wise to hold people responsible for practical purposes. This isn't an oxymoron; it's something a lot of hard determinists believe.

The book is excellent for a variety of reasons, many of which Dennett extolls in the opening paragraphs (before cutting up many other aspects of the book). And to someone who is a hard determinist, they'll find a lot to like, even if it misrepresents compatibilism at times. The approachability of Harris's writing is one of its main draws, however...a much better intro than the comparatively complicated Dennett.

...

I'm personally with Dennett (and Waller and others, by extension) on compatibilist free will (see my first few posts for a working definition). Moral responsibility, still on the fence, as mentioned.

Ok, let me start by saying that I hate going into a discussion were we have to stick to hard definitions, call me lazy, but I've studies languages enough to be uneasy with definitions. This probably sums up my take on the subject too, I don't care about any differences created exclusively by language.

So I mostly side with the idea of hard determinism. I do think that "miracles" could happen in a deterministic system, but since we only understand the universe as a linear entity they would seem determined from our perspective. I wouldn't asign morality to actions either.

Originally posted by Bentley
Ok, let me start by saying that I hate going into a discussion were we have to stick to hard definitions, call me lazy, but I've studies languages enough to be uneasy with definitions. This probably sums up my take on the subject too, I don't care about any differences created exclusively by language.

So I mostly side with the idea of hard determinism. I do think that "miracles" could happen in a deterministic system, but since we only understand the universe as a linear entity they would seem determined from our perspective. I wouldn't asign morality to actions either.

Cool, thanks for the response. Definitions in common usage are another matter, but definitions are very needed in this case to understand what is meant between say, libertarian free will, compatibilist free will, etc. Otherwise we'd have no way of communicating with each other about these ideas. So it's not merely a language issue, but that the term "free will" can mean radically different ideas depending on usage. So there is a need for clarity. The definitions presented represent pretty much every major philosophical stance on the matter.

How would miracles be possible in a deterministic system? The two seem at odds to me. And to be clear, miracle in this sense means a deliberate action removed from causal forces, a literal transcendence of physical laws. Nothing less could produce libertarian free will.

As a hard determinist, what's your take on compatibilist free will? I can see the argument for complete hard determinism - i.e. no free will of any kind, and no moral responsibility - but I personally think compatibilist free will is completely reasonable. I'd be interested to hear your take on it.

Originally posted by Digi
How would miracles be possible in a deterministic system? The two seem at odds to me. And to be clear, miracle in this sense means a deliberate action removed from causal forces, a literal transcendence of physical laws. Nothing less could produce libertarian free will.

In determinism time exists only as a frame of reference, so the future events will be as implied by the past events as the present is implied by the future. So even if there was a possible miracle in such situation, our conception of the past and the future would make sense of such miracle as if it always belonged in the system.

Miracles would be like a pinpoint violence on the system, something like a temporary suspension of the regular laws that it's so minimal -and at the same time so all encompassing-, that don't really change anything as how the universe is determined already. From that point of view I think the idea of a miracle is acceptable, but I personally wouldn't link it to libertarian free will, because that's like trying to build a paper plane that runs on atomic fission.

Originally posted by Digi
As a hard determinist, what's your take on compatibilist free will? I can see the argument for complete hard determinism - i.e. no free will of any kind, and no moral responsibility - but I personally think compatibilist free will is completely reasonable. I'd be interested to hear your take on it.

I'm not sure if a concept as complex as free will would make much sense to me. I accept the idea of responsability, and it shares several elements with the compatibilist free will you describe. You cannot have responsability without identity, if I become a different man than I was before, I cannot be acused of a crime. But identity can only be won by becoming aware of it's own inconsistencies and weaknesses, hence you are never fully responsible of anything. You can also refuse to assume your identity, because an identity is asigned -not to say forced- into you. I think that if there was any kind of freedom, it'd depend on the concept of responsability -which as you can figure, is not necessarily the consensual sense of the word freedom-.

Originally posted by Bentley
In determinism time exists only as a frame of reference, so the future events will be as implied by the past events as the present is implied by the future. So even if there was a possible miracle in such situation, our conception of the past and the future would make sense of such miracle as if it always belonged in the system.

Miracles would be like a pinpoint violence on the system, something like a temporary suspension of the regular laws that it's so minimal -and at the same time so all encompassing-, that don't really change anything as how the universe is determined already. From that point of view I think the idea of a miracle is acceptable, but I personally wouldn't link it to libertarian free will, because that's like trying to build a paper plane that runs on atomic fission.

This is an interesting take. I'll try to follow along. If you're touching on concepts like time travel or changing physical laws, those could potentially be absorbed into determinism based on laws we don't yet understand. But for a concept like free will to exist (in a libertarian sense), it would be a person making a conscious decision that is, unto itself, uncaused by anything preceding it. It gives the power of "first creation," often thought to be the exclusive privilege of, say, God.

But it sounds like you're a determinist. Whatever your idea of "miracle," it looks like it wouldn't allow for libertarian free will.

Originally posted by Bentley
I'm not sure if a concept as complex as free will would make much sense to me. I accept the idea of responsability, and it shares several elements with the compatibilist free will you describe. You cannot have responsability without identity, if I become a different man than I was before, I cannot be acused of a crime. But identity can only be won by becoming aware of it's own inconsistencies and weaknesses, hence you are never fully responsible of anything. You can also refuse to assume your identity, because an identity is asigned -not to say forced- into you. I think that if there was any kind of freedom, it'd depend on the concept of responsability -which as you can figure, is not necessarily the consensual sense of the word freedom-.

I think compatibilists are needlessly confusing others by trying to repurpose the phrase "free will," but their idea of it more closely resembles what we call "freedom." However, there's no sense knocking them for something we can't change at this point, and the idea itself (compatibilist free will) is quite interesting imo. And yes, this idea of free will usually carries with it moral responsibility. In that, you're with the majority of thinkers on the subject. Doesn't mean it's right necessarily, but it's certainly the most commonly held belief that we are responsible in some way.

Originally posted by Digi
For a great example from cognitive science, we've discovered that our body is already beginning the process of completing an action, BEFORE we become aware of the decision we've made to complete the action. This is testable, and it points to the conclusion that awareness is a byproduct of our cognition, but not a determining factor in decisions as we might suspect.

Studies that were highly criticized, I would note. I do not argue with the study or even what it implies (I believe that we have very little tangible will).* Dennett was one of the criticizers of these types of studies.

And Dennet's criticisms (which he attributed to attention to various variables as the contributing factor) were validated in newer studies.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10333013

And the concept of the subject's perceived readiness potential was philosophically ambiguous (which is what the test is truly measuring).


Even worse for this type of study is the finding that the subjective self-assessment of readiness potential appears to be retrospectively reconstructed:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19152537

Next, this readiness potential does not actually reflect a decision, but just simply "thinking" because the same readiness potential was observed in another study when subjects did not actually act (same signs of readiness potential but without the action):

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17835-free-will-is-not-an-illusion-after-all.html

For me, this is the most recent study that doesn't necessarily refute Libet's findings (or tests that seemingly confirm Libet's findigns), but it does not really contradict the Libet-like studies. It seeks to explain what the conclusory error in those studies were.


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3746176/


"The work of Libet has inspired generations of researchers and has started a still ongoing experimental quest on the interaction between neural processing and consciousness. He has been the first to show that decisions are not instantaneous or purely mental events, but that they represent the readout of an implementational brain process. However, findings obtained with Libet's clock paradigm still seem to suggest that consciousness of intentions is a single, instantaneous event. Most current interpretations of the research inspired by Libet assume that unconscious neural decision processes build up until they cross a threshold which then enables the instantaneous appearance of a full-blown conscious intention (Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al., 2011). However, this instantaneous appearance of conscious intentions might be an artifact of the method used for assessing the contents of consciousness. Studies using alternatives to the Libet clock have suggested that intention consciousness is a multistage process just as the neural mechanisms of motor decisions (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008; Fahle et al., 2011). The time of conscious intentions reported by the participants therefore might be only the culmination of preceding conscious deliberations, not a unique and instantaneous event. If this is true, the delay between the onset of neural predictors of motor decisions and conscious intentions reported with the Libet clock is not due to unconscious neural processes but due to conscious evaluations which are not final yet. The data currently available does not allow drawing definitive conclusions and other interpretations are equally possible. There are in fact instances when motor decisions are clearly initiated unconsciously (Custers and Aarts, 2010). The question whether early neural predictors of decision outcome are conscious is currently unresolved and requires more refined methods for assessing consciousness. Yet, the model proposed here is consistent with current findings without putting into question our conviction that we can consciously influence motor decisions. Given recent observations that denying the existence of free will has negative behavioral consequences (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009; Rigoni et al., 2012, 2013b; Alquist et al., 2013), this new conclusion could have significant behavioral relevance."


What's wonderful about these research is we still aren't very sure! There's more to know!


*I'm a Mormon, afterall. We don't say, "Free will" or "Free Agency", we say "Agency." This is to recognize things such as rape ( to use a harsh example, a woman who has been raped and gets pregnant has very little free will in that entire process: she was raped, FFS) or being born into a very poor environment. Free will doesn't really make sense. "I am going to decide to not be poor, today! WEEEE!" Nope, doesn't work that way. The set of choices an individual had is directly restricted by that individual's environment. Even further, genetics do play a role in the types of decisions we are prone to make and it takes quite a bit to change our natural dispositions. So, our set of "choose-able" choices is clearly finite and quite limited. There's your agency, mang.

Originally posted by Digi
Awareness doesn't change causal forces, though. And we're unaware of most of the causal forces leading to our decisions, up to and including falsely attributing our choices to internal rather than (often) external forces. Awareness of an action, even awareness of it as good or bad, is not justification for moral responsibility.

Responsability for me, is mostly about following actions with awareness. It does not have any particular moral implications by itself.


Originally posted by Digi
But because their beliefs dictate it, they start with a conclusion (libertarian free will) and try to work backwards from it, rather than letting evidence and logic lead to a conclusion.

I think this is partly one of the problems I have with libertarian freewill. By assuming it comes from outside our system, it cannot be explained simply by proof sensible experience, and thus we define the universe around free will instead of the opposite. But there is no reason to assume free will is beyond our universe to begin with!

This is not one of those mystic concepts as the afterlife whose separation from the physical universe comes from design.


Originally posted by Digi
So, for example, in my "A Brief Defense of Determinism" thought experiment in one of my opening posts, for libertarian free will to exist, you'd need to explain why or how you choose chocolate sometimes and vanilla sometimes.

Well, the problem with that thought experiment is that it cannot happen, literaly. You're pretty much breaking the universe with a set of miracles and assuming they should work as "no-miracles". I know it's just a thought experiment, but for me it just helps to show that the difference between actual free will and the illusion of freewill is nonsensical.

Was hoping someone would bite on the cognitive stuff. We're probably more in agreement than you might think dudemon, but I don't have time to properly respond to either of you atm. Maybe over the weekend.