Zampano I require your advice. If I claim it makes no sense to say that, "a set of contingent beings requires a set that contains at least one necessary being to exist", because causality is a properly that exists in the set of contingent beings. Does this make sense to you? Essentially:
{x | x = all contingent beings}
Causality is a contingent being.
A set of all contingent beings must be caused by a set with at least one necessary being. Causality must be caused?
I'm having a hard time putting this into words that make sense.
Bullied girl gets support from Star Wars fans: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/21/living/bullied-girl-star-wars-feat/index.html
Originally posted by |King Joker|
Bullied girl gets support from Star Wars fans: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/21/living/bullied-girl-star-wars-feat/index.html
cutest thing ever 👆
What should have happened with the Ewoks.
Originally posted by Lucius
What should have happened with the Ewoks.
Best anime ever. 👆
Originally posted by |King Joker|
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-3207415/Dracula-legend-grave-Star-Wars-prequel-Peter-Cushing-digitally-recreated-new-spin-Rogue-One.htmlHoly shit
Well dang, so they're going to Tupac/MJ him? Jeez that's going to be costly.
Originally posted by Lucius
Zampano I require your advice. If I claim it makes no sense to say that, "a set of contingent beings requires a set that contains at least one necessary being to exist", because causality is a properly that exists in the set of contingent beings. Does this make sense to you? Essentially:{x | x = all contingent beings}
Causality is a contingent being.
A set of all contingent beings must be caused by a set with at least one necessary being. Causality must be caused?
I'm having a hard time putting this into words that make sense.
I think you're stumbling over the phrasing of the requirement. To take a stab at it, the claim it sounds like you are addressing as wrong is "for a set of contingent beings to be non-empty, then at least one necessary being must exist." Then you are claiming that the property "causality" is an element in that set of contingent beings. This means that a circularity develops when you want to appeal to causality to justify the existence of a necessary being.
The bit that I colored red is the critical part. If causality is a part of that contingent set, then there's no reason to think that the necessary being is bound by any statement of the form "must be caused by" (formalizing this might be difficult).
Actually, let's try. Define a non-reflexive relation xMy, where y must be caused by x. Then if it is true that causality is a "contingent being" (in the sense you're using above), there exists an edge case x` where the relation does not hold. Specifically, when x` is a necessary being that does not entail the existence of causality.
Spoiler:
If such an x` does not exist, then perhaps causality is not a contingent being, but I'm not sure if that helps you or not.
Feel free to distill these ramblings into anything that looks like a point, if you can.
Originally posted by Lucius
That makes a lot more sense. I can work with that. For context, I was debating a Jesuit trained Thomist over Aquinas' Cosmological Argument, and those guys know their shit.
good luck! the jesuits are powerful and enigmatic figures, found more often in the fringes of spacers' tall tales than on the public stage. If cornered by a jesuit, be aware that the legal code does permit them to use deadly force. They avoid this for aesthetic reasons, but have been known to undermine governments as a sort of friendly warning not to interfere with their dealings.
