is it possible for a computer to gain self awareness

Originally posted by 753
but we're not machines although everything about our inner workings is bound by physical law. when people think about computers gaining conscience or auto-conscience they are usually talking about silicon chips somehow emulating what the cellular network know as brain can do without an actual mollecular replica of it.

this argument is built upon the assumption that the epiphenomenon of conscience can be replicated independetly of the specific underlying physical processes that actually generate it. therefore electronic circuitry of a completely different material nature and organizational dynamic could generate the same epiphenomenon and software could be a mind.

I am yet to see anything even remotely approaching reasonable evidence for this belief, the so called multi-realizability, which IMO is nothing but sci-fi fantasy

computers as understood by us will never gain sentience (that's conscient sensations like pain, images and smells, not sci-fi personhood btw) or metacognition.

Agreed, but if one uploads their own "metacognition" through transhuman processes-we will change what it is to be self-aware as we change what it is to be human.

Originally posted by 753
I am yet to see anything even remotely approaching reasonable evidence for this belief, the so called multi-realizability, which IMO is nothing but sci-fi fantasy

I'd point to the whole history of machines.

Time can be kept on a sun dial, a grandfather clock, and a digital watch. Obviously many processes are multi-realizable (actually I can't think of any that aren't). Why should consciousness be an exception?

In theory, even if it were impossible to build a conscious machine out of non-organic parts, the mechanisms could be simulated on a sufficiently powerful computer. With enough processing power, there is nothing that would stop a program from being identical to the human brain, down to a molecular level if need be.

No, a computer program would only mimic true awareness. This would take a lifetime of algorithmic notations however to perfect. It would then mimic a true person, but would never truly feel emotion, although it's computations could fool a person into believing that it feels emotions.

why is it a mimic if it is identical? how couldn't that be emotion?

Because emotions are a chemical reaction. This would be technically different.

Originally posted by Oliver North
In theory, even if it were impossible to build a conscious machine out of non-organic parts, the mechanisms could be simulated on a sufficiently powerful computer. With enough processing power, there is nothing that would stop a program from being identical to the human brain, down to a molecular level if need be.

how would a representation of a physical entity actually be identical to it, if it isnt a physical entity onto itself? why should we assume an algorithmic representation of a brain can produce the same epiphenomenon?

Originally posted by Stoic
Because emotions are a chemical reaction. This would be technically different.

emotions are not a chemical reaction

Originally posted by 753
a painting isn't the portrayed object.

how would a representation of a physical entity actually be identical to it, if it isnt a physical entity onto itself? why should we assume an algorithmic representation of a brain can produce the same epiphenomenon?

then what is special about the physical brain that couldn't be modeled? This is dangerously close to dualism, no? some special matter in the brain?

Does this end with an attempt to define and describe a soul?

Originally posted by Symmetric Chaos
I'd point to the whole history of machines.

Time can be kept on a sun dial, a grandfather clock, and a digital watch. Obviously many processes are multi-realizable (actually I can't think of any that aren't). Why should consciousness be an exception?

we have models of population genetics and evolution, they produce codes that increase or decrease in frequency depending on their meeting of certain parameters designed to mimic environemntal selective pressures. without even going into definitions of life, are they replicators that undergo darwininan evolution? I say they aren't.

Originally posted by Oliver North
[B]emotions are not a chemical reaction

then what is special about the physical brain that couldn't be modeled? This is dangerously close to dualism, no? some special matter in the brain?

assume we can model weather patterns with perfection - we have the processing capacity + perfect data imput from a complete understanding of the physical system's behavior (unatainable, but let's assume). the model can now emulate and predict weather behavior to a tee. but it's not weather, it has no physical reality, it produces no changes in pressure, temperature or moisture.

a software that models matter perfectly does not project gravitational and electromagnetic fields. it occupies no space, has no mass, carries no energy (of course the underlying hardware is matter and has physical properties, but not the ones the software is modelling).

the point isnt that the brain is made of magical matter, but that it is a dynamic system of matter and computer models aren't (again, of course the underlying hardware is a material system, but it's not the same system as a brain)

Originally posted by 753
the point isnt that the brain is made of magical matter, but that it is a dynamic system of matter and computer models aren't (again, of course the underlying hardware is a material system, but it's not the same system as a brain)

You seem to have a very 1950s era view of what computers can do.

Originally posted by Symmetric Chaos
You seem to have a very 1950s era view of what computers can do.

Originally posted by 753
what are they exaclty? or rather, what physical process underlies them?

glibly I'd ask what part of the experience of an emotion are you talking about, but generally speaking, an emotion would be the activation of distributed neuronal networks. The chemicals are the mechanism by which these neurons communicate, but in terms of experience or information processing, they are only relevant insomuch as they are the things that allow neuronal communication. The actual emotional experience is based on patterns of activation over time, not on the chemical reactions.

Calling something like serotonin the "happy" chemical is a gross oversimplification that really only exists because of pop psychology wanting simple answers to sell crappy books.

Originally posted by 753
a software that models matter perfectly does not project gravitational and electromagnetic fields. it occupies no space, has no mass, carries no energy (of course the underlying hardware is matter and has physical properties, but not the ones the software is modelling).

the point isnt that the brain is made of magical matter, but that it is a dynamic system of matter and computer models aren't (again, of course the underlying hardware is a material system, but it's not the same system as a brain)

I actually have a lot of difficulty differentiating this argument from "the brain is magic"

Originally posted by Oliver North
glibly I'd ask what part of the experience of an emotion are you talking about, but generally speaking, an emotion would be the activation of distributed neuronal networks. The chemicals are the mechanism by which these neurons communicate, but in terms of experience or information processing, they are only relevant insomuch as they are the things that allow neuronal communication. The actual emotional experience is based on patterns of activation over time, not on the chemical reactions.

Calling something like serotonin the "happy" chemical is a gross oversimplification that really only exists because of pop psychology wanting simple answers to sell crappy books.

I actually have a lot of difficulty differentiating this argument from "the brain is magic" [/B]

the organizational pattern of a system is bound by the material nature of said system. the behavior of physical entities cant be divorced from the physical entities themselves. it is untranslatable. a mere representation of it as abstractions we make sense of isn't an actual reproduction of the pattern.

this is a pretty interesting discussion and I like being made to think about it. thinking about your position (assuming I understand it correctly) there is something about it that bugs me and I can't quite put my finger on it. I've sort of encountered it before in discussions about gene expression, cell signaling etc. this idea that information is a real thing onto itself and not an abstraction. as if the gene could be decoupled from the physical entity that is dna. as if the physical structure of the molecule werent the "be all" of the "message". ironically this is what seems close to dualism to me.

I don't see why not

Originally posted by 753
the organizational pattern of a system is bound by the material nature of said system. the behavior of physical entities cant be divorced from the physical entities themselves. it is untranslatable.

Why not?

If I build a mechanical clock it will keep time.
If I simulate the same mechanical clock in a computer it will keep time.

If I build a brain it will be conscious insofar as the word conscious has any meaning.
If I simulate the same brain in a computer it will be conscious insofar as the word conscious has any meaning.

Originally posted by 753
a mere representation of it as abstractions we make sense of isn't an actual reproduction of the pattern.

But an exact reproduction of the pattern would be a reproduction of the pattern. There is no reason we can't simulate an exact replica of a brain in a computer (except that it's really hard to do).

Originally posted by 753
this is a pretty interesting discussion and I like being made to think about it. thinking about your position (assuming I understand it correctly) there is something about it that bugs me and I can't quite put my finger on it. I've sort of encountered it before in discussions about gene expression, cell signaling etc. this idea that information is a real thing onto itself and not an abstraction. as if the gene could be decoupled from the physical entity that is dna. as if the physical structure of the molecule werent the "be all" of the "message". ironically this is what seems close to dualism to me.

I think what you're seeing is the argument that there is nothing special about the brain (which I have now mistyped four times as brian, btw). If I build a clock out of brass would you tell me that I cannot build a clock out of steel? Of course not because there is nothing special about the brass only what the brass is doing and I can translate that into steel just fine.

There's no need for dualism here only recognition that "the thing" and "what the thing does" are not the same thing.

Originally posted by Symmetric Chaos
Why not?

If I build a mechanical clock it will keep time.
If I simulate the same mechanical clock in a computer it will keep time.

If I build a brain it will be conscious insofar as the word conscious has any meaning.
If I simulate the same brain in a computer it will be conscious insofar as the word conscious has any meaning.

I take the word consciousness to be synonimous with the occurrence of qualia or subjective conscious experiences and assume you do too.

If I built a black hole, it could drag light into it by its infinite gravity (I actually know dick about black holes, but last I heard their gravity was infinite)

If I simulated the same black hole in a computer would it have gravity insofar as the word gravity means anything?

But an exact reproduction of the pattern would be a reproduction of the pattern. There is no reason we can't simulate an exact replica of a brain in a computer (except that it's really hard to do).

I think what you're seeing is the argument that there is nothing special about the brain (which I have now mistyped four times as brian, btw). If I build a clock out of brass would you tell me that I cannot build a clock out of steel? Of course not because there is nothing special about the brass only what the brass is doing and I can translate that into steel just fine.
[quote]
quite right. but the brain isn't a substance, it's an organ made of cells, which are selfbound systems of chemical reactions. it is both the substract and the "clockwork" the substract's very material nature conditions.

[quote]
There's no need for dualism here only recognition that "the thing" and "what the thing does" are not the same thing. [/B]

ultimately what irks me about it is the implicit reduction of the mind to computational functions and the rejection of subjective experience, as per Daniel Dennet's eliminative materialism, which I find absurd. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism

here's an interesting though experiment
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

functionalists like Dennet bite the bullet and claim this system can realize a mind.

Originally posted by 753
by activation do you mean the flow of action potentials? arent they ultimately complex systems of chemical reactions? arent the cells themselves?

aren't tables and chairs?

the chemicals aren't the important part, it is the distributed pattern of activation. What causes that activation is interesting, but in theory, anything that allowed that type of inter-cellular communication would have the same effect.

Originally posted by Oliver North
aren't tables and chairs?

the chemicals aren't the important part, it is the distributed pattern of activation. What causes that activation is interesting, but in theory, anything that allowed that type of inter-cellular communication would have the same effect.

"Some" are thinking that memristors will act as the electronic medium necessary for true AI because each memristor "cell" can both store data and process data...like a real neuron is supposed to do.

But, here's the odd part about that: memristors operate much more quickly than neurons and the connections are not lost nearly as frequently as neurons. So, basically, it will be a faster thinking, better memory retaining AI than a human mind......IF they can get it work properly.

How do neurons store memories?