Moral Responsibility (& Free Will)

I just discovered an excellent addition to this thread. Dan Dennett has reviewed Sam Harris's book "Free Will" at length.
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/reflections-on-free-will

Harris is a hard determinist, for reference (though Dennett questions this somewhat, saying he's quite possibly a compatibilist in everything but name). The main crux of the review is that he misunderstands and/or falsely represents compatibilist free will in his critique, and throws out a straw man in its place.

On moral responsibility Harris, as a hard determinist, is against moral responsibility in theory, but at one point says it's wise to hold people responsible for practical purposes. This isn't an oxymoron; it's something a lot of hard determinists believe.

The book is excellent for a variety of reasons, many of which Dennett extolls in the opening paragraphs (before cutting up many other aspects of the book). And to someone who is a hard determinist, they'll find a lot to like, even if it misrepresents compatibilism at times. The approachability of Harris's writing is one of its main draws, however...a much better intro than the comparatively complicated Dennett.

...

I'm personally with Dennett (and Waller and others, by extension) on compatibilist free will (see my first few posts for a working definition). Moral responsibility, still on the fence, as mentioned.

Ok, let me start by saying that I hate going into a discussion were we have to stick to hard definitions, call me lazy, but I've studies languages enough to be uneasy with definitions. This probably sums up my take on the subject too, I don't care about any differences created exclusively by language.

So I mostly side with the idea of hard determinism. I do think that "miracles" could happen in a deterministic system, but since we only understand the universe as a linear entity they would seem determined from our perspective. I wouldn't asign morality to actions either.

Originally posted by Bentley
Ok, let me start by saying that I hate going into a discussion were we have to stick to hard definitions, call me lazy, but I've studies languages enough to be uneasy with definitions. This probably sums up my take on the subject too, I don't care about any differences created exclusively by language.

So I mostly side with the idea of hard determinism. I do think that "miracles" could happen in a deterministic system, but since we only understand the universe as a linear entity they would seem determined from our perspective. I wouldn't asign morality to actions either.

Cool, thanks for the response. Definitions in common usage are another matter, but definitions are very needed in this case to understand what is meant between say, libertarian free will, compatibilist free will, etc. Otherwise we'd have no way of communicating with each other about these ideas. So it's not merely a language issue, but that the term "free will" can mean radically different ideas depending on usage. So there is a need for clarity. The definitions presented represent pretty much every major philosophical stance on the matter.

How would miracles be possible in a deterministic system? The two seem at odds to me. And to be clear, miracle in this sense means a deliberate action removed from causal forces, a literal transcendence of physical laws. Nothing less could produce libertarian free will.

As a hard determinist, what's your take on compatibilist free will? I can see the argument for complete hard determinism - i.e. no free will of any kind, and no moral responsibility - but I personally think compatibilist free will is completely reasonable. I'd be interested to hear your take on it.

Originally posted by Digi
How would miracles be possible in a deterministic system? The two seem at odds to me. And to be clear, miracle in this sense means a deliberate action removed from causal forces, a literal transcendence of physical laws. Nothing less could produce libertarian free will.

In determinism time exists only as a frame of reference, so the future events will be as implied by the past events as the present is implied by the future. So even if there was a possible miracle in such situation, our conception of the past and the future would make sense of such miracle as if it always belonged in the system.

Miracles would be like a pinpoint violence on the system, something like a temporary suspension of the regular laws that it's so minimal -and at the same time so all encompassing-, that don't really change anything as how the universe is determined already. From that point of view I think the idea of a miracle is acceptable, but I personally wouldn't link it to libertarian free will, because that's like trying to build a paper plane that runs on atomic fission.

Originally posted by Digi
As a hard determinist, what's your take on compatibilist free will? I can see the argument for complete hard determinism - i.e. no free will of any kind, and no moral responsibility - but I personally think compatibilist free will is completely reasonable. I'd be interested to hear your take on it.

I'm not sure if a concept as complex as free will would make much sense to me. I accept the idea of responsability, and it shares several elements with the compatibilist free will you describe. You cannot have responsability without identity, if I become a different man than I was before, I cannot be acused of a crime. But identity can only be won by becoming aware of it's own inconsistencies and weaknesses, hence you are never fully responsible of anything. You can also refuse to assume your identity, because an identity is asigned -not to say forced- into you. I think that if there was any kind of freedom, it'd depend on the concept of responsability -which as you can figure, is not necessarily the consensual sense of the word freedom-.

Originally posted by Bentley
In determinism time exists only as a frame of reference, so the future events will be as implied by the past events as the present is implied by the future. So even if there was a possible miracle in such situation, our conception of the past and the future would make sense of such miracle as if it always belonged in the system.

Miracles would be like a pinpoint violence on the system, something like a temporary suspension of the regular laws that it's so minimal -and at the same time so all encompassing-, that don't really change anything as how the universe is determined already. From that point of view I think the idea of a miracle is acceptable, but I personally wouldn't link it to libertarian free will, because that's like trying to build a paper plane that runs on atomic fission.

This is an interesting take. I'll try to follow along. If you're touching on concepts like time travel or changing physical laws, those could potentially be absorbed into determinism based on laws we don't yet understand. But for a concept like free will to exist (in a libertarian sense), it would be a person making a conscious decision that is, unto itself, uncaused by anything preceding it. It gives the power of "first creation," often thought to be the exclusive privilege of, say, God.

But it sounds like you're a determinist. Whatever your idea of "miracle," it looks like it wouldn't allow for libertarian free will.

Originally posted by Bentley
I'm not sure if a concept as complex as free will would make much sense to me. I accept the idea of responsability, and it shares several elements with the compatibilist free will you describe. You cannot have responsability without identity, if I become a different man than I was before, I cannot be acused of a crime. But identity can only be won by becoming aware of it's own inconsistencies and weaknesses, hence you are never fully responsible of anything. You can also refuse to assume your identity, because an identity is asigned -not to say forced- into you. I think that if there was any kind of freedom, it'd depend on the concept of responsability -which as you can figure, is not necessarily the consensual sense of the word freedom-.

I think compatibilists are needlessly confusing others by trying to repurpose the phrase "free will," but their idea of it more closely resembles what we call "freedom." However, there's no sense knocking them for something we can't change at this point, and the idea itself (compatibilist free will) is quite interesting imo. And yes, this idea of free will usually carries with it moral responsibility. In that, you're with the majority of thinkers on the subject. Doesn't mean it's right necessarily, but it's certainly the most commonly held belief that we are responsible in some way.

Responsability for me fits an idea of the awareness of the agent as a part of a cause-consequence chain. Agents, even animals, are aware of their actions and can assume them in different matters. Sympathy is projecting awareness into a second agent. These are to me pretty basic ideas regarding identities, which only happen through time, which is a perspective for agents anyways.

I'd argue that freedom is way more composite than that, so much that it doesn't succesfully describe any real thing.

Libertarian freewill it's pretty hipster, everything you do is original in the first sense of the word. The core concept of it seems related to reinvention, since if there exists a "nature" of the individual no choice would be fully original, they'd come from a predetermined set of choices a kin to your own "soul". To entertain the idea of reinvention I suggest the possibility of denying one's identity, thus throwing previous responsability out of the window. Which I think it's funny, because the idea of being capable of taking décisions of your own would actually substract responsability from you, if we were to assume you can be fully original in the decisions you take.

Originally posted by Bentley
Responsability for me fits an idea of the awareness of the agent as a part of a cause-consequence chain. Agents, even animals, are aware of their actions and can assume them in different matters. Sympathy is projecting awareness into a second agent. These are to me pretty basic ideas regarding identities, which only happen through time, which is a perspective for agents anyways.

Awareness doesn't change causal forces, though. And we're unaware of most of the causal forces leading to our decisions, up to and including falsely attributing our choices to internal rather than (often) external forces. Awareness of an action, even awareness of it as good or bad, is not justification for moral responsibility when we still have no ultimate control over the forces - even internal forces - that lead to a decision. At least I (and Waller, Harris, etc.) would argue it isn't.

For a great example from cognitive science, we've discovered that our body is already beginning the process of completing an action, BEFORE we become aware of the decision we've made to complete the action. This is testable, and it points to the conclusion that awareness is a byproduct of our cognition, but not a determining factor in decisions as we might suspect.

You seem to assume determinism with your cause-consequence chain, though, so we seem to be in agreement about determinism (or naturalism) itself. Just not the implications of it.

Originally posted by Bentley
I'd argue that freedom is way more composite than that, so much that it doesn't succesfully describe any real thing.

More composite than what? Exactitude is important here. Are you drawing a line between freedom and free will? If it helps, throw out the idea of freedom, and just focus on compatibilist free will. I only referenced the concept of freedom as a handy comparison, not a literal substitution.

Originally posted by Bentley
Libertarian freewill it's pretty hipster, everything you do is original in the first sense of the word. The core concept of it seems related to reinvention, since if there exists a "nature" of the individual no choice would be fully original, they'd come from a predetermined set of choices a kin to your own "soul". To entertain the idea of reinvention I suggest the possibility of denying one's identity, thus throwing previous responsability out of the window. Which I think it's funny, because the idea of being capable of taking décisions of your own would actually substract responsability from you, if we were to assume you can be fully original in the decisions you take.

Hipster? Ok. It's more a religious thing than anything else. God gives us free will, or so many religions state, with the ability to choose between alternatives. Determinism refutes this, and it's currently our best understanding of the universe, and even removed from physics, being able to separate oneself from causality is also a logical conundrum. But because their beliefs dictate it, they start with a conclusion (libertarian free will) and try to work backwards from it, rather than letting evidence and logic lead to a conclusion.

Deciding to discard "previous responsibility" as you put it, would also be determined. Unpredictable, perhaps, but no less caused by preceding causes. Same with "denying one's identity" (a problematic phrase for me in this context, but w/e). You seem to be discussing authenticity (i.e. "This decision is mine"😉, not libertarian free will. Because neither of these things would be sufficient for libertarian choice among alternatives to exist.

So, for example, in my "A Brief Defense of Determinism" thought experiment in one of my opening posts, for libertarian free will to exist, you'd need to explain why or how you choose chocolate sometimes and vanilla sometimes.

But you're a determinist, so some of this is pedantic. We're not in any disagreement, I'm just a little confused at your take on libertarian free will.

Originally posted by Digi
For a great example from cognitive science, we've discovered that our body is already beginning the process of completing an action, BEFORE we become aware of the decision we've made to complete the action. This is testable, and it points to the conclusion that awareness is a byproduct of our cognition, but not a determining factor in decisions as we might suspect.

Studies that were highly criticized, I would note. I do not argue with the study or even what it implies (I believe that we have very little tangible will).* Dennett was one of the criticizers of these types of studies.

And Dennet's criticisms (which he attributed to attention to various variables as the contributing factor) were validated in newer studies.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10333013

And the concept of the subject's perceived readiness potential was philosophically ambiguous (which is what the test is truly measuring).

Even worse for this type of study is the finding that the subjective self-assessment of readiness potential appears to be retrospectively reconstructed:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19152537

Next, this readiness potential does not actually reflect a decision, but just simply "thinking" because the same readiness potential was observed in another study when subjects did not actually act (same signs of readiness potential but without the action):

http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17835-free-will-is-not-an-illusion-after-all.html

For me, this is the most recent study that doesn't necessarily refute Libet's findings (or tests that seemingly confirm Libet's findigns), but it does not really contradict the Libet-like studies. It seeks to explain what the conclusory error in those studies were.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3746176/

"The work of Libet has inspired generations of researchers and has started a still ongoing experimental quest on the interaction between neural processing and consciousness. He has been the first to show that decisions are not instantaneous or purely mental events, but that they represent the readout of an implementational brain process. However, findings obtained with Libet's clock paradigm still seem to suggest that consciousness of intentions is a single, instantaneous event. Most current interpretations of the research inspired by Libet assume that unconscious neural decision processes build up until they cross a threshold which then enables the instantaneous appearance of a full-blown conscious intention (Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al., 2011). However, this instantaneous appearance of conscious intentions might be an artifact of the method used for assessing the contents of consciousness. Studies using alternatives to the Libet clock have suggested that intention consciousness is a multistage process just as the neural mechanisms of motor decisions (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008; Fahle et al., 2011). The time of conscious intentions reported by the participants therefore might be only the culmination of preceding conscious deliberations, not a unique and instantaneous event. If this is true, the delay between the onset of neural predictors of motor decisions and conscious intentions reported with the Libet clock is not due to unconscious neural processes but due to conscious evaluations which are not final yet. The data currently available does not allow drawing definitive conclusions and other interpretations are equally possible. There are in fact instances when motor decisions are clearly initiated unconsciously (Custers and Aarts, 2010). The question whether early neural predictors of decision outcome are conscious is currently unresolved and requires more refined methods for assessing consciousness. Yet, the model proposed here is consistent with current findings without putting into question our conviction that we can consciously influence motor decisions. Given recent observations that denying the existence of free will has negative behavioral consequences (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009; Rigoni et al., 2012, 2013b; Alquist et al., 2013), this new conclusion could have significant behavioral relevance."

What's wonderful about these research is we still aren't very sure! There's more to know! 😄

*I'm a Mormon, afterall. We don't say, "Free will" or "Free Agency", we say "Agency." This is to recognize things such as rape ( to use a harsh example, a woman who has been raped and gets pregnant has very little free will in that entire process: she was raped, FFS) or being born into a very poor environment. Free will doesn't really make sense. "I am going to decide to not be poor, today! WEEEE!" Nope, doesn't work that way. The set of choices an individual had is directly restricted by that individual's environment. Even further, genetics do play a role in the types of decisions we are prone to make and it takes quite a bit to change our natural dispositions. So, our set of "choose-able" choices is clearly finite and quite limited. There's your agency, mang.

Originally posted by Digi
Awareness doesn't change causal forces, though. And we're unaware of most of the causal forces leading to our decisions, up to and including falsely attributing our choices to internal rather than (often) external forces. Awareness of an action, even awareness of it as good or bad, is not justification for moral responsibility.

Responsability for me, is mostly about following actions with awareness. It does not have any particular moral implications by itself.

Originally posted by Digi
But because their beliefs dictate it, they start with a conclusion (libertarian free will) and try to work backwards from it, rather than letting evidence and logic lead to a conclusion.

I think this is partly one of the problems I have with libertarian freewill. By assuming it comes from outside our system, it cannot be explained simply by proof sensible experience, and thus we define the universe around free will instead of the opposite. But there is no reason to assume free will is beyond our universe to begin with!

This is not one of those mystic concepts as the afterlife whose separation from the physical universe comes from design.

Originally posted by Digi
So, for example, in my "A Brief Defense of Determinism" thought experiment in one of my opening posts, for libertarian free will to exist, you'd need to explain why or how you choose chocolate sometimes and vanilla sometimes.

Well, the problem with that thought experiment is that it cannot happen, literaly. You're pretty much breaking the universe with a set of miracles and assuming they should work as "no-miracles". I know it's just a thought experiment, but for me it just helps to show that the difference between actual free will and the illusion of freewill is nonsensical.

Was hoping someone would bite on the cognitive stuff. We're probably more in agreement than you might think dudemon, but I don't have time to properly respond to either of you atm. Maybe over the weekend.

Ah. I seem to have forgotten to make my response here. Soon, perhaps.

Until then, Sam Harris has fired back at Dan Dennett's review of Harris's book (linked above):
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-marionettes-lament

And linked in that rebuttal is another interesting article on free will and love:
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/free-will-and-the-reality-of-love

Of particular interest to me was Harris's idea that compatibilism is ignoring the central question of free will, and is, if anything, unnecessary "window dressing" on the subject. He writes:
"You think that compatibilists like yourself have purified the concept of free will by “deliberately using cleaned-up, demystified substitutes for the folk concepts.” I believe that you have changed the subject and are now ignoring the very phenomenon we should be talking about—the common, felt sense that I/he/she/you could have done otherwise (generally known as “libertarian” or “contra-causal” free will), with all its moral implications. The legitimacy of your attempting to make free will “presentable” by performing conceptual surgery on it is our main point of contention. Whether or not I can convince you of the speciousness of the compatibilist project, I hope we can agree in the abstract that there is a difference between thinking more clearly about a phenomenon and (wittingly or unwittingly) thinking about something else. I intend to show that you are doing the latter."

It's an interesting take. It doesn't so much call compatibilism false as beside the point.