Originally posted by DarkC
That's the testimony; none has arisen to disprove it.
How Hitler met his end is still too this day has not been fully explain due to contradicting statements from those who surrendered, I think we can all agree Hitler died in the Bunker. As for his body why the Soviets did not put it on display like they did with Joseph Goebbels, why did the Soviet 1945 investigation end in a mess which resulted in another investigation. In 1946 Stalin launched Operation Myth which resulted in mixed findings.
I am not sure the Soviets ever got their hands on Hitler's body for one fact Hitler's body was taken up to the tee garden to be burnt but the war would continual for another 10 hours, the tee garden suffered a number of direct hits from Soviet artillery for that duration of time. I tend to think Hitler's body was destroyed, but for the Soviets they needed a body knowing how paranoid Stalin was about Hitler they may have lied to Stalin.
😮💨 hitler was an idoit the only way he was powerful was three reasons one
he was a great speacker two he had unlimited mony for new war wepons. three the peapole of germany hated the treaty. ow and one more thing HE HAD THE CHANCE TO CREATE NECULAR WEPONS AND PUT THEM IN INTO V2 ROCKETS BUT HE DIDINT LIKE THE IDEA. so
clearly he is an idot HE COULD HAVE WON THE WAR. he also had a
meadical condison wich made him a slow thinker he is an idoit. 😆
Originally posted by DUDEEAT
[B HE HAD THE CHANCE TO CREATE NECULAR WEPONS AND PUT THEM IN INTO V2 ROCKETS BUT HE DIDINT LIKE THE IDEA. so
clearly he is an idot HE COULD HAVE WON THE WAR. [/B]
Hitler was hardly an idiot on the political stage, just look at his clever moves during 1935-1939. But as a war leader his thinking was questionable, He can not take the entire fault for the errors of war his Generals were just as bad at times. As for this idea of a V2 caring atomic warhead what rubbish, well the hell did you get that piece of information from.
German physicists, headed by the theoretical physicists Werner Heisenburg, who were developing the bomb had their calculations wrong and believed they needed far more U-235 was needed to build a bomb.
Germany could never have won the war for these four big reasons.
1. Their biggest weakness was oil
2. The logistical situation
3. Declaring war on Russia
4. Declaring war on America
Russia won WW2; people and Americans in general over estimate America's importance in WW2(No offence by the way; i'm American).
No to reiterate facts here but the reasons the Americans, British and Canadians didn't get pushed back into the Ocean what the late movement of the Panzer forces in Pas de Calais because Hitler said they couldn't move without his orders. Most of the troops defending the beaches were illequipted and illtrained 'Ost Troops', Force Enlisted Ukrainians that just wanted to go home; with a few exception like the 352nd Infantry Division and of crouse the fanatical 12th Waffen-SS that fought like hell against the Allies inland.
And by the way people read some ****ing books before you tell you stupid ****ing comment of what you think. I started laughing when the guy of first page said how great a Military General Hitler was.
Don't beleive all of the shit you read in school; get some real History books. RZM Imports is a good place; the moderators wont let me post a link until I am 'more well known'.
Anyways I love the history involving the Second World War and the Eastern Front in particular.
"
Originally posted by Koenig
The Russian invasion plan was a mess from the start, Hitler made the error is trying to kill the Goose that laid the golden egg. 😉
I just want to say one thing first I do not agree with Hitler being a good General; that is perhaps the most idiotic thing I have read on the forum
But saying Operation Barbossa was a 'mess from the start' is rediculous. Conqouring 500,000 sqaure miles from the start on June 22, 1941 to December 1941. The Blitz in Russia was just as effective at first as the Blitz in 1940 of 1941 in Europe.
But for sure invading Russia lost Hitler the war.
Hitler had to depend on most of his generals to do what needed to be done. I don't think hitler was smart enough to make good decisions on his own but he sure was good at convincing Germany of the "pure race'' and the extermination of the Jews. Germany's biggest mistake was invading Russia before when Germany made a deal with Stalin not to invade a certain part of Poland I think that was the country and that put them at odds with Germany and the final straw was when Germany invaded Russia in the early 40's.
Originally posted by Dogigi
But saying Operation Barbossa was a 'mess from the start' is rediculous.
Really?
Logistics planning was overly optimistic and totally unrealistic and planning factors were often determined by capability rather than actual requirements. For example, although the number of armoured divisions available for "Operation Barbarossa" had more than doubled from 15 in May 1940 to 32 in June 1941, the number of vehicles had only increased by a third from 2574 to 3332.5
Similarly, full wartime production was not in effect before the invasion. For a campaign of such magnitude, German factories were operating on a single shift basis and the under-utilisation of German industrial capacity resulted in shortfalls in essential combat materials. Production consistently lagged behind consumption. The Germans had been involved militarily in Norway, Belgium, France and the Balkans prior to the invasion of Soviet Union, resulting in major equipment shortfalls and damages. For a force which depended on machines for its offensive capability and its survival as none had depended to the same extent before, these were crippling defects. Many of the deficiencies had been foreseen and, as often as not, side-stepped or ignored on grounds of economy or because Hitler and many of his commanders had deluded themselves into believing the war would be won long before winter took its toll.
Transport assets within a theatre are major factors in campaign planning, both tactical and logistical. Being a key element in logistics, it can severely restrict operations. In Sinews of War, James Huston has highlighted that in a theatre of operation, a single authority, identical with the command authority should be responsible for logistics. This is again precisely what the German logistics system lacked - unity of command. The transportation responsibilities were split between the Chief of Transport (rail and inland waterways) and the Quartermaster-General (motor transport). This made an already bad situation worse. The German motor vehicle production could replace neither normal wear and tear nor keep up with combat losses.
As a result, the Wehrmacht conducted a major demotorization programme, procuring horses and wagons to offset the critical truck shortage. The transport of supplies became more dependent on horse, than motorised power. During 'Operation Barbarossa", the Wehrmacht relied on more than 625 000 horses.
Although the Germans committed themselves to a strategy that favoured rapid movement over long distances, heavy reliance was made on horses, which were used to pull everything from field kitchens to artillery pieces.
Logistics assets must be manoeuvrable. Support units must be sufficiently agile and mobile. But when a German division entered the fighting, it did so with 162 different types of soft skin vehicles, among the 21 major groupings of which it was composed. Most of these groupings had 17 different types of lorries within a unit establishment of 33 vehicles. The artillery regiment had 445 vehicles on establishment and there were 69 different types of lorries.
The problem of spares for these many and often unusually different types of machines can best be imagined. The lack of standardisation and the limited supply of spare parts was exacerbated by the lack of maintenance units within the invasion force. Heavy maintenance units remained in Germany or Poland based on the incorrect assumption of no requirement due to the short duration of the campaign.
By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear.
Food was another essential commodity that was in critical short supply. It was never an important priority to Hitler. When in late 1941, Hitler was told of the shortage in transport and that the system was only able to supply the armies in the field with one of the most urgent priorities and to choose between warm clothing, food and ammunition, Hitler chose ammunition. Shortfalls in the ration resupply system resulted in 'slaughter' platoons being formed within divisions as an expedient measure. Commanders in the field relied on foraging local livestock to feed the soldiers and this continued until such time when shortages resulted in troops eating their units' horses.
The Germans discovered that most roads in Russia, except only a few main highways, were turned into impassable mud tracks following even moderate rainfall. Therefore, railway, the only other main source of communication was heavily depended upon. This too was grossly inadequate. Not only were the main lines few in number and the branch line system poor, but the whole railway network used a broader gauge than that of Western European. This incompatibility between German and Russia rail systems brought about a tremendous strain upon the small amount of rolling stock which the German Army was neither able to seize nor to adapt. In winter, the railway life-line often failed and in the sector of the Army Group Centre, to quote just one example, only 9 out of 27 trains which were required daily to sustain the Front completed the journey.
The Russian winter is one main reason often cited by historians for the failure of the German offensive. No provision was made for extremely cold temperature in Russia which at times was as low as -40o F. Vehicle engines froze, artillery and rifles were rendered useless by frozen lubricants. Grease, oil and other lubricants with cold resistant properties were needed to keep vehicles and guns in action as the normal issues were found ineffective. While the Germans did not have these, the Russians in contrast had developed them years before. One critical failure was that no provision was made for cold weather clothing, as it was assumed that the campaign would be over before the onset of winter. Troops resorted to stuffing newspaper into summer uniform to keep warm. It was estimated that 14,000 amputations resulted from frostbite during the winter and the impact on the morale of the soldiers can be imagined.
By October 1941, Hitler's lines of communication stretched from 800 km initially to about 1600 km eventually. As the invasion advanced, the lines of communication became unmanageable and unable to satisfy continuing logistics demands. Front line units were soon operating on a hand-to-mouth existence. Stretched to its limit, the state of the German supply lines created a logistical nightmare. Conditions rapidly became sub-human, supply systems failed and it was more a question of surviving than of fighting.
On 6 Dec 1941, after 168 days of continuous combat and within 30km of Moscow, the most modern and powerful armed force in the world was nearly exhausted. They were half-starved and half-frozen; out of fuel and ammunition. The overstretched 1,600km supply lines, exacerbated by severe transportation and weather problems, had proven to be grossly ineffective. The result was the Wehrmacht's inability to sustain the battle. Despite their precarious condition, the disciplined Wehrmacht tried desperately to reach Moscow. During the final stage, Stalin's Red Army counter-attacked, forcing a hasty retreat of Hitler's forces. Although the war was to continue a few more years, this failure, as the first German defeat in the Russian war, had a devastating impact on the Germans.
The Wehrmacht's greatest resupply failures can be summarised as follows: a) its inability to sustain the force; b) excessive long lines of communications, c) over dependence on rail roads, d) severe shortfall in motor transport capability, and e) untrafficable roads causing a total collapse of the supply system resulting in diversions of supplies, hoarding and total lack of confidence in the supply system as resupply could not sustain the battle.
When the completely copy once person's point of view it's nice to give them credit. Does it make you smart by posting somebody else's work so poeple think you know a lot? I cannot post the link becasue again I am not more well known. I can PM anybody that wants to see it though. By the way the article you copied was about the faluire of the logistics of Operation Barbarossa.
By the way I never said the Wehrmacht(By the way, that's the real spelling) was completely motorized so why haggle me about that?
I've ready the book by Glantz; I find it funny when you refer to a book that is about the whole entire Russo-German War when we are talking Operation Barbarossa.
I also find it laughable that you refer a book that is mostly 'What If'
Also please read more than one book about a certain subject becasue poeple disagree.
Originally posted by Koenig
Really?Logistics planning was overly optimistic and totally unrealistic and planning factors were often determined by capability rather than actual requirements. For example, although the number of armoured divisions available for "Operation Barbarossa" had more than doubled from 15 in May 1940 to 32 in June 1941, the number of vehicles had only increased by a third from 2574 to 3332.5
Similarly, full wartime production was not in effect before the invasion. For a campaign of such magnitude, German factories were operating on a single shift basis and the under-utilisation of German industrial capacity resulted in shortfalls in essential combat materials. Production consistently lagged behind consumption. The Germans had been involved militarily in Norway, Belgium, France and the Balkans prior to the invasion of Soviet Union, resulting in major equipment shortfalls and damages. For a force which depended on machines for its offensive capability and its survival as none had depended to the same extent before, these were crippling defects. Many of the deficiencies had been foreseen and, as often as not, side-stepped or ignored on grounds of economy or because Hitler and many of his commanders had deluded themselves into believing the war would be won long before winter took its toll.
Transport assets within a theatre are major factors in campaign planning, both tactical and logistical. Being a key element in logistics, it can severely restrict operations. In Sinews of War, James Huston has highlighted that in a theatre of operation, a single authority, identical with the command authority should be responsible for logistics. This is again precisely what the German logistics system lacked - unity of command. The transportation responsibilities were split between the Chief of Transport (rail and inland waterways) and the Quartermaster-General (motor transport). This made an already bad situation worse. The German motor vehicle production could replace neither normal wear and tear nor keep up with combat losses.
As a result, the Wehrmacht conducted a major demotorization programme, procuring horses and wagons to offset the critical truck shortage. The transport of supplies became more dependent on horse, than motorised power. During 'Operation Barbarossa", the Wehrmacht relied on more than 625 000 horses.
Although the Germans committed themselves to a strategy that favoured rapid movement over long distances, heavy reliance was made on horses, which were used to pull everything from field kitchens to artillery pieces.
Logistics assets must be manoeuvrable. Support units must be sufficiently agile and mobile. But when a German division entered the fighting, it did so with 162 different types of soft skin vehicles, among the 21 major groupings of which it was composed. Most of these groupings had 17 different types of lorries within a unit establishment of 33 vehicles. The artillery regiment had 445 vehicles on establishment and there were 69 different types of lorries.
The problem of spares for these many and often unusually different types of machines can best be imagined. The lack of standardisation and the limited supply of spare parts was exacerbated by the lack of maintenance units within the invasion force. Heavy maintenance units remained in Germany or Poland based on the incorrect assumption of no requirement due to the short duration of the campaign.
By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear.
Food was another essential commodity that was in critical short supply. It was never an important priority to Hitler. When in late 1941, Hitler was told of the shortage in transport and that the system was only able to supply the armies in the field with one of the most urgent priorities and to choose between warm clothing, food and ammunition, Hitler chose ammunition. Shortfalls in the ration resupply system resulted in 'slaughter' platoons being formed within divisions as an expedient measure. Commanders in the field relied on foraging local livestock to feed the soldiers and this continued until such time when shortages resulted in troops eating their units' horses.
The Germans discovered that most roads in Russia, except only a few main highways, were turned into impassable mud tracks following even moderate rainfall. Therefore, railway, the only other main source of communication was heavily depended upon. This too was grossly inadequate. Not only were the main lines few in number and the branch line system poor, but the whole railway network used a broader gauge than that of Western European. This incompatibility between German and Russia rail systems brought about a tremendous strain upon the small amount of rolling stock which the German Army was neither able to seize nor to adapt. In winter, the railway life-line often failed and in the sector of the Army Group Centre, to quote just one example, only 9 out of 27 trains which were required daily to sustain the Front completed the journey.
The Russian winter is one main reason often cited by historians for the failure of the German offensive. No provision was made for extremely cold temperature in Russia which at times was as low as -40o F. Vehicle engines froze, artillery and rifles were rendered useless by frozen lubricants. Grease, oil and other lubricants with cold resistant properties were needed to keep vehicles and guns in action as the normal issues were found ineffective. While the Germans did not have these, the Russians in contrast had developed them years before. One critical failure was that no provision was made for cold weather clothing, as it was assumed that the campaign would be over before the onset of winter. Troops resorted to stuffing newspaper into summer uniform to keep warm. It was estimated that 14,000 amputations resulted from frostbite during the winter and the impact on the morale of the soldiers can be imagined.
By October 1941, Hitler's lines of communication stretched from 800 km initially to about 1600 km eventually. As the invasion advanced, the lines of communication became unmanageable and unable to satisfy continuing logistics demands. Front line units were soon operating on a hand-to-mouth existence. Stretched to its limit, the state of the German supply lines created a logistical nightmare. Conditions rapidly became sub-human, supply systems failed and it was more a question of surviving than of fighting.
On 6 Dec 1941, after 168 days of continuous combat and within 30km of Moscow, the most modern and powerful armed force in the world was nearly exhausted. They were half-starved and half-frozen; out of fuel and ammunition. The overstretched 1,600km supply lines, exacerbated by severe transportation and weather problems, had proven to be grossly ineffective. The result was the Wehrmacht's inability to sustain the battle. Despite their precarious condition, the disciplined Wehrmacht tried desperately to reach Moscow. During the final stage, Stalin's Red Army counter-attacked, forcing a hasty retreat of Hitler's forces. Although the war was to continue a few more years, this failure, as the first German defeat in the Russian war, had a devastating impact on the Germans.
The Wehrmacht's greatest resupply failures can be summarised as follows: a) its inability to sustain the force; b) excessive long lines of communications, c) over dependence on rail roads, d) severe shortfall in motor transport capability, and e) untrafficable roads causing a total collapse of the supply system resulting in diversions of supplies, hoarding and total lack of confidence in the supply system as resupply could not sustain the battle.
Point one, I lost the link to the article and no I was not being smart, I only had part of the article at hand so I posted it, due to the fact I had not the author's name on that part of the article I could not post it, I was going to search for it all the next day. It was late at night here when I put the post up. If you gave me a chance to post the link and not get on your high horse and kick up a stink about it, I was going to update my post and make it clear to everyone. I have now got the link and I shall post it, so everyone can read the article in full.
Point two, I read a lot of books on the subject and yes everyone has a view point.
Here's the link to the article.
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1998/Vol24_2/4.htm
For the attention of everyone my post showing part of an article was not complete and if this miss lead anyone, I apologise for the error. I have contacted a friend who was able to supply me with the link so everyone can read the article in full.