Free Will

Originally posted by 753
How can one claim with certainty that the material universe is indeed deterministic and that the future is entirely and unidirectionally (a single cause can only lead to a single effect, not multiple possible ones) dictated by the present?

There are several material systems that as far as we can perceive and understand can only be described as probabilistic and indeterministic. A lot of research also presents systems previously assumed to be deterministic as indeterministic.

Any examples other than quantum mechanics?

Originally posted by 753
How can one claim with certainty that the material universe is indeed deterministic and that the future is entirely and unidirectionally (a single cause can only lead to a single effect, not multiple possible ones) dictated by the present?

There are several material systems that as far as we can perceive and understand can only be described as probabilistic and indeterministic. A lot of research also presents systems previously assumed to be deterministic as indeterministic.

however, from the view of modern neuroscience, such deterministic/indeterministic quandries of sub atomic physics are irrelevant.

The behaviour of neuronal function is entirely deterministic, with all but very mundane effects (and even unlikely at that) being attributable to sub-atomic phenomenon (there are some implausable arguments for effects in cytoskeleton tubules and potential effects on potassium or sodium ion channels during an action potential). The parts of the self that might be said to have free will, however, are themselves part of deterministic structures, and such 1/0 dualities are irrelevant. The self happens at a scale where quantum interactions are moot.

However, there is no need to even talk about atomic determinism, when the concept of a self which could have a choice about what it wills is an errorous concept from Enlightenment philosophy. That self is in fact an amalgamation of different information coming from different systems, largely pieced together after an event and behaviour has occured. Experements show that one's motivation to act comes after their body has prepared to move, the self then being secondary to underlying processes that generally govern behaviour. There is evidence that will may allow people to supress their motivations, but if you want to expand this, it can even be argued that cognitive and memory systems are reactive to stimuli, and such "free wont" might just be like a more-complex series of deterministic dominos.

Originally posted by inimalist
Experements show that one's motivation to act comes after their body has prepared to move

Ooh, shiny! How do you set up an experiment to measure that?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readiness_potential

Wow, that's pretty definitive.

Originally posted by Symmetric Chaos
Wow, that's pretty definitive.

It was, and it sort of stands out as a nice "one off" experiment specifically about free will, rather than stuff from research that only relates to it.

For instance, much better proof of this "readiness potential" that preceeds motivation comes from basic fMRI and other imaging studies that show clear activation in areas associated with planning movement (SMA, PMA) much earlier than in the more frontal regions associated with cognitive awareness. I could probably pull a thing or two off of PubMed if you are interested, but Libet is still pretty amazing.

That being said, no one study can be definitive 😉

Originally posted by Andrew Ryan
So basically you're saying that we can choose, but the environment hedges us in and basically determines our choices? It seems like semantic nonsense to me.

Free will is apparently the concept that human choice is not determined by pre-existing factors, but yet it attempts to explain freedom in limited, relative terms. No one ever argues that a human being themselves is "free of being caused". Obviously we were all born, cultivated, raised, and then unleashed on the unsuspecting world. Our genetic material, our primordial instincts, urges, goals, desires, and society each work to shape our personality. The point I strongly reject when it comes to the assumption of Free Will is that somehow humans develop choices in a void. This is as irrational as it is silly.

All personalities are caused by a multitude of factors, many subtle others jarringly obvious, but they are all caused. No one comes out of the womb, untouched, and develops choice to be free of all variables. How one can argue "choice is free" when there is no evidence to support it reeks of anthropocentric romanticism, clinging to the idea that "man is free".

God had given everyone a free will that we can choose from right or wrong or know what is right or wrong.Althrough if we pick the bad path it will only lead to unhappiness.
If you pick the right one it will lead to happiness.

My personal thoughts on the matter:

Operating under the following definition of free will: "the ability to make choices (choices as in "conscious activity that is of a variable capacity to be"😉", and assuming the validity of the foundational knowledge that my argument relies upon, as well as the adequacy of my awareness as it relates to the process of analysis, objects of thought and function with variable capabilities have free will.

Free will exists in this scenario as it is thought and function that can be said to directly determine the activity of such an object.

That there are alternative determinents of the activity in question is an irrelevance that simply highlights the point that there are multiple perspectives from which an issue can be observed and an object can exist. From the appropriate perspective (from the perspective of the material world, free will is a meaningless concept), that which gives meaning to the concept of free will, that is, from the domain of the mind as it has been outlined, free will is the direct cause of conscious activity.

That there is only a single predetermined form that the universe can take at any particular point at any given scale, including the choices that can be made and the design behind the aforementioned 'objects of thought and function with variable capabilities", does not prove incompatibilism (the concept of material determinism or the idea of destiny would not even be required to those ends in the first place - conscious activity that is of a variable capacity to act, if assumed to itself be of a deterministic nature using the beginning existence of the mind as a point of reference, would in itself only ever interact with a fixed constant in a single given manner), as free will as it has been
outlined here concerns itself with the variable capacity to act in alternate hypothetical scenarios with respect to the function of the object of thought, not in reality with respect to a single given function and a fixed state of the external environment. Free will concerns itself with the freedom of the individual, and it is only because the function of thought, which predates free will in the choice making process, is fixed, that choices are fixed. Function does not restrict the freedom of the individual, it in fact largely defines the individual. Individuals have free will because the elements that define their existence, from its very beginning to its entire timeline, determine how their variable capacity to act is realised through conscious effort. Fixed outcomes do not disprove freedom, but in fact confirm how freedom is utilised in the face of fixed factors at play.

Other notable counter arguments, without going into specifics, for the most part suffer from errors or intentional distortions of equivocation, and I'd appreciate it if you were to pay attention to the exact definitions I'm operating under and I'll gladly clarify where such indication hasn't been given so that we can minimise the potential for such errors for this particular discussion.

I've come to realise that this entire argument, when you get to the root of the issue, is entirely semantical in nature, with the concept only having meaning from the perspective where it by definition exists; the philosophical argument would appear to concern itself more with the existence of such a thing as an object of thought and function with variable capabilities.

I feel this has become such a significant philosophical argument, if only for the fact that philosophers enter complicated semantical territory where they're unable to maintain the overly technical approach that they originally take and lose sight of the simple truths of the matter.

Originally posted by inimalist
Experements show that one's motivation to act comes after their body has prepared to move, the self then being secondary to underlying processes that generally govern behaviour.

Well, let's be clear that this is motivation to do a rather primitive action: movement that results in pressing a button.

The study itself is not being scruitinized (it is for other reasons..but not in the context of this conversation) for being inconclusive. It is being scrutinized because it is a far too simplistic action to really come close to determining free will. It does not even come close to a complex decision that a human brain could make.

Originally posted by inimalist
There is evidence that will may allow people to supress their motivations, but if you want to expand this, it can even be argued that cognitive and memory systems are reactive to stimuli, and such "free wont" might just be like a more-complex series of deterministic dominos.

iirc, the 'no' command takes a certain amount of time to cancel the "press it" action resulting in an "point of no return" situation. I don't remember the exact numbers but if a "no" command was received before a certain point, the cancelling of the action would occur. The study that tried to measure the "veto" portion of the free will sensation failed to measure the proper "veto" that Libet originally referred to. The veto Libet referred to was an internal veto not one that occured from an external stimuli. I take the Brass and Kuhn study to be another measure of what Hallett and Matsuhashi had already determined (It sounds like a contrived statement but it's not: they both measure the propogation of actions processed in the subconscious...it measures the same thing, basically...which would explain why both have almost the exact same time variance to target effect).

This indicates that we do have a certain measure of free will and it is why I take this stance:

Humans have free will but we do not have libertarian free will.

We are bound by certain deterministic restraints but humans do have the ability to choose things that contradict the seemingly deterministic action or thought. That's an oversimplification in binary terms. There are decisions we can make that are extremely complex (if you think about how those decisions came about from a neuroscientific perspective) and cannot be boiled down to a binary decision.

The subconscious: the last great frontier of medical science.

However, and this is a major however...

As a religious person, I believe the soul plays a very tiny portion in our decision making processes. Our soul's primary function is acting as the conduit between this plane and the next rather than the primary actor in free will. In other words, I think the complete human body is greater than the sum of it's parts. Not by much, of course, but it's there. Basically, the soul is a subtle element to decision making (or thinking, if you will) but it's primary function is to act as a conduit and a "hard drive". I'm sure you get the "hard drive" reference but I can explain that if it isn't clear.

I agree with ini busting the laughable notion of "self", the experiment is also very interesting. Kudos.

This is really a good thing for all to think and take decision....

Free will exists, but it is completely effective. The power to make a choice with agreement is out there, and the freedom is present. The external environment does have a say in the choice of free will, but the person has the capacity to make the decision.

There are barriers that control the free will of humans. The teachers keep the schools safe, and promote the children to rise to better people. This allows the children to choose better and have more freedom.

The police watch the streets and track down criminals who might interfere with the free will. They keep the society functioning normal and possible for kids to be who they want to be.

No one can really force another person to lose his or her free will.

In the sense that we're born a certain way, into certain circumstances, and shaped by our environment, we probably don't have 'free will', or at least, not very free. However, the only way for society to function is based on the assumption that everyone has largely free will- and arguably that is the only way we collectively can shape people's environment and then influence the choices others might make through 'free will'. If we punish certain crimes, ensure people are economically self-sufficient, etc., then we give them greater free will, and also shape them into people whose lack of free will will at least be less harmful.

Originally posted by ArabianDrums
In the sense that we're born a certain way, into certain circumstances, and shaped by our environment, we probably don't have 'free will', or at least, not very free. However, the only way for society to function is based on the assumption that everyone has largely free will- and arguably that is the only way we collectively can shape people's environment and then influence the choices others might make through 'free will'. If we punish certain crimes, ensure people are economically self-sufficient, etc., then we give them greater free will, and also shape them into people whose lack of free will will at least be less harmful.

Punishment for crimes (or sin) seems to be in conflict with free will.

Originally posted by Shakyamunison
Punishment for crimes (or sin) seems to be in conflict with free will.

...

We do have certain level of free will, however there are consequences within a society, such as ostracization if one uses in it's entirety.

Is 'free will' being equated with, 'I can do whatever I want - nah nah nah nah nah'?

Originally posted by Mindship
Is 'free will' being equated with, 'I can do whatever I want - nah nah nah nah nah'?

Free will should be just that. Then, in that case, only a god has free will. Could it be a way of saying we are God?

I can't fly faster than the speed of light. I feel so enslaved. Physics has taken my free will from me. I'm going to press charges.

Originally posted by Shakyamunison
Free will should be just that. Then, in that case, only a god has free will. Could it be a way of saying we are God?