Originally posted by Wild Shadow
[B]its that they are dishonest lying cheating manipulative
These are all signs of intelligence. Horrible or not.
Another thing is that, those same lying manipulative assholes also tend to have guns and shit, which are the most prevailent weapon we've got. Another point subtracted from physical superiority.
there was an ape which killed and stole from the main group and was quiet smart in his behavior and approach from deception and cruelty it was killing baby apes eatin them and burying the remains..
it was believed that it was doing it so it could become the dominate male..
the problem was its behavior was unacceptable to the social group and guess what would happen to it once it was discovered the entire society would turn on it and kill him... regardless of his lvl of intelligence and manipulation that was slightly superior then its peers
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
IIn my opinion, the best comparison to China today is Imperial Germany in WWI: perhaps the single strongest power in the region that would likely be able to defeat any one of its enemies (save perhaps the US or India) but which would get severely worn down and ultimately defeated in a prolonged war against a large alliance.
...
I don't see how China is really anything like Germany in 1914... aside from what you said, which is nearly applicable to any middle power.
lol, Brazil is like Germany at the start of ww1, Egypt and Turkey are like Germany at the start of ww1, ethiopia and south africa, just like germany before ww1.
"I don't see how China is really anything like Germany in 1914... aside from what you said, which is nearly applicable to any middle power."
To an extent that was something like what i meant, but if you look closely you can see several parallels that are almost unique to the situation.
1. China and Imperial Germany (again) both had militaries that were the most powerful in the region and which could defeat any other enemy power in a 1 on 1 fight (though in China's case this is somewhat disputable when talking about the US or India).
2. China and Imperial Germany both had histories of significant maritime dominance (as the latter showed with the Hanseatic League, which at one time even defeated the effing Danes at a time when they were perhaps the most modern navy in the region) which they mothballed or otherwise retreated from and which are now seeking to regain.
3. China and Imperial Germany both have suffered extremely harsh clashes between the military and civilian leadership (there is a VERY good reason why the CPP keeps its military leadership on a tight leash indeed) for political dominance.
4. China and Imperial Germany both engaged in spats of expansionist activity thoughout their history, particularly in the early years (Denmark, Austria, France, German African colonies) (Xinjiang, Tibet, various ROC islands, Vietnam, conflict with USSR).
5. Both steadily built up their military and political strength into a force capable of projection power onto other continents.
6. Both believe they have a window of oppertunity in which to act militarily if they ever will do so successfully and are facing considerable pressure on whether to do so or not (Germany believed that by 1916 at peacetime levels Russia would have rebuilt itself to a level that would effectively make the Entente invincible, we do not know what China feels like regarding that but we know they are feeling that to some extent, as various leaks from the PRC show and the neigh-inevitable population decline due to the "Bare Branches."
7. Both Imperial Germany's and China's main activity overseas have been to shop around for allies and supply them ecconomically and militarily without being directly involved (see German support to virtually everybody and anybody in Latin America that disliked the US as per the 1898 Cuba Memorandum and China's support to the Khartoum regime, Turkey, and Iran).
It is not a 100% corrolation, but it is unique and comprehensive enough to be quite worth the comparison.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
"I don't see how China is really anything like Germany in 1914... aside from what you said, which is nearly applicable to any middle power."To an extent that was something like what i meant, but if you look closely you can see several parallels that are almost unique to the situation.
no, and a lot of what you said isn't incorrect, however, as I'll expand on at the end, there are many, imho, more important reasons why they are not the same, and largely, I feel that by refering to China as Imperial Germany, you are framing the issue in a way that shows a needless paranoia that China intends to destabalize, at least, East Asia with relentless warfare on a scale previously unseen to mankind.
I don't know if that was your intent, but the appeal to trench warfare, i think at least, overstates your point.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
1. China and Imperial Germany (again) both had militaries that were the most powerful in the region and which could defeat any other enemy power in a 1 on 1 fight (though in China's case this is somewhat disputable when talking about the US or India).
China: Japan and Russia should also both be considered local powers around China. However, this isn't to say I think China would win a 1-1 war with most of these nations. While high in numbers, the Chinese army is only now in the process of modernizing to the technology and, most importantly, the mobility of these other nations. Invading China would be impossible for any other nation on the planet, minus a nuclear first strike from Russia or America [who shouldn't be considered a regional power with China] (arguably the only two nations with this capability), but they don't currently have the capacity to extend their military against any of these powers. I might say, especially India, whose army is not only modern, but highly experienced given India's modern history. China's economic power has yet to fully translate into modern military power.
Germany: I'll give you this, though whether or not they were so powerful is arguable. German generals certainly thought they had a more powerful army than the other powers. However, even then, there is evidence that they [stupidly] hoped England wouldn't enter the war if they eliminated France with the Blitzkrieg. Generals feared both the French and English armies, which is actually logical. I would argue that German experiences in the Baltic and Russo-Japanese wars immediatly preceeding WW1 was what gave them initial victories over the French army (after the Blitzkrieg itself failed to capture Paris, its SOLE goal [re: not that powerful]), as they still wore colourful costumes and ran directly into artilery fire (a tactic used by the allies, with as much success, for a bewilderingly long part of the war), as opposed to military might. Yes, this is obviously in the context of their Eastern campaign, but I think it is important to distinguish between the fact and the reality, Germany was powerful, and had a clear tactical advantage, but I don't know if it is fair to say they would have beat any other European Imperial power.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
2. China and Imperial Germany both had histories of significant maritime dominance (as the latter showed with the Hanseatic League, which at one time even defeated the effing Danes at a time when they were perhaps the most modern navy in the region) which they mothballed or otherwise retreated from and which are now seeking to regain.
fair enough.
there might be a framing issue here though. China traditionally had a strong navy, but that has been ignored in modern times. As such, they have a largely inadequate navy to even defend themselves, so massive spending so it is able to at least protect its national interests is probably forgiveable.
China says this is what they are doing, and the only reply from the DoD I've heard to this confirms that, however, they claim that China shouldn't feel the need to protect its international cargo because America already does. It isn't hard to see how anyone with even an iota of Chinese nationalism isn't going to support this.
unless you have a link or anything, my thoughts are that China's naval increases are largely defensive, and even then, they have yet to complete their first air craft carrier. In terms of a threat to Western powers, China is 2 decades, at least, away.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
3. China and Imperial Germany both have suffered extremely harsh clashes between the military and civilian leadership (there is a VERY good reason why the CPP keeps its military leadership on a tight leash indeed) for political dominance.
You will have to show me this in the case of Germany. After their mid 19th century war with France, German moral towards the military was high in all parts of society. Politicians, generals, etc, all thought that a great war would be beneficial to Germany, as it would cleanse the slate and move progress forward. At the start of the war there was almost unanimous approval for it from the German people.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
4. China and Imperial Germany both engaged in spats of expansionist activity thoughout their history, particularly in the early years (Denmark, Austria, France, German African colonies) (Xinjiang, Tibet, various ROC islands, Vietnam, conflict with USSR).
yes, but there is no indication at all from the Chinese that they have an expansionist military agenda, and even then, any reasonable arguemts that I have heard have tended toward Central Asia, rather than major powers, as being targets. This could cause proxy spats between Russia and China, but that is, imho, unlikely.
China has, in fact, even shut down funding the global Revolution. Obviously I can't say for sure, but evidence points to Maoist groups losing support from the Chinese state over the past, 15?ish years.
this is far different than the outright expansionist policy of imperial germany, with essentially ideas of manifest destiny. The assassination of Ferdinand in Sarajevo was merely a pretext for their invasion.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
5. Both steadily built up their military and political strength into a force capable of projection power onto other continents.
that isn't correct in China's case. They would be hard pressed to expand into one of their less powerful neighbours today.
I believe they want this capacity, but are decades away from it.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
6. Both believe they have a window of oppertunity in which to act militarily if they ever will do so successfully and are facing considerable pressure on whether to do so or not (Germany believed that by 1916 at peacetime levels Russia would have rebuilt itself to a level that would effectively make the Entente invincible, we do not know what China feels like regarding that but we know they are feeling that to some extent, as various leaks from the PRC show and the neigh-inevitable population decline due to the "Bare Branches."
again, I don't see this. There are no regional powers against who China is losing strength. If anything, it is the exact opposite (in fact, the article at the origin of this discussion argues that India only has a window of opportunity to act against China).
and frankly, again, China doesn't have the military power, in terms of mobility and logistics.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
7. Both Imperial Germany's and China's main activity overseas have been to shop around for allies and supply them ecconomically and militarily without being directly involved (see German support to virtually everybody and anybody in Latin America that disliked the US as per the 1898 Cuba Memorandum and China's support to the Khartoum regime, Turkey, and Iran).
yes, but this is true of all nations and civilizations, modern or ancient.
argh, this is going to be too long, i'll finish the last part in another post
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
It is not a 100% corrolation, but it is unique and comprehensive enough to be quite worth the comparison.
I do see where you are coming from. however, even in the eyes of the PLA, the Chinese are nowhere near a strong enough military power to be compared to the 1914 Germans. Even from the points you make above, the "window of opportunity" especially, China much more resembles Russia than Germany.
Beyond that, I think the implications of such a comparison don't hold up. If anything, China is a stabalizing force in the region, maybe not in terms of US interests, but they are the only nation who some of the most dangerous rogue states will talk to. Chinese pressure almost certainly is as persuasive as MAD in keeping Kim from dramatically escalating the conflict with the south.
But even then, I think there are some clear, fundamental differences between modern china and imperial germany that weigh so heavily against your similarities that they, not to sound snide, become moot.
1 - and most important, We are no longer in the Age of Empires. The mindset of Imperial leaders, of the people, the context of rival Empires vying not only for resources but noble honour and prestiege, of manifest destiny and all that, its gone. Nobody, especially China, envisions the modern nation state in those terms. While China does have some territories it has expanded into, psychologically to the Chinese, these represented traditional Chinese lands. We can argue about whether they are or not, but it is important to remember that it is not Imperial desire to conquor for the inherent destiny of the great Chinese empire, which, imho, was what drove Germany. In the early 20th century, Germany was the center of science, art, culture, economy, etc in the world. It believed in a germanic supremecy that justified its outward expansion because it was their just due.
2- As I mentioned above, civilian opinion in 1914, all throughout Europe, was nearly unanimously in favor of war. This is not the case in modern China.
3 - Globalization has intertwined national economies to the point where many military options are no longer available to armies. I believe it is a financial form, rather than nuclear, of MAD that ensures China and America will never go to war. The same holds here. In 1914, most nations were much more insular, had local economies, and were not really looking to globalize. China and India specifically have a massively intertwined economy.
4 - in 1914, Germany was a stable, homogenous, resource rich nation. China is a dichotomous nation, with military insurrection in several places for a diverse array of causes, that is in desperate need of most natural resources.
"I feel that by refering to China as Imperial Germany, you are framing the issue in a way that shows a needless paranoia that China intends to destabalize, at least, East Asia with relentless warfare on a scale previously unseen to mankind."
Perhaps, but I feel it shows NEEDED paranoia.
"I don't know if that was your intent, but the appeal to trench warfare, i think at least, overstates your point."
And again, I believe it understates the point.
"Japan and Russia should also both be considered local powers around China."
But for how long? The Japanese have suffered a colossal demographic crisis to the point where the next generation is to be roughly 3/4s of the past one. Not to mention the fact that militarily Japan couldn't compete with China on land back at its apex from '37-42 when it actually had a demographic surplus. And while a lot of credit goes to the Western Allies and some to the Soviets who put the final blow in to the Kwantung army, the simple fact of the matter is that people grossly underestimat the competence and involvement of the Chinese in that victory. And as for naval power the Japanese barely have a navy anymore and most of those are lighter vessels dedicated to home defense (they rely on the USN for heavylifting far from home) compared to the already-formidible PLN which is now entering into a massive shipbuilding project. The only place they are really in a position to compete with the Chinese would be the Air, and while technologically and possibly in regards to training and experience they would likely be superior to the Chinese, they would certainly have trouble replacing lost men and probably replacing lost equipment. Even if Japan turned around right this minute, it would take about a generation for Japan to get anywhere near its' 70's-level strength. Their trump card is their allies: due to treaty, if anybody attacks them, most of the West will dogpile on the offender. Or at least try. But alone, the best hope the Japanese have barring a miracle on the scale of the Kamilkaze is to fight until a very painful draw.
Russia is likewise suffering from a major population decline: their male population (the part of the population that does most of the building, fighting, killing, and dying in war) has an ALE that is not even 60 years, which is below the world average. And when we factor out lovely places like the Sudan and Burma, it is still far below the average of most industrialized nations. This might not be so terrible were it not for the fact that the population has already fallen over 1.5 % from its hight just a scant 16 years ago. In contrast, the Chinese have experienced continuous population growth for the past several decades- up to an additional 4% every decade-, hence the entire "One Child Policy." And this graph gets even more skewed when you compare the Russian male population to the Chinese male one, whereup the former has nowhere near enough and the latter has far, FAR too many (the infamous "Bare Branches" or- more risquely- "Bare Sticks"😉. In short, the Russians would face great difficulties replenishing their lost men, because the stereotype of the endless Russian hordes is long gone. Consider this: while the Chinese and Indians are perhaps predictable, and the North Koreans might be guessworthy, did you know that the Vietnamese, Iranians, and South Koreans both field more active troops than the Russians have (Active and Reserves) but together? While I am sure Moscow could scrape together people to fight, that strategy only works as long as there are people- preferably fit young men- to scrape together. And even if we were to assume that somehow the Russians mobilize every one of their reserves, throw all their men into battle, and are joined by the entire militaries of Serbia, Montenegro, and (for the hell of it) Iran for some strange reason, the Chinese forces concentrated on the Siberian border (from our last knowledge of them) would STILL outnumber them by nearly 2-1? And that this number discounts the extremely likely reinforcements from elsewhere and the other military services (Navy, Air Force, etc)?
And while you later mention Chinese military modernization (which has indeed run into several snags) the Russians do not have nearly enough modern equipment to arm themselves. And the defenders in Siberia would hardly be at the top of the Kremlin's priority list. And that also means that equipment losses would be very difficult to replace.
Russia's trump card lies in the fact that the relations between the Kremlin and the "Forbidden Congress" are fairly warm. Which is very good for Putin, because if they ever soured he would have his hands more than full. In a protracted battle without some "Bear and the Dragon"-esque scenario, there is little reason to believe the Russian military would be able to stand against the PLA. And before we talk about the nuclear issue, don't think anybody would be interested in using it: the Russians will NEED foreign goodwill to even survive, and turning Beijing into an atomic crater is unlikely to get it. And they probably do not want to make their population problems any worse by provoking a Chinese response. And the Chinese have fairly little reason to do so either, given their conventional superiority, the need to remain on somewhat neutral terms with their clients/debetors/creditors/etc.
In short, neither Russia and Japan have the practical capacity to fight a battle against Beijing with almost any chance of victory or even a slightly favorable stalemate, particularly in a protracted fight. Their main hope in a showdown with Beijing is to act as part of a fairly broad alliance against China.
"German generals certainly thought they had a more powerful army than the other powers"
And they were mostly right, albiet some of our knowledge that that was true was from hindsight. Only the French and Brits could really match their quality mano-on-mano and the British regulars were pathetically understrength and after 1914 effectively dissolved, and the French suffered from hubris and irrational focus on Alsace-Lorraine. Had the Germans gotten into an isolated war with pretty much any nation, they almost certainly would have won. And even when opposed by an alliance covering most of the world, they still came chillingly close to victory. Even one of Berlin's greatest strategic worries (the infamous Russian steamroller) proved to be a paper tiger in East Prussia and Poland. And while I am a Western Allied Fanboy (for lack of a more appropriate term), I must admit that the failure to conquer Paris was by no means a forgone conclusion and indeed was the sum of several major and minor errors during the campaign, amongst them the gross underestimation of the BEF and the Belgians and the resulting inadaquate preparation to deal with them, the attempt by the 1st and 2nd armies to try to pocket and crush the main French army, and the fact that logisticially the Germans underestimated the need to care for their horses. And while the conquest of Paris likely would not have led to a 1940-esque fiasco or even force much of a further Western Allied retreat, it certainly could not have been good and possibly (POSSIBLY) might have changed the course of the war and maybe even its outcome.
"as they still wore colourful costumes and ran directly into artilery fire (a tactic used by the allies, with as much success, for a bewilderingly long part of the war), "
Two things:
1. No they didn't. The uniforms were fairly showy, but not overwhelmingly gaudy and were actually fairly functional. The Franch are the main perpetrators of that particular error, and that was due to the underestimated demand which resulted in new recruits and reserves being sent off in paradeware.
2. No they didn't. WWI may have been bloody and frustratingly static, but neither side were THAT stupid. They didn't make that particular mistake for long after the Marne. They made all new ones, certainly, but they learned from their mistakes comparatively well, particularly on the cutthroat Western front.
"Germany was powerful, and had a clear tactical advantage, but I don't know if it is fair to say they would have beat any other European Imperial power."
In a prlonged war? Absolutely. Hell, the fact that by within a few months prior to their collapse after fighting a very broad alliance for roughly three years they could still have concievably won the land war should testify to that. The only real doubt is regarding a naval war versus Britain, but without a foothold on the mainland, it is doubtful the British could harm German production enough to prevent Berlin from building enough ships and eventually breaking out into the Atlantic.
"As such, they have a largely inadequate navy to even defend themselves,"
Perhaps against the USN or a fairly large combined Western navy, but their naval size is bigger than most maritime nations put together, and they have long outshown historical naval powers like France and Britain. They are hardly like the Japanese or Russians, much less the Italians or Scandinavians.
"so massive spending so it is able to at least protect its national interests is probably forgiveable."
Conceded.
"they claim that China shouldn't feel the need to protect its international cargo because America already does."
Which is largely bunk and what you would call a "polite untruth." Chinese shipping as Chinese rarely going far beyond the Suez or Panamanian canals and navally they are followed pretty much everywhere they go by light elements of the PLN or the armed merchant marine. They rarely go any further because usually they transfer the goods to another ship (almost always non-Chinese), at which point it becomes "Somebody else's problem." The PLN is hardly understrength for its current roles, and what deficiencies there are will probably be dead some once the naval buildup is finished.
Continued...
"unless you have a link or anything, my thoughts are that China's naval increases are largely defensive,"
Touche. Good show. Here is perhaps the most through I can find regarding
said implications and the highly likely non-defensive assets that would be avalible to the PLN because of this naval buildup drive.
http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33153.pdf
"and even then, they have yet to complete their first air craft carrier."
They are working on those, and that ignores the strong likelyhood of purchasing them on the open market.
"In terms of a threat to Western powers, China is 2 decades, at least, away."
As Lord Fisher of the RN said "a fifty year [naval] gap can be closed in fifteen years tops, five if blessed by God." And this was from an era where naval ships still had to be effectively build from the bottom up each time with slightly new designs, in contrast to the comparatively automatic and factory-line production avalible today, which (factoring in the far greater technological gap and the need to furnish ships today with all the "necessary toys" to borrow from Bond) probably breaks about even. If the Chinese are hungary enough for naval superiority, they will get it fairly quickly on a peacetime level. To say nothing of the possibility of dedicated wartime manufacturing.
"You will have to show me this in the case of Germany. After their mid 19th century war with France, German moral towards the military was high in all parts of society. Politicians, generals, etc, all thought that a great war would be beneficial to Germany, as it would cleanse the slate and move progress forward. At the start of the war there was almost unanimous approval for it from the German people."
Eh, more or less I was simplifying the matter, but it held a grain of truth: the Reichstag tried several times to limit the power of the German military during the interbellum and a few even tried it late in WWI, only for Bismarck's constitution and the "Bayonet veto" the military won from its role in 1848 meant such challenges fell largely stillborn. And at the very end, there was a fair amount of clashing even between the Kaiser and the OHL, though most of it took place behind the scenes.
"yes, but there is no indication at all from the Chinese that they have an expansionist military agenda, and even then, any reasonable arguemts that I have heard have tended toward Central Asia, rather than major powers, as being targets."
In the short run? Probably. But that does not mean that:
A. It might not happen in the future after Central Asia and other "soft targets" have already been taken, and
B. It doesn't mean that something might not push them over the edge.
"This could cause proxy spats between Russia and China, but that is, imho, unlikely."
Which brings me to my next point: the fairly cordial relationship between Moscow and Beijing. The two have cooperated quite well overall save for some occasional jockying for position, and between the two of them Central Asia is already in their hands, and even the direct conquest of the region by one or the other would be unlikely to greatly shake that relationship. Which means that China would likely turn elsewhere. And with Vietnam, Burma, and North Korea all more-or-less allied, that mainly leaves somebody with a tripwire connected right to DC.
"China has, in fact, even shut down funding the global Revolution."
To a point. However, even when they have abandoned some of their allies, they have been quite willing to cultivate new ones (the Sudan, Vietnam, Cuba, and Venezuela to name but the frontrunners). And if one-onehundreth of one percent of the rumors I have heard have any basis in reality, they haven't completely given up on 'The Cause of Mao!' (TM), and if and when relations sour (and they are more likely to do so than not) they are likely to fall back.
"Obviously I can't say for sure, but evidence points to Maoist groups losing support from the Chinese state over the past, 15?ish years."
Again, partially true but likely not the whole truth.
"this is far different than the outright expansionist policy of imperial germany, with essentially ideas of manifest destiny."
Meh, yes and no. While Berlin certainly DID want a 'Place In The SUN!' (TM), the only power they were explicitly gunning for (as in actively stoking conflict with) until about the decade prior to the war was (surpisingly) the US (as per the Cuba Memorandum of 1898), and from what we know now after some shifting in the archieves they were fairly happy about the Status Quo in Europe as long as it allowed Germany to expand its political and military power and possibly even peaceibly bring the rest of Europe into line via ecconomics and buy its way into colonial domiance. Indeed, the predominant theme in German propaganda at the time was that the Kaiserreich and its Austro-Hungairan ally were in fact (and I could not make this up if I REALLY wanted to and tried REALLY hard) "the Guarentors of World Peace!" The defeat of Russia in 1905 opened the door to actually considering the possibility of achieving these aims militarily, which was bolstered by the pressure to take advantage of Russian weakness while it still lasted. The main motivations for German military intervention were A. The ability to gain astronomically if victorious and speed up the process of gaining global power, and B. The aforementioned fear of the Entente's rebuilding of Russia and the expected 1916 deadline after which war would be unwinnable. Which is why they advocated such a belligerent foreign policy: if a general European war was ever going to happen, it would have to happen fairly quickly before Germany had to re-gear for ecconomic warfare. The Austro-Hungarians were the main force with an actual military reason to violently intervene (again, to crush the pesky Yugoslavs), but even they would probably have preffered to gain dominance over them politically rather than militarily (if for no other reason than that would almost certainly bring in the Czar and open the Pandora's Box of ethnic unrest in the Dual Monarchy).
"The assassination of Ferdinand in Sarajevo was merely a pretext for their invasion."
Agreed wholeheartedly, as shown by the saberrattling and various war plans that had been thrown around beforehand and the irrationally fanatical line Vienna took at Berlin's encouragement. However, one thing that should be remembered is that (as war is diplomacy by 'other means'😉, had the Entente caved, the Central Powers would have been all too happy to take their spoils and go home even at this late date, as they would have gained a strategic victory without bloodshed. These men may have been unsavory to the core and more than a little bit evil but they were not completley insane. Which is something many forget when dealing with tyrants and megalomaniacs.
"that isn't correct in China's case. They would be hard pressed to expand into one of their less powerful neighbours today."
Hardly. Particularly in a war of any protracted length. In living memory they fought us to a draw in Korea, gave crucial aid to the VM/VC that eventually helped them win the Indochina Wars (if primarily diplomatically/psychologically), made good progress against the NVA later, easily absorbed Tibet and Xinjiang, kicked the KMT off several of their Islands, have supported rebels in India, Nepal, Indochina, Afghanistan, governments from the Sudan to Venezuela, and have amassed the largest standing military on the face of Earth (barring the international cat conspiracy, of course). If they seriously- and I mean seriously, as in even 1951 Korea seriously or even higher- went after any of their minor neighbors and those minor neigbors did not recieve considerable and direct outside aid, they would do little more than get plowed under.
"I believe they want this capacity, but are decades away from it."
I wish. They've been skirmishing with the Indians to this day over the MacMahon Line and they outnumber any possible single enemy by a considerable margain save PERHAPS India or the US. In addition, the Chinese military is mostly composed of mobile divisions (Mechanized, Motorized, Armor, etc), and their preformance and time are on par with or above most of the world.
"again, I don't see this. There are no regional powers against who China is losing strength."
Hardly. Case example # 1 is India, which I will get into later, but if US military advancement and demography continues apace, they will likewise fall behind. To say nothing about the entire demographic fiasco of the "Broken Branches", which means that China is going to demographically loose pace with everybody save those who are demographically worse than they are (notably both Japan and Russia), and ecconomically they have already suffered several kicks to the shin.
"If anything, it is the exact opposite"
Which is in fact the direct opposite from the truth certarum relatively Parabus.
"(in fact, the article at the origin of this discussion argues that India only has a window of opportunity to act against China)."
Which is dead wrong for the following reasons:
and frankly, again, China doesn't have the military power, in terms of mobility and logistics.
Next up: The Reason why China is strategically falling in dominance, the politics of military supremacy, how history rhymes, and (if possible) more stupid cat jokes here at TH's Huge Wall of TEEXXXTTTT!
And, since I feel you summed it up, best,
"this is going to get out of control...."
Oh, you have NO idea....
Ok, back where we left off with your previous quote:
"(in fact, the article at the origin of this discussion argues that India only has a window of opportunity to act against China)."
In that case that article was not merely wrong but a full 180 degrees away from reality. And here's why:
1. Demography. Simply put, the Indian population has been growing consistently and why it has slackened off a bit, it shows no real signs of Plateauing in the foreseeable future (say about 1/2 a century all things constant). China, on the other hand, has adopted the Birth Control issue and even if they reversed it, it would take 2 generations at least to get back to the level it will be this generation. There literally are not enough women to maintain stable population growth barring widespread polygamy or the PRC becoming the world's largest importer of Mail-Order bridges, and that means that lovely young male surplus that would go quite a bit to soften the impact of war. To say nothing of the considerable risk to the Chinese government if they have literally over a million young men who are almost by definition likely converts to the dissidents laying about (for clarification, the last time there was anywhere near such a demographic imbalence present, the Qing dynasty ceased to exist thanks to groups like the Tongmenghui being bolstered by said disenfranchised young men embittered at their unlikely ability to get a wife and thus leave a family heritage- which was VERY important in China and to a lesser extent is even today- and who were ginned up against the "babylonian" Manchus and their concubines).
2. Technology: The Chinese are not the only ones who are modernizing; while the Chinese have been building the PLN and upgunning and enlargening the PLA, the Indians have been doing the same. As mentioned in the article above, they have already entered into a naval arms race against the Chinese in the Indian and (to a lesser extent) Pacific Oceans, and they have already made some advancements in that area to catching up with the PLN. To say nothing of plans to expand the Indian ground and air forces and modernize them. And with a population growing into the forseeble future and increasing capital investment, they will probably have the monetary and human resources to do so, and they will- if all remains relatively constant- outstrip the PRC in at most two decades.
3. The Western Factor. India has unsurprisingly begun to attract Western notice and aid as a possible alternative to India, which is likely to only increase as time goes on. Which will readily strengthen India's hand and weaken China's. The demographic decline of much of the West (especially Europe) in the meantime will likely be offset by Indian growth, to say nothing of advanced technology. Just like Putin acted before Georgia could call on NATO when most of the world was distracted with the Summer Olympics in Beijing, it is likely Beijing will seek to stop an already formidible India from getting too closely tied to the West to the point where an attack on India would mobilize the West. To say nothing of the bleeding away of Chinese strength as time goes on.
In short: delay benefits India, not China. And if Beijing waits too long, New Dehli may well overshadow it.
"and frankly, again, China doesn't have the military power, in terms of mobility and logistics."
Again, I think you underestimate Chinese military capacity. They may not have units capable of deploying anywhere in the world in a day's time like the US does, but they are logistically mobile and capable in their own right. Again, it is worth noting that the vast majority of their regular and "professional reserve" army is in fact made of mobile divisions (Mech, Mot, Armor, etc), but they still train on foot and their marches are something few nations indeed would do without Human Rights complaints being filed. In addition, while the Chinese countryside is unlikely to offer quite the same level of support it did in the Japanese invasion and the Chinese Civil War, it is quite likely to do so on some level, and if need be those Chinese units without sufficient vehicle support will likely revert to Napoleonic tactics and forage as they go. It will hardly be nice and will likely be disorganized and costly, but the Chinese military and the disciplinarians (many of whom could be mistaken for the Commisars of old) will likely keep the effective strength of the Chinese military fairly high at least in the early phases.
"yes, but this is true of all nations and civilizations, modern or ancient."
Not really anywhere near "all." Again, you underestimate exactly how much direct power is valued. Most anchient Empires (particularly the further back you get towards the Fertile Crescent states) and many modern ones simply trust direct control far more than indirect influence. And where indirect influence is leveraged, it often morphs into direct control (see the colonial histories of the majority of India, Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and the Far East). Historically, in fact, states tend to really only hedge upon indirect influence to large degrees if they need to compete in a tight race or when they are dealing with a state of comparative or greater strength. The Bismarckean Empire and the modern Chinese government are rather similar in as much as they have the misfortune (granted, to some extent of their own making, though far moreso in the case of the former) to be right smack dab in the relative center of a rather large number of nations that do not particularly like them and which can to some extent unite against them. The exceptions in this case would be the semi-satilities of Burma and North Korea and possibly Vietnam and Russia (depending on just what kind of mood Hanoi and Moscow are in). As such, they can really not risk stepping out directly too far unless they are ready to throw the dice and cross the Rubicon. As such, they tend to try and find allies away from home to help keep non-lcoal actors tied up and thus strategically immobilized from use against them. The Germans did it with the Cuba Memorandum that effectively popped a large sign to Latin America that anybody who wanted to give it to the US would recieve straight from the Kaiserreich. And while China is not that open as of yet that we are in any place to know about, their alliances with the Sudanese regime, Venezuela, and Cuba fit that pattern quite well.
"China much more resembles Russia than Germany."
I disagree. It is more like India is Russia. Russia at the outbreak of WWI was a growing power recovering its strength from the defeat in Manchuria. Delay benefitted them, as shown by the "1916" cutoff date the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership was floating around. More time increased its strategic power, not decreased it. In contrast, China is Germany as both were in races against time: delay only further weakened them as the development of their rivals and their increasingly tight-nit relations closed the window of oppertunity in which they could strike and realistically hope to win, while at the same time both were very powerful nations, at least being VERY strong runner-ups for (if not actually THE) most powerful nation in the region.
"If anything, China is a stabalizing force in the region, maybe not in terms of US interests, but they are the only nation who some of the most dangerous rogue states will talk to."
No nation is truly a permanent stabilizing or destabilizing force. For instance, one could make a DAMN good case that Bismarck was a very stabilizing influence in Europe by definitively squashing and incorporating the various German states which had been warring for a very large chunk of recorded history while devising various treaties and alliance systems that helped (temporarily) insure peace in Europe. The problem is that Bismarck's own actions and character helped make the breakdown of that peace all but inevitable by his relative grandstanding, his (fairly moderate, admittedly) desires for overseas colonies, doing to the future Wilhelm II what we would now call "Child Abuse," (which doubtless didn't help his pre-existing mental... issues) and perhaps most crucial of all: crippling the Democratic organs of Germany while empowering the military to effectively act unbound by the law.
China, in my humble opinion, seems to be drifting that way as Chinese demographic power starts to march towards decline and the various rivals at her borders start to unite to counter what they alone cannot. And talk with rouge states has often been overrated (see the entire NK nuke saga, which wlll make you wonder whether to laugh or cry), and by all accounts the Chinese have been perpetuating some of these crisises by arming said rogue states (North Korea in particular is a very good example of this).
"Chinese pressure almost certainly is as persuasive as MAD in keeping Kim from dramatically escalating the conflict with the south."
But there are ways other than nuclear fire to try and expand one's influence. Particularly since the vast majority of involved parties would not be eager to get the stigma of being the first nation to drop the 3rd nuclear strike in history and to open the way for nuclear exchanges in the modern world starting with (presumably) the return strike that will render the offender and those within a few miles radius into either ashes or dust (some truly unhinged parties like the kookier terrorists might be exceptions but they are unlikely to have the resources in the near future).
And besides, however crazed the Kims are, they want to conquer South Korea, not destroy it (directly at least). Which means that conventional military action is possible. To say nothing of the threats of the suspected power struggle up North and possible missteps.
"argh, this is going to be too long, i'll finish the last part in another post"
I feel your pain. Sorry for the rant.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Perhaps, but I feel it shows NEEDED paranoia....
And again, I believe it understates the point.
I'd disagree.
We can both probably agree that China isn't going to pose a military threat to the US or Europe for a long time, however, as far as a threat to their major local rivals, I just don't see it. Especially in the terms of the carnage seen in WW1.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
But for how long? [will japan be a rival power to china?]
actually, I agree with most of what you said entirely. I think you might have misunderstood my point. It wasn't necessarily that China was weaker than most of their neighbours, just that there isn't a colossal gap between them.
It is also worth mentioning that the advantage Japan has over China, that you agreed to at least, is in terms of air superiority. This just happens to be the hallmark of conventional modern warfare.
I will concede this, no nation on the planet, minus maybe russia and america [nuclear superiority], could invade mainland china and hope to succeed. The asymmetric warfare would be far too intense
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
is to fight until a very painful draw.
I think with most of these we might just be arguing different sides of the same coin. While we can talk about how painful a war against China would be for Japan, India, Russia, etc, we also have to admit that such a war would almost certainly cause the end of the already tenuous [in areas] grasp of the CCP on the population. In terms of economic and material tolls on the Chinese nation, it would essentially cause a collapse. I know you talk about this with Russia's need for good ties with other nations, but even a slight reduction of trade with America would destabalize the Chinese economy, which requires absurd rates of annual growth to work.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Russia is likewise suffering from a major population decline: their male population (the part of the population that does most of the building, fighting, killing, and dying in war) has an ALE that is not even 60 years, which is below the world average. And when we factor out lovely places like the Sudan and Burma, it is still far below the average of most industrialized nations. This might not be so terrible were it not for the fact that the population has already fallen over 1.5 % from its hight just a scant 16 years ago. In contrast, the Chinese have experienced continuous population growth for the past several decades- up to an additional 4% every decade-, hence the entire "One Child Policy." And this graph gets even more skewed when you compare the Russian male population to the Chinese male one, whereup the former has nowhere near enough and the latter has far, FAR too many (the infamous "Bare Branches" or- more risquely- "Bare Sticks"😉. In short, the Russians would face great difficulties replenishing their lost men, because the stereotype of the endless Russian hordes is long gone. Consider this: while the Chinese and Indians are perhaps predictable, and the North Koreans might be guessworthy, did you know that the Vietnamese, Iranians, and South Koreans both field more active troops than the Russians have (Active and Reserves) but together?
While interesting, I don't really see population demographics or ary size as being as deterministic in these as you do.
Probably the best example of this is the British empire, who during their height in the late 1700s, had a fighting force only a fraction of the size of most other European empires. Their training and tactics made them so efficent that the man-power difference was irrelevant.
It is worth mentioning that among the weaker nations you list, with maybe the exception of NK & SK [which makes sense imho, they are technically still at war], Russian military technology would clearly make up for the difference in numbers. lol, most are using Russian technology that Russia itself abandoned generations ago.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
While I am sure Moscow could scrape together people to fight, that strategy only works as long as there are people- preferably fit young men- to scrape together. And even if we were to assume that somehow the Russians mobilize every one of their reserves, throw all their men into battle, and are joined by the entire militaries of Serbia, Montenegro, and (for the hell of it) Iran for some strange reason, the Chinese forces concentrated on the Siberian border (from our last knowledge of them) would STILL outnumber them by nearly 2-1? And that this number discounts the extremely likely reinforcements from elsewhere and the other military services (Navy, Air Force, etc)?
Yes, but these forces would be essentially stationary targets for far superior Russia air-craft and likely artillery.
Such a conflict would obviously have catastrophic results, but I hardly think it is unquestionable that China would overwhelm the Russia military.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
And while you later mention Chinese military modernization (which has indeed run into several snags) the Russians do not have nearly enough modern equipment to arm themselves. And the defenders in Siberia would hardly be at the top of the Kremlin's priority list. And that also means that equipment losses would be very difficult to replace.
of course, but, the equipment that Russia can field is superior to that of the Chinese, especially in terms of air supremecy.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
And before we talk about the nuclear issue, don't think anybody would be interested in using it: the Russians will NEED foreign goodwill to even survive, and turning Beijing into an atomic crater is unlikely to get it. And they probably do not want to make their population problems any worse by provoking a Chinese response.
I'll give you the point about Russia not wanting to use their nuclear arsenal, but the idea that, in nuclear conflict, China could stand against Russia, is absurd.
I'm sure you know, nuclear warfare is much different than just aiming your missiles at another nation. There is a huge strategy involved in how to send your missiles in waves, how to target enemy nuclear and military command-and-control, etc. Because of the cold war, only two nations really have this infrastructure built up.
Even the Chinese military position on nuclear warfare is more defensive than aggressive. They hope to have an arsenal that could do significant damage on a counter-attack to prevent a first strike against them. However, it is certainly debateable as to whether Russia has the power to eliminate their response capabilities with a first strike, and my thoughts are that they probably could. Even now, China is working to further entrench some of their bunkers to be less vulnerable to nuclear sites, but the Russians have been designing first strike plans against a far more nuclearly threatening target for 50+ years.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
And the Chinese have fairly little reason to do so either, given their conventional superiority, the need to remain on somewhat neutral terms with their clients/debetors/creditors/etc.
we might be able to agree on "conventional numerical superiority", however, we clearly don't agree on how much of a factor this would be.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
In short, neither Russia and Japan have the practical capacity to fight a battle against Beijing with almost any chance of victory or even a slightly favorable stalemate, particularly in a protracted fight. Their main hope in a showdown with Beijing is to act as part of a fairly broad alliance against China.
again, I think we are arguing the same point, if just reversed. China also does not have the military power for anything close to a clear victory over these nations. Their internal problems, at the very least, nearly ensure their government would collapse in the event of total war.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
And they were mostly right, albiet some of our knowledge that that was true was from hindsight. Only the French and Brits could really match their quality mano-on-mano and the British regulars were pathetically understrength and after 1914 effectively dissolved, and the French suffered from hubris and irrational focus on Alsace-Lorraine. Had the Germans gotten into an isolated war with pretty much any nation, they almost certainly would have won. And even when opposed by an alliance covering most of the world, they still came chillingly close to victory. Even one of Berlin's greatest strategic worries (the infamous Russian steamroller) proved to be a paper tiger in East Prussia and Poland. And while I am a Western Allied Fanboy (for lack of a more appropriate term), I must admit that the failure to conquer Paris was by no means a forgone conclusion and indeed was the sum of several major and minor errors during the campaign, amongst them the gross underestimation of the BEF and the Belgians and the resulting inadaquate preparation to deal with them, the attempt by the 1st and 2nd armies to try to pocket and crush the main French army, and the fact that logisticially the Germans underestimated the need to care for their horses. And while the conquest of Paris likely would not have led to a 1940-esque fiasco or even force much of a further Western Allied retreat, it certainly could not have been good and possibly (POSSIBLY) might have changed the course of the war and maybe even its outcome.
fair enough. We can probably agree that such plans, like the failed Blitzkrieg of Paris, might show that German generals did underestimate their opponents, they probably were the dominant local power.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
1. No they didn't. The uniforms were fairly showy, but not overwhelmingly gaudy and were actually fairly functional. The Franch are the main perpetrators of that particular error, and that was due to the underestimated demand which resulted in new recruits and reserves being sent off in paradeware.
lol, thats pretty amazing
however, I sort of meant in terms of "relative to the german forces"
They had learned about more camo-esque attire from earlier conflicts in the 20th century, and had much more appropriate combat fatigues.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
2. No they didn't. WWI may have been bloody and frustratingly static, but neither side were THAT stupid. They didn't make that particular mistake for long after the Marne. They made all new ones, certainly, but they learned from their mistakes comparatively well, particularly on the cutthroat Western front.
you seem to know more about this stuff than me, so I might not get the nuance between one type of "run into their artillery and machine guns" versus another, but it really wasn't until the Somme that the British started changing their tactics to something more appropriate to the battlefield.
For the french it was enen longer. Their generals were still talking about glorious calvary charges in late 1916. Sure, some of their generals had better tactics even in the early stages of the conflict, but the Imperial mindset of glorious victory was apparent into the later stages of the conflict on the french side. Hell, even their perverse desire to hold meaningless medieval fortresses was anachronistic.
Even then, iirc, it was the Germans who first introduced the moblie, small unit tactics that eventually became the standard anti-artillery strategy.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
In a prlonged war? Absolutely. Hell, the fact that by within a few months prior to their collapse after fighting a very broad alliance for roughly three years they could still have concievably won the land war should testify to that. The only real doubt is regarding a naval war versus Britain, but without a foothold on the mainland, it is doubtful the British could harm German production enough to prevent Berlin from building enough ships and eventually breaking out into the Atlantic.
ok, true enough, though we shouldn't forget how potent the British naval blockade of Germany was. The 'turnip winter' and all that, the famine was one of the most important issues in the propoganda against the vymar republic and socialist/jew traitors who sold out the war cause.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Perhaps against the USN or a fairly large combined Western navy, but their naval size is bigger than most maritime nations put together, and they have long outshown historical naval powers like France and Britain. They are hardly like the Japanese or Russians, much less the Italians or Scandinavians....
Which is largely bunk and what you would call a "polite untruth." Chinese shipping as Chinese rarely going far beyond the Suez or Panamanian canals and navally they are followed pretty much everywhere they go by light elements of the PLN or the armed merchant marine. They rarely go any further because usually they transfer the goods to another ship (almost always non-Chinese), at which point it becomes "Somebody else's problem." The PLN is hardly understrength for its current roles, and what deficiencies there are will probably be dead some once the naval buildup is finished.
Ok, I might have used the wrong military term. By defense, I meant exactly what you are talking about in the second paragraph.
There are certain straights and what have you in SE Asia that a good number of Chinese imports and exports pass through. Obviously they are looking for naval stregth to control these passages, especially against someone like the USN.
Maybe not win against them in open conflict, but certainly be able to protect what it sees as its economic interests against the nation that seems most likely to try and pressure the Chinese through these straights. It would be like if America couldn't control the Panama Canal or if Canada couldn't control the north-west passage.... actually, scrap that last one, lol
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Touche. Good show. Here is perhaps the most through I can find regarding
said implications and the highly likely non-defensive assets that would be avalible to the PLN because of this naval buildup drive.
I skimmed it, but I don't see anything that conclusively points to the PLN having goals of a offensively minded policy.
I guess arguably all military expendature can have offensive and defensive capacities, but even looking at their nuclear program, their newly developed anti-sattalite missiles and their cyber-warfare program, it appears that they are developing, primarily defensive measures to exploit weaknesses in western and primarily American military capabilities.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
They are working on those, and that ignores the strong likelyhood of purchasing them on the open market.
true, but their military lacks certain abilities to extend its influence without them.
For instance, a prolonged blockade of any Russian/Indian economic interest would require one, as certainly would any invasion of Japan.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
As Lord Fisher of the RN said "a fifty year [naval] gap can be closed in fifteen years tops, five if blessed by God." And this was from an era where naval ships still had to be effectively build from the bottom up each time with slightly new designs, in contrast to the comparatively automatic and factory-line production avalible today, which (factoring in the far greater technological gap and the need to furnish ships today with all the "necessary toys" to borrow from Bond) probably breaks about even. If the Chinese are hungary enough for naval superiority, they will get it fairly quickly on a peacetime level. To say nothing of the possibility of dedicated wartime manufacturing.
I'm getting that figure from and American DoD representative talking about China's navy on, i believe part 2 of 4 in the BBC podcast documentary "China's Long Arm". My thoughts are that they would have accounted for these things, but if they are incorrect then I am also.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Eh, more or less I was simplifying the matter, but it held a grain of truth: the Reichstag tried several times to limit the power of the German military during the interbellum and a few even tried it late in WWI, only for Bismarck's constitution and the "Bayonet veto" the military won from its role in 1848 meant such challenges fell largely stillborn. And at the very end, there was a fair amount of clashing even between the Kaiser and the OHL, though most of it took place behind the scenes.
no, totally, the famine had taken its toll on the people, and left of center groups in the government tried to negotiate peace, but even at the end of the war, the German people still thought their army was powerful and felt betrayed by those who had sold them into defeat.
But prior to the war, the german people were almost unanimously behind the effort.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
In the short run? Probably. But that does not mean that:A. It might not happen in the future after Central Asia and other "soft targets" have already been taken, and
ha, lets see them deal with a modern asymmetric battlefield before we talk about their motivations after that.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
B. It doesn't mean that something might not push them over the edge.
of course not. This could be true of modern germany as well though
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
To a point. However, even when they have abandoned some of their allies, they have been quite willing to cultivate new ones (the Sudan, Vietnam, Cuba, and Venezuela to name but the frontrunners). And if one-onehundreth of one percent of the rumors I have heard have any basis in reality, they haven't completely given up on 'The Cause of Mao!' (TM), and if and when relations sour (and they are more likely to do so than not) they are likely to fall back.
sure, there might be some reminant support, but this is in stark contrast to their policy even 25-30 years ago, where they openly supported any group in the region who looked for it. For instance, while some Hawks may claim it, I looked through Google, and could find nothing that supports the idea that China is supporting the Maoists in India any longer, who were longtime subordinates to China.
Your point about them cultivating alliances is also true, but extends to all the powers we are talking about. The past 10 years have seen huge improvements in sino-india relations, unseen since the revolution. While tepid, relations between Japan and China also are increasing. In fact, I tried ioncorpoate this into my 4 critiques, China is interested in being a global citizen, it doesn't want the type of war that would occur if it invaded any of the local players in the region.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Meh, yes and no. While Berlin certainly DID want a 'Place In The SUN!' (TM), the only power they were explicitly gunning for (as in actively stoking conflict with) until about the decade prior to the war was (surpisingly) the US (as per the Cuba Memorandum of 1898), and from what we know now after some shifting in the archieves they were fairly happy about the Status Quo in Europe as long as it allowed Germany to expand its political and military power and possibly even peaceibly bring the rest of Europe into line via ecconomics and buy its way into colonial domiance....
...Agreed wholeheartedly, as shown by the saberrattling and various war plans that had been thrown around beforehand and the irrationally fanatical line Vienna took at Berlin's encouragement. However, one thing that should be remembered is that (as war is diplomacy by 'other means'😉, had the Entente caved, the Central Powers would have been all too happy to take their spoils and go home even at this late date, as they would have gained a strategic victory without bloodshed. These men may have been unsavory to the core and more than a little bit evil but they were not completley insane. Which is something many forget when dealing with tyrants and megalomaniacs.
touche
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Hardly. Particularly in a war of any protracted length. In living memory they fought us to a draw in Korea, gave crucial aid to the VM/VC that eventually helped them win the Indochina Wars (if primarily diplomatically/psychologically), made good progress against the NVA later, easily absorbed Tibet and Xinjiang, kicked the KMT off several of their Islands, have supported rebels in India, Nepal, Indochina, Afghanistan, governments from the Sudan to Venezuela, and have amassed the largest standing military on the face of Earth (barring the international cat conspiracy, of course). If they seriously- and I mean seriously, as in even 1951 Korea seriously or even higher- went after any of their minor neighbors and those minor neigbors did not recieve considerable and direct outside aid, they would do little more than get plowed under.
the Chinese army doesn't strike me as one that would do well against an anti-foreigner insurgency.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
I wish. They've been skirmishing with the Indians to this day over the MacMahon Line and they outnumber any possible single enemy by a considerable margain save PERHAPS India or the US. In addition, the Chinese military is mostly composed of mobile divisions (Mechanized, Motorized, Armor, etc), and their preformance and time are on par with or above most of the world.
interesting, I get a lot of my info from places comparing china in terms of US strength, so I might be off on this.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Hardly. Case example # 1 is India, which I will get into later, but if US military advancement and demography continues apace, they will likewise fall behind. To say nothing about the entire demographic fiasco of the "Broken Branches", which means that China is going to demographically loose pace with everybody save those who are demographically worse than they are (notably both Japan and Russia), and ecconomically they have already suffered several kicks to the shin.
I really don't consider America a competing local power with China though
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
1.
2.
3.
oh totally, the article is retarded
and actually, I agree with your assessment entirely. I've long said that investment in India is going to pay off, in the long run, better than in China, because as the world's producer of goods, the Chinese economy will destroy itself and gets bigger, because factories will move to places where the people aren't rich enough to demand workers rights.
In terms of domestic resources, they are in need dramatically, and problems with internal security are almost as bad as India's, though I would argue that India's Maoist, Sikh and Muslim insurrections are much less of a threat to national stability as are the various Muslim and ethnic revolts in China.
However, as in today, China is still growing faster than India, and prudent internal policy might help them maintain this, but no, I agree with you, India will eventually out-perform China.
so, I concede that, conditionally, China may have a window of opportunity against India, but that sort of assumes that China has a chance now, and frankly, I don't think China could win a descisive victory against India.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
Again, I think you underestimate Chinese military capacity. They may not have units capable of deploying anywhere in the world in a day's time like the US does, but they are logistically mobile and capable in their own right. Again, it is worth noting that the vast majority of their regular and "professional reserve" army is in fact made of mobile divisions (Mech, Mot, Armor, etc), but they still train on foot and their marches are something few nations indeed would do without Human Rights complaints being filed. In addition, while the Chinese countryside is unlikely to offer quite the same level of support it did in the Japanese invasion and the Chinese Civil War, it is quite likely to do so on some level, and if need be those Chinese units without sufficient vehicle support will likely revert to Napoleonic tactics and forage as they go. It will hardly be nice and will likely be disorganized and costly, but the Chinese military and the disciplinarians (many of whom could be mistaken for the Commisars of old) will likely keep the effective strength of the Chinese military fairly high at least in the early phases.
however, the majority of that equipment is still outdated. Maybe I do underestimate their abilities in general, but I still don't feel they would be very effective against modern military powers such as India.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
I disagree. It is more like India is Russia. Russia at the outbreak of WWI was a growing power recovering its strength from the defeat in Manchuria. Delay benefitted them, as shown by the "1916" cutoff date the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership was floating around. More time increased its strategic power, not decreased it. In contrast, China is Germany as both were in races against time: delay only further weakened them as the development of their rivals and their increasingly tight-nit relations closed the window of oppertunity in which they could strike and realistically hope to win, while at the same time both were very powerful nations, at least being VERY strong runner-ups for (if not actually THE) most powerful nation in the region.
I understand why you make the comparison, and it works, other than to say, I don't think there is any indication that China sees themselves as having a "window" against India, be it because India is already strong enough to defend itself or that China is in the midst of attempting substantial internal reform.
Germany DID think it would destroy Russia, and probably could have, Russia's rail system was completely inadequate, in 1914, to field the troops necessary to defeat the Germans, and lacked the equipment to do so anyways (russia artillery being hugely inferior to the Germans).
Largely, I don't think the presence of two powers demands that they will exist in conflict. For all observers, save those who think every word from the CCP is a blatant lie, China is open to the world in terms of national diplomacy, even countries we in the West shy away from. I don't think a powerful India scares them, so long as trade and other forms of normalization continue, which it seems they will.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
No nation is truly a permanent stabilizing or destabilizing force. For instance, one could make a DAMN good case that Bismarck was a very stabilizing influence in Europe by definitively squashing and incorporating the various German states which had been warring for a very large chunk of recorded history while devising various treaties and alliance systems that helped (temporarily) insure peace in Europe. The problem is that Bismarck's own actions and character helped make the breakdown of that peace all but inevitable by his relative grandstanding, his (fairly moderate, admittedly) desires for overseas colonies, doing to the future Wilhelm II what we would now call "Child Abuse," (which doubtless didn't help his pre-existing mental... issues) and perhaps most crucial of all: crippling the Democratic organs of Germany while empowering the military to effectively act unbound by the law.
lol, I hardly got the impression that you were such a relativist 😛
you are totally right, for all China does to stabalize things now, who knows what will happen in the future. All I'm saying, and I'll expand where you talk about NK, is that China has some influence that it isn't necessarily using to destroy the world. It doesn't want war on its boarders, and while this might empower modern and future dicators to oppress their public while also placating to Beijing's interests, it prevents nations from outright violence against eachother. I don't know if I think this is better, but I do know I prefer Burma the way it is today versus the Burma that has eyes on other East Asian territory.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
China, in my humble opinion, seems to be drifting that way as Chinese demographic power starts to march towards decline and the various rivals at her borders start to unite to counter what they alone cannot. And talk with rouge states has often been overrated (see the entire NK nuke saga, which wlll make you wonder whether to laugh or cry), and by all accounts the Chinese have been perpetuating some of these crisises by arming said rogue states (North Korea in particular is a very good example of this).
But these alliances on China's borders are not really there. China is trying to be diplomatic with all of its neighbours. This doesn't mean they do what the US wants, but it has deliberatly been trying in the past 10-15 years to improve its relations with its neighbours and descalate boarder disputes and traditional grievences it has.
otherwise, don't get me wrong. I'm not a china supporter by any means. I don't think their rise is going to destabalize the way the modern world works, or plunge us into warfare, but I can offer as critical a look at chinese policiy if you want. However, my only remark here is that arming NK, while proposterous, happened during a different time in China's government (for instance, China is not helping Burma get a bomb), and, in terms of the discussion we are having, didn't start a war. It might have prevented further NATO engagement, but that is counter-factual history.
Originally posted by Tortoise Herder
But there are ways other than nuclear fire to try and expand one's influence. Particularly since the vast majority of involved parties would not be eager to get the stigma of being the first nation to drop the 3rd nuclear strike in history and to open the way for nuclear exchanges in the modern world starting with (presumably) the return strike that will render the offender and those within a few miles radius into either ashes or dust (some truly unhinged parties like the kookier terrorists might be exceptions but they are unlikely to have the resources in the near future).And besides, however crazed the Kims are, they want to conquer South Korea, not destroy it (directly at least). Which means that conventional military action is possible. To say nothing of the threats of the suspected power struggle up North and possible missteps.
actually, your second paragraph was what I was responding to. I don't think too many people would argue that SK would hold out long against the full brunt of a NK assault, and more than America protecting the South Koreans, I think China has influenced the North Koreans away from further warfare out of sheer desire for self preservation. The longer a Korean war goes on, the harder it gets for China, who is destabalized by the economic effort of supporting the NK and having a huge conflict at its boarders, versus NATO, who get the advantage of fighting a conventional war on someone else's property.
but no, NK wont nuke SK for so many reasons
HOLY SHIT!
I got about 3/4 the way through this two-way discussion. It was interesting and passed the time.
Basically, half of Russia's military capability (minus nukes from either side) is more than enough to completely crush China with minimal losses.
China is not as militarily minded as other western nations are. I do see an economic bubble popping, but it looks like the Chinese government is taking slight measures to curb or reduce the severity of such a bubble bursting (for example, trying to make amends on their currency devaluation.)
I wonder what would happen to the US if we cut our military budget in half and invested that half into social programs? (a tangent...I know)
China definitely cannot afford* a significant military conflict, especially at it's borders: it would be damaging to their controlled "explosive economic growth." The extent of that damage could vary depending on the international communities interpretation of the holder of the moral high-ground.
*Afford as in, it would damage their current economic goals of growth.
just to add as proof of china's policy of openness:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100629/wl_asia_afp/taiwanchinatrade
while it might be a tentative first step, china is clearly trying to end traditional grievances rather than escalate local conflict