Originally posted by Adam_PoE
Your argument attempts to justify unplugging oneself from the famous unconscious violinist by characterizing doing so as a form of passive euthanasia, without realizing that in many instances, abortion can be characterized this way as well.
The acceptability of one form of euthanasia or another does not affect the moral obligation of one to the famous unconscious violinist.
You cannot have it both ways. The woman has a moral obligation to the life of the fetus the moment you concede that you have a moral obligation to the famous unconscious violinist.
You probably could have read the definition of "parasite," and saved yourself the trouble of arguing that in "a strictly biological sense, an infant is a parasite," when it does not feed, grow, or is [b]sheltered inside another organism.[/b]
No one argued that personhood stops when one does not exhibit characteristics of personhood. To the contrary, it is being argued that the sentient fox, the mute townspeople, and the comatose person in your examples [b]are persons, and that a fetus is not.[/b]
And, a better question is, when does personhood begin? An infant surely doesn't display the qualities of personhood. Simply because it has a human appearance the ability to gain the qualities of being a person surely doesn't make it a person.
In this instance, killing the infant would not be wrong, because it would coincide with "nature taking its course," remember? "Passive euthanasia."
Originally posted by FeceMan
In what cases would these be?
In cases like the one I cited in my previous post.
Originally posted by FeceMan
You're right. It doesn't affect the idea of moral obligation. However, in order to compare abortion to the violinist analogy, one must use a more accurate form of "disconnecting" from the violinist. With this in mind, certainly people would object to the violinist being "terminated" in this fashion, overriding the moral obligation (or lack thereof) to the violinist.
If the acceptability of the termination of life does not affect the moral obligation of one to the life of another, then why do you continue to argue the point?
Originally posted by FeceMan
So you are saying that a woman NEVER has a moral obligation to the fetus? Not even if she has in vitro fertilization and then decides that she doesn't want a baby, so she is allowed to kill it?
Are you saying that you do not have a moral obligation to the famous unconcious violinist?
Originally posted by FeceMan
Except that parasites are harmful to their hosts, while reproduction is certainly not harmful in the long run.
[list=1][*]Parasites are not necessarily harmful to the host, they simply contribute nothing to its survival.
[*]The phrase, "died in childbirth," does not exist because it only happened one or two times.
[*]The point is that you miscategorized an infant as a parasite to further your argument, when an infant does not qualify as a parasite.[/list]
Originally posted by FeceMan
But what I'm asking is WHY they continue to be persons. Why, when they no longer exhibit characteristics of personhood, do they not lose their status of being persons? Why is personhood permanent? The comatose person, if one does a checklist of characteristics defining personhood like one does when evaluating the status of a fetus, is not a person.
Why are you asking for an answer to a question that no one asked, and to a point that no one argued?
Originally posted by FeceMan
And, a better question is, when does personhood begin? An infant surely doesn't display the qualities of personhood. Simply because it has a human appearance the ability to gain the qualities of being a person surely doesn't make it a person.
A beating heart and electrical brainwave activity aside, personhood begins the moment one is no longer growing, feeding, and being sheltered inside another organism.
Originally posted by FeceMan
I said that implanting the infant would "ensure its survival" not that it would surely die without being implanted. However, the infant has become a parasite, so why would it be wrong to kill it?
The conrapositive of which is endanger, imperil, or jeopardize, etc. The point is that without medical intervention, the infant will die. By your reasoning, any termination of life that coincides with "nature taking its course" is a form of passive euthanasia and therefore, acceptable.
Originally posted by Adam_PoE
In cases like the one I cited in my previous post.If the acceptability of the termination of life does not affect the moral obligation of one to the life of another, then why do you continue to argue the point?
Are you saying that you do not have a moral obligation to the famous unconcious violinist?
[list=1][*]Parasites are not necessarily harmful to the host, they simply contribute nothing to its survival.[*]The phrase, "died in childbirth," does not exist because it only happened one or two times.
[*]The point is that you miscategorized an infant as a parasite to further your argument, when an infant does not qualify as a parasite.[/list]
2. Be that as it may, reproduction is largely beneficial--like surgery. Some may die while undergoing it, but it is, overall, so incredibly helpful that we could (literally) not live without it.
3. I was under the impression that you were categorizing an infant as a parasite.
Why are you asking for an answer to a question that no one asked, and to a point that no one argued?
A beating heart and electrical brainwave activity aside, personhood begins the moment one is no longer growing, feeding, and being sheltered inside another organism.
The conrapositive of which is endanger, imperil, or jeopardize, etc. The point is that without medical intervention, the infant will die. By your reasoning, any termination of life that coincides with "nature taking its course" is a form of passive euthanasia and therefore, acceptable.
Originally posted by FeceMan
Because the acceptability overrules whether or not one has a moral obligation.
There is no relationship between the acceptability of the termination of life, and the moral obligation of one to the life of another, e.g. capital punishment is regarded as acceptable, but it does not follow from this that it is morally right. You even admitted as much:
Originally posted by FeceMan
You're right. It doesn't affect the idea of moral obligation.
Originally posted by FeceMan
Answer my question.
I did answer your question, "The woman has a moral obligation to the life of the fetus the moment you concede that you have a moral obligation to the famous unconscious violinist."
Now answer mine, "Are you saying that you do not have a moral obligation to the famous unconscious violinist?"
Originally posted by FeceMan
Be that as it may, reproduction is largely beneficial--like surgery. Some may die while undergoing it, but it is, overall, so incredibly helpful that we could (literally) not live without it.
Beneficial to whom? It is certainly not beneficial to the woman who dies in childbirth, which is whom this argument is concerned with.
Originally posted by FeceMan
I was under the impression that you were categorizing an infant as a parasite.
I never mentioned infants. To the contrary, you miscategorized an infant as a parasite to further your argument:
Originally posted by FeceMan
From a strictly biological sense, an infant is a parasite. It suckles from the mother, steals time and energy from her, and gives nothing in returns, save for its existence. Thus, an infant should be allowed to be exterminated with this school of thought.
Not to mention that this commits the logic fallacy of False Analogy, as it draws a conclusion between two relevantly dissimilar things, i.e. a fetus and an infant; the definitional fallacy of Too Broad, as it includes terms that should not be included, i.e. it includes infants among parasites; the logic fallacy of Prejudicial Language, as it attaches a value to believing the proposition, i.e. equating a fetus to a parasite is morally wrong; the logic fallacy of Appeal to Emotion, as it appeals to emotions or psychological factors in place of support, i.e. it equates abortion to infanticide; and the logic fallacy of Straw Man, as it attacks an argument which is different from the argument I presented, i.e. the right of a woman to bodily integrity is more stringent than the right to life of a fetus.
Originally posted by FeceMan
Because I want to know the answer?
Is that a statement or a question?
Originally posted by FeceMan
Why doesn't it start when one exhibits characteristics of being a person?
Who determines what qualifies as "exhibiting characteristics of personhood?" It is simply not an objective criterion.
Originally posted by FeceMan
And why does it start when the stops growing/feeding/being sheltered inside another organism?
So long as an organism is growing, feeding, and being sheltered inside another organism, it is an extension of the host, and therefore, dependent upon the will of the host to allow it to live.
Originally posted by FeceMan
That's true. Refusing the infant treatment would be acceptable. However, an infant lacks an advance directive or DNR, so it's likely that the doctors would not refuse it treatment.
If the termination of life that coincides with "nature taking its course" is acceptable, then why do you continue to argue the point?